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Mark Maguire and Ursula Rao
Tricksters or fakes, assistants or ’toons, they are the exemplars of the 
coming community.
 — Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community
In this volume, we propose that evidence is a key problem in the contempo-
rary moment. Today, evidence- based knowledge is everywhere in demand. 
Indeed, one sees a veritable obsession with measurement, quantification and 
verification in areas as diverse as medical science, government decision mak-
ing, global finance and security policy (see Merry 2011). Disturbingly, even 
the so- called Islamic State issued periodic corporate reports with metrics and 
key performance indicators, including the number of “knife murders” and 
“apostates run over” (Shore and Wright 2015, 440). Yet, at the same time, com-
mentators suggest that this is the age of uncertainty, the post-truth era.1 Thus, 
between the demand for evidence- based knowledge and the widespread anxi-
ety that the truth is not what it used to be, we find shifting relations of cause 
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and effect, fact and falsehood, the observable and the occluded. We explore 
these shifting relations in security contexts.
In this volume, we focus on security contexts because problems of evi-
dence are acute there and thus available for critical reflection. We discuss 
“bodies as evidence” as a way to explore biometric identification, borders and 
migration control, forensic knowledge, policing, and counterterrorism. By at-
tending to bodies as evidence, we show how security discourses and practices 
target the body while also contributing to emergent configurations of knowl-
edge and power. This volume, then, provides anthropological perspectives on 
the great technical, scientific, and expert efforts that characterize the drive to 
know and manage the complexities of security in the contemporary moment.
Of course, evidence has always been a problem in contexts of security 
and insecurity and especially in situations when political power must justify 
the use of force. Today, when so- called realists attempt to excuse imperial-
ism, they often turn back to Thucydides’s Melian Dialogue, which details the 
Athenian effort to secure their empire at the expense of a free society. Their 
“suspicions about the future” justified the brutal suppression of others, while 
Melian appeals for justice fell on ears attuned differently — “Your hatred is 
evidence of our power,” the Athenian diplomats explained (Thucydides 1998, 
404). Ancient Greece certainly provides us with many examples of conflicts 
that included battles over the truth, but one can find innumerable bodies of 
evidence buried throughout history. Some evidential regimes are distinctive; 
at other times, one can detect striking resemblances across cultural and his-
torical lines.2
History certainly teaches us that there is a tendency in contexts of war 
to fabricate a reality in which to act. In the nineteenth century, for example, 
British interests in Southern Africa advanced through fraudulent “conces-
sions,” carpet bagging, chicanery, and, occasionally, genocidal violence. In-
deed, historian Robert Blake (1977, 55) describes Cecil Rhodes’s annexation of 
Matabeleland as a giant episode of suppressio veri — an attack on reality itself. 
Blake’s description could serve just as well in an account of the pretext for war 
in Vietnam or the push for “regime change” Iraq. As is well known, in the 
run- up to the second Gulf War, a White House advisor (probably Karl Rove) 
dismissed journalist Ron Suskind (2004) because of his emphasis on facts and 
evidence. The White House insider explained the situation succinctly: “We 
create our own reality.”
It seems, however, that arguments about evidence are becoming even more 
pervasive today. Dictionaries declared “post- truth” the word of the year in 
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2016, but it is just one term in a constellation that includes “truthiness,” “fake 
news” and “alternative facts,” terms that suggest the erosion of long- trusted 
evidential foundations. One cannot dismiss this as a hysterical moment in 
public culture. In Russia, top Putin aid and former theater student Vladislav 
Surkov — the Kremlin’s “gray cardinal” — openly combines Orwellian ideo-
logical techniques and performance art. In Great Britain, many of the discus-
sions about Brexit politics center on a loss of faith in “experts from organiza-
tions with acronyms” (Sky News 2016). However, former White House deputy 
assistant Sebastian Gorka set out the situation in even clearer terms. During 
an interview with the bbc he explained, “We are not going to put up with 
people who believe they have a monopoly on the truth simply because they 
have sixty years of a letterhead above them” (bbc 2017).
Clearly, the recent U.S. presidential election highlighted the extraordinary 
shift in public discourse about evidence from the very outset. Anthropologist 
Maximilian Forte, one of the few public intellectuals to predict the rise of 
President Donald Trump, emphasized Trump’s theatrics during the election 
campaign: 
Trump often emerges on stage from behind a dark navy curtain. That is 
a symbolically rich move, and it is a symbolism whose deeper meaning 
and importance throws others off. . . . This is the puppet master, the 
man behind the curtain, the campaign donor and buyer of favours and 
influence, who has suddenly decided to step out into the spotlight, and to 
not only be seen but to announce his role as a former puppet master. . . . 
The move is so deeply subversive, that one has to wonder just how many 
have truly appreciated its import. (Forte 2016)
The U.S. president may be famous for his failure to reference the usual norms of 
truth telling, but as Forte realizes, his political power operates off a particular, 
if deeply authoritarian, body- evidence relationship, namely, his “authentic” 
betrayal of insider knowledge communicated to an audience who “knew it” 
all along. Evidence takes the form of a trick revealed, as if the Wizard of Oz 
pulled back his own curtain. And what becomes possible alongside theatrical 
subversion is the fabrication of a new reality. In this striking and ritualized 
political performance, then, one sees no truth per se, but, rather, “the play of 
light and shadow, truth and error, true and false, hidden and manifest, visible 
and invisible” (Foucault 2014, 17).
Commentators will surely be preoccupied with matters of evidence in poli-
tics for years to come, but here our explicit focus is on security contexts. In 
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recent years, there has been steady flow of anthropological publications on 
security. Many of the contributors to this volume have added considerably 
to this literature. Ursula Rao (e.g., 2013; see also M’charek, Hagendijk, and 
de Vries 2013) explores how security manifests itself in efforts to identify the 
human body using biometric technologies. Daniel Goldstein (2016) and Ieva 
Jusionyte (2015) study local articulations and contestations of security in their 
ethnographic work in Latin America and the United States. Gregory Feldman 
(2012) and Mark Maguire (2014) write about the security apparatuses that 
are changing policy and policing. Among others, Antonius C. G. M. Robben 
(2010), Joseph P. Masco (2014), and Joseba Zulaika (2014) examine transfor-
mations in international security and warfare and the consequences of those 
changes. In short, anthropologists have been able to track security as it shifted 
the sands under people’s feet in numerous field sites, and, from this granular 
level, they have been able to connect to broader transformations, even at the 
transnational scale.
The contributors to this volume attend to the extraordinary problems of 
evidence that manifest themselves in security contexts. Biometric security, for 
example, is precisely an effort to render the body as evidence for identification; 
and in the realm of counterterrorism, vast and shadowy security apparatuses 
scour the present and the near future for real and imagined threats. In short, 
problems of evidence are acute in security contexts, and yet, with just a few 
notable exceptions (e.g., Masco 2014), anthropologists have not dealt directly 
with evidence and security. Moreover, the contributors to this volume also 
attend to the extraordinary emphasis on the body as a source of evidence for 
and target of intervention. Bodies as Evidence moves back and forth between 
the analyses of different dimensions of the body- evidence relation. The differ-
ent chapters show how bodies become sources for the production of evidence, 
the way bodies as evidence are organized and deployed to classify, recognize, 
and manage human life itself. We describe a circular motion in which bodies 
are both the origin of evidence and the target of evidence- based interven-
tions. Rooting truth- making routines in new technologies of the body signifi-
cantly influences notions of self and other, morality and crime, security and 
threat. Which assumptions and knowledge systems underscore the making of 
new security cultures? How do they shape who we are, what we do, and how 
we perceive of ourselves as physical and social beings? Here, we offer answers 
to these important questions. However, before formulating those answers, we 
first need to explore anthropology’s approach to evidence.
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Anthropology and Evidence
It is possible to narrate the history of sociocultural anthropology as a se-
ries of battles over evidence. For example, sociocultural anthropologists of-
ten teach students that disciplinary history began when heroes from long ago 
abandoned their university armchairs to gather evidence firsthand in faraway 
fields. Franz Boas used ethnographic evidence to challenge racism and evolu-
tionism throughout his career. However, Bronislaw Malinowski’s Argonauts 
of the Western Pacific offers an even more dramatic mise- en- scène. In the 
preface, James Frazer yields his armchair to the “young science” before him; 
then Malinowski ritually dispatches his predecessor for “wholesale general-
izations” (Malinowski 1922, viii, 3). This tale of scholarly patricide centers on 
evidence, and, like all tales, much is omitted. In fact, Malinowski’s scientific 
approach to “collecting, manipulating, and fixing evidence” offers few inno-
vations (Malinowski 1922, 6; cf. Rivers 1912). Disciplinary historian George W. 
Stocking argues that the “ethnographer’s magic” was less a matter of scien-
tific evidence and more about a style of writing and narrative of adventure 
whereby “experience of the native’s experience must become the reader’s ex-
perience as well — a task that scientific analysis yielded up to literary analysis” 
(Stocking 1992, 53).
Analysis of the birth of ethnography reveals that anthropologists have long 
conflated matters of evidence and methodology. Even Matthew Engelke’s re-
cent The Objects of Evidence, one of the few anthropological volumes on this 
topic, foregrounds the following question: “How can we turn fieldwork expe-
rience — a highly personal, temporally- bound, and inter- subjective method 
for collecting data — into objects of evidence?” (Engelke 2009, 2; see also Csor-
das 2004; Hastrup 2004). Interestingly, one of the other volumes on evidence, 
How Do We Know?, is bookended by two contrasting answers to this question. 
Marilyn Strathern opens by eschewing the all- encompassing and reductive 
knowledge of other disciplines before flattering the style of analogical rea-
soning available in anthropology. However, Keith Hart concludes that the 
whole enterprise is indefensible, riddled with occult practices, and managed 
by people “who live in constant fear of being found out” (2008, 207).
Yet, social and cultural anthropology has long been open to self- criticism 
on these matters. The questions that animate recent volumes on this topic 
are also found in the contributions to James Clifford and George E. Mar-
cus’s Writing Culture, a response to the crisis of representation that swept the 
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humanities and social sciences during the 1980s in the form of postcolonial 
and feminist- inspired critiques of objectivism and the rhetoric of authority 
(e.g., Pratt 1986, 33). This was also an experimental moment, as illustrated 
by George E. Marcus’s early discussion of multi- sited ethnography and Paul 
Rabinow’s approach to studying how contemporary power and knowledge 
produce milieux or realities in which to act. In this volume, we are also inter-
ested in the bodily and evidential foundations of security reality. However, the 
question remains unanswered: what precisely is evidence in anthropology?
Battles over evidence and methodology have certainly raged throughout 
disciplinary history, but definitions have always been in short supply. The 
settlement that most anthropologists have reached is that evidence is not just 
something, a quality always- already present in the world; rather, evidence is 
also a question or argument.3 In short, it is relational, or as Thomas Csordas 
argues, “Evidence has to be of or for something” (2004, 475 [emphasis added]). 
This relational openness is important, first, because social and cultural an-
thropology tends to use the label ethnography for a rather ecumenical collec-
tion of theories and techniques, and, second, because it is difficult to operate 
using a single definition of evidence as one studies populations in which other 
(“local”) definitions obtain simultaneously. In his last major book, Anthro-
pology and History, E. E. Evans- Pritchard cast the problem of evidence in 
separate magisteria thus, “Myth and history are in important respects dif-
ferent in character, not just in the degree to which they can be substantiated 
by appeal to evidence or to the laws of natural science. Hence a story may be 
true and yet mythical in character, and a story may be false and yet historical 
in character. . . . Then, myth differs from history in that it is regarded differ-
ently by the people to whose culture both belong” (1961, 8). Here, again, we 
find the secret core of evidence as discovered by anthropologists: evidence is 
relational. If this is true, then the truth itself becomes, to borrow from politi-
cal anthropologist June Nash, a “suspect category” (1997, 25).
Perhaps this is an obscene finding, because it resembles so closely the 
body- evidence relationship uncovered by those who witnessed and recorded 
the workings of totalitarian regimes. Take for example Aleksandr Solzhenit-
syn’s harrowing three- volume account of Soviet forced labor camps, The Gu-
lag Archipelago, in which the author realizes that “evidence is always relative.” 
Indeed, he describes what passed for a criminal inquiry as a complex interplay 
between an interrogator’s willingness to inflict cruelty, the physical capacity 
of the victim, and nebulous “moral forces” that included “party sensitivity” 
(1974, 179). However, it would be a mistake to read Solzhenitsyn as simply 
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documenting the moral relativity of totalitarian wastelands; rather, he ap-
preciates that bodies as evidence are required to hold knowledge and power 
together. In short, evidence is not a thing- in- itself but, rather, an expression 
of broader configurations of power and knowledge. Seen in this light, secu-
rity is a privileged site in which to study matters of evidence. At root, security 
concerns itself with fixity, certainty, and control, while never fully restrain-
ing mutability, uncertainty, and even chaos. The power- knowledge nexus 
here includes the ability to arbitrate about the usefulness of any information; 
accordingly the powerful not only establish the right to know but also the 
terms of “truth,” together with the right to obviate, ignore, or obscure. The 
process of creating evidence is linked to parallel processes of denying alterna-
tive knowledge status as evidence or even destroying material that could give 
alternative testimony.
Jean and John Comaroff are among the first anthropologists to work 
through matters of evidence and security ethnographically, though their ef-
forts are concerned primarily with crime and policing. Their anthropological 
writing on the South African postcolony aims to explore the boundaries of 
post- Enlightenment humanity (see Comaroff and Comaroff 1999, 281). From 
a purely economic perspective, South Africa certainly offers perspectives on 
“the enigma of . . . wealth: of its sources and the capriciousness of its distri-
bution, of the mysterious forms it takes, of its slipperiness, of the opaque 
relations between means and ends embodied in it” (Comaroff and Comaroff 
2000, 298). However, the story they tell is larger than that of Voodoo econom-
ics after Apartheid. In the post – Cold War era, much of the world expected 
colonialism and socialist totalitarianism to vanish beneath an expectant wave 
of liberal democracy, but the perception in many parts of Eastern Europe and 
Africa is that crime and social disorder followed in the wake of change.4 Nu-
merous other countries also witnessed the “deregulation of monopolies over 
the means of legitimate force, of moral orders, of the protection of persons 
and property” (2004, 2).5 Thus, in the gaps, interstices, and aporias of the 
contemporary one finds the flourishing of shadow banking, occult econo-
mies, spectral private armies, and deafening demands for security (see also 
Marcus 1999).
Like Jean and John Comaroff, we see the great technical, scientific and 
expert efforts that characterize the contemporary drive to secure individual 
identities, bodies, borders, and all sorts of boundaries as emergent in the mi-
metic impulses at the heart of modernity: the impulses to fix, define, secure 
and otherwise make certain a world that seems incapable of fully obliging. 
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Moreover, modernity also has its obverse in counterfeit versions of modernity, 
versions where fakes, tricksters, and frauds prevail. The Comaroffs (2004, 13, 
15) explain:
Mimesis has classically been an attribute projected onto Europe’s others, 
of course, marking the distance between civilization and its apprentices, 
those perpetually deemed “almost, but not quite,” the real thing. Times, 
though, have changed. In the postcolonial era, copies declare independence 
as commodities and circulate autonomously. The electronic revolution has 
abetted this by democratizing the means of mechanical reproduction. It 
has demystified proprietary goods, whose aura can be mass- produced and 
flogged at a discount. These brazen simulacra, like counterfeit money, ex-
pose a conceit at the core of the culture of Western capitalism: that its sig-
nifiers can be fixed, that its editions can be limited, that it can franchise 
the platonic essence of its mass- produced modernity. . . .
Crime itself is frequently the object of criminal mimesis. Counterfeit 
kidnappings, hijack hoaxes, and bogus burglaries are everywhere an ex-
panding source of profit, to the extent that, in the Cape Province of South 
Africa, where simulated claims are becoming epidemic, a Zero Tolerance 
Task Group has been created to put a stop to them. . . . The fetish and the 
fake. Each, finally, fades into the other.
Jean and John Comaroff (e.g., 2006a) continue to explore crime and the 
law as sites of battles over numbers and nonsense, mimesis and magic, fetish-
ism and fakery. Indeed, they propose that the ethnographer, much like the 
detective, has always been a participant in these battles, bringing expertise on 
the elementary truths encoded in nods and winks and the skills to demystify 
the magical or even the bizarre (see also Boltanski 2014). Again, we make the 
point that security contexts are particularly good places in which to observe 
the contemporary. In this volume, we are interested in security rather than 
the policing of crime, and we are interested in exploring evidence in close 
detail.
Evidence in the Anthropology of Security
In recent years we have seen a growing body of ethnographic research on se-
curity and insecurity. There is already a large and well- respected anthropo-
logical literature on violence and warfare, the military and militarism, and 
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increasingly anthropologists have explored security and insecurity by focus-
ing their ethnographic work (rather unsurprisingly) on everyday experiences. 
In this latter vein, ethnographies often depict security as a violent and disrup-
tive intrusion. Other anthropologists focus their attention on new security 
assemblages by working adjacent to security expertise (e.g., Maguire 2014). 
Studying security agencies and expertise is enormously challenging. Access 
is often limited, if granted at all, and one often finds oneself lost in a dizzy-
ing world of paranoia within reason (see Marcus 1999). In the realm of se-
curity agencies, multiple layers and partitions separate and divide bodies as 
evidence and versions of “the truth.” Thus, one must understand configura-
tions of power, knowledge, and evidence in order to understand this realm, 
and especially in order to understand performances of security. It is, for ex-
ample, only by attending to power, knowledge, and evidence that one can 
appreciate the conditions for the possibility of security speech- acts (cf. Wae-
ver 1995), such as, for instance, the following statement by a key figure in the 
infamous U.S. Joint Special Operations Command (jsoc): “We’re the dark 
matter. We’re the force that orders the universe but can’t be seen” (quoted in 
Whitehead and Finnström 2013, 21).
However, before most anthropologists even get to explore the operations of 
security in their field site, they spend frustrating hours trying to answer the 
question: What is security? One quickly discovers that “security” is a seman-
tically vacuous term that refuses definition. One also discovers that neigh-
boring disciplines offer little by way of support. In the liberal philosophical 
tradition, for example, security is understood as the foundation stone of good 
government and even civilization itself — it is that which allows other things 
to happen, such as the flourishing of life (e.g., Mill [1859] 2002). Political sci-
entists, international relations experts, and security studies scholars tend to 
draw upon this tradition in ways that naturalize security, and yet they still 
acknowledge that it is an “essentially contested concept” — in other words, it 
gains content from things other than itself and from how the concept is de-
ployed (see Buzan 1991). How, then, do we grapple with this rascal concept?
Perhaps the very looseness of security is the key to unlocking it anthropo-
logically. Security is not a thing- in- itself; it is, rather, relational, and so too is 
evidence. Therefore, security discourses and practices gain their solidity by 
producing their own, self- reinforcing “bodies” — bodies that always threaten 
to flee upon close inspection. There are many examples that illustrate the 
suspicious importance of evidence in security contexts. The contributions to 
this volume cover biometric security, borders and migration control, forensic 
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knowledge, policing, and counterterrorism. In every one of these domains, 
one sees great efforts to know, target, and make use of the human body; and 
we see emergent bodies as evidence that result from these great efforts to 
ground knowledge and thereby secure the contemporary. It is our contention 
here that Bodies as Evidence offers a way to explore security as efforts to fix 
and make certain a world while never fully closing off mutability, uncertainty, 
and the potentially chaotic underside of order.
Bodies as Evidence
It is not surprising that in the contemporary moment one sees a resurgent in-
terest in the body as source of knowledge. Advancements in forensic science, 
dna decoding, and biometric technology provide new pathways for the re-
cursive reimagining of the social through the body (see M’charek, Hagendijk, 
and de Vries 2013). New technologies are nesting alongside established ways 
of scrutinizing the body through visual inspection (see Maguire 2009). Their 
common goal is fixity, because the extraction of precise information about 
identity enables history and projects into the future. Of course, feminist 
scholars have long argued against tendencies in sciences to reify their own 
models — such as dna — by first developing the model and then mistaking 
it for all there is to know about life itself. However, today, the human and 
social sciences are placing great emphasis on “emergence.” Thus, Tim In-
gold recently argued that “we can no longer think of the organism, human 
or otherwise, as a discrete, bounded entity, set over against an environment. 
It is rather a locus of growth within a field of relations traced out in flows of 
materials” (2013, 10; see also Foucault 1994).6 Such relativist accounts of life as 
dynamic, nonessential, and evolving threaten the self- assured fixity promised 
in the obsessive focus on bodies by new security technologies.
In this book, we follow the construction of body- evidence. What we know 
of a person is often the outcome of processes in which social actors are em-
powered to read cues and make inferences about identity, rights and duties, 
treatments, security, and insecurity. In a Latourian (1996) sense, anthropolo-
gists are often interested in entanglements between bodies, objects, and tech-
nology that lead to effectual interpretations. Annemarie Mol (2002) provides 
an illustrative example. She analyzes the making of atherosclerosis patients 
during hospital routines. Being an atherosclerosis patient means being a per-
son with pain that can be related to specific kinds of observations gained 
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during diagnostics — visual inspection, touching, measuring of blood veloc-
ity or vessel lumen — and postmortem knowledge of atherosclerosis patients 
underpins this specific knowledge. The process of knowing about athero-
sclerosis and deciding about treatment is an uncertain journey of pitching 
together or discriminating between different (at times contradictory) sets of 
evidence. The processes of gaining knowledge and acting upon it is the result 
of specific and fateful relations created between patients, doctors, medical 
data, machines, hospital accounting, and so on. There is, in short, a specific 
body- evidence regime in operation.
Body- evidence in security contexts may take the form of identity con-
structions through biometric inspection, treatment decisions following the 
anamnesis of injured migrant bodies, the dead body as evidence of violent 
borders, gaps in forensic infrastructure, or evidence for historical truth- 
telling; then there are the various traces of criminality, and even the tortured 
body in the War on Terror. We propose that practices of collecting and col-
lating of evidence about bodies shows the visceral dimensions of (in)security. 
Bodies as evidence (and knowledge- power) inform the processes by which 
people become migrants, welfare recipients, prisoners, targets, or victims. 
These fateful classifications inform decisions about treatment, thus creating 
the abject body of the torture victim, the targeted body of the terrorist, the 
hungry body of the noncitizen, the hiding body of the “illegal” immigrant, or 
the dead body at the border. Of course, a number of prominent theorists have 
foregrounded the body in theories of social order. Taboo breakers and “oth-
ers” become figures of danger (Lianos and Douglas 2001), and political order 
creates its own shadow, bodies that do not matter (see also Agamben 1998). 
However, evidence matters clearly in the sense that processes are required 
to know people, to categorize, judge, determine, and even cast people out. 
Evidence is deployed to fix identity and avoid status ambivalence. If bodies 
can be linked through biometric technology to databases, assorted officials 
no longer depend on the narratives of untrustworthy others, who might be 
terrorists, illegal immigrants, beggars, or welfare frauds.
The first chapter in this volume, “The Truth of the Error: Making Identity 
and Security through Biometric Discrimination,” by Elida K. U. Jacobsen and 
Ursula Rao, deals directly with contemporary security technoscience. Dur-
ing the past two decades, the world has seen a mushrooming of biometric 
“solutions” to deal with everything from transit through airports to welfare 
disbursements. Today, India’s Unique Identity (uid), or aadhaar, scheme is an 
experiment in biometric security of global significance. Thus far, over one bil-
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lion people have registered with a system that promises interoperable digital 
governance and is widely regarded as a model for emulation by other countries. 
However, for all the images of clean and efficient contact and circulation — 
and those images certainly saturate media and policy discourse — biometric 
security also promises to target the unwanted circulations of illegal migrants, 
criminals, and terrorists by exposing the fraudulent body. Jacobsen and Rao, 
however, focus specifically on error: the damaged fingers and eyes, and the 
failure to account for problematic names and unlikely kinships that lead to 
exclusions as “failure to enroll.” Instead of showing a neutral process of regis-
trations, their ethnographic accounts tell of dense cultural processes through 
which authorities inspect, visualize, and question bodies, together with the 
numerous ways that Indian residents attempt to work around a system that 
now offers a passport to spaces and privileges.
Of course, “error” is a technoscientific concept within the field of biomet-
ric security: a tolerable margin of error is that which establishes a norm and 
thereby the truth of one’s identity. Jacobsen and Rao therefore propose that er-
ror is constitutive of evidence in the aadhaar scheme. In cases of technical fail-
ure, due to manual labor or military service rendering a body unreadable, resi-
dents must resort to private brokers that operate a black market in biometric 
enrollments. What’s at stake here, between a system that strives for universal-
ity through bodily evidence and a population excluded from benefits to which 
they are entitled, is a modern dream of a stable truth referent. Deploying the 
concept of a negative space archive, Jacobsen and Rao argue that the body will 
only act as a truth referent if historical and sociocultural contexts are excluded 
or at least controlled in the name of neutrality, and thus schemes such as 
aadhaar will always run the risk of excluding those persons who deviate from 
the norm. Biometric security thus has deadly consequences: a single older 
woman who is unreadable, they explain, becomes a marginal person who can-
not claim her right to a food allowance, a victim of “good governance.”
Biometric registration in India is certainly one of the more extraordinary 
experiments in governance through security in the contemporary moment. 
However, there are many more laboratory spaces where new body- evidence 
relations are emerging. One such laboratory is the Mexico- U.S. border, an 
uneven zone of securitization in which one finds high- tech military gadgetry 
and the hostile landscape itself recruited to deter migration. In chapter 2, 
“Injured by the Border: Security Buildup, Migrant Bodies, and Emergency 
Response in Southern Arizona,” Ieva Jusionyte shows us the ways in which 
securitization produces new regimes of inclusion and exclusion and associ-
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ated regimes of evidence. She begins with the shocking description of an in-
jured man literally stuck in the border fence. Based on ethnographic fieldwork 
with emergency responders on both sides of the border, Jusionyte explores 
the regimes of power and knowledge that struggle over the contested body 
of the injured migrant. The increasing securitization of the border results 
directly in physical harm, as migrants break limbs and suffer from dehydra-
tion en route to the United States. But what does it mean to rescue migrants? 
In ways that are comparable with ongoing debates about emergency care for 
migrants crossing the Mediterranean (see Amade M’charek in this volume), 
in southern Arizona we see a redefinition of lifesaving treatment and a revalu-
ation of human life. Migrants who call 911 are redirected to Border Patrol, and 
emergency responders are expected to differentiate between those deserving 
of help and “bad guys” who should be placed in custody immediately.
Of course, there are financial and resource allocation implications when 
Border Patrol or local emergency responders take charge of an injured body, 
but many decisions rely on the skill of reading signs of the bodies as evidence 
of illegal entry, or just a “gut feeling.” Matters are further complicated be-
cause, for example, traffickers force some migrants to carry drugs, blurring 
handy distinctions between the “good guys” and the “bad guys.” In part, Ju-
sionyte’s argument is that the broad landscape of securitization is recruiting 
the skills of emergency responders, but, in part also, we see the different evi-
dence produced by Border Patrol and emergency responders as suggestive of 
deep cracks and fissures in the realm of human security.
Félix Guattari once imagined a future world of security in which technolo-
gies would enable the spread of electronic borders throughout daily life, a 
world where everyone is expected to be in their “permissible place” (Deleuze 
1988, 182). Jacobsen and Rao show us the powerful role of biometrics in India 
in establishing and sorting norms, access, and exclusions, while Ieva Jusio-
nyte speaks to the violence of external borders and the intractable problems 
facing those attempting humanitarian responses. In chapter 3, “E- Terrify: Se-
curitized Immigration and Biometric Surveillance in the Workplace,” Daniel 
M. Goldstein and Carolina Alonso- Bejarano contribute further to this dis-
cussion. The rapid rise and spread of U.S. “Homeland Security” as an institu-
tional form, as a set of discourses and interventions, involves the conflation 
of undocumented migrants with potential terrorists and thus produces a vast 
suspect population. However, the border is no longer where the map suggests 
it is: Goldstein and Alonso- Bejarano expose E- Verify, a workplace, web- based 
biometric technology that aims to square the U.S. reliance on cheap immi-
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grant labor with securing the homeland. E- Verify turns the workplace into a 
space of immigration surveillance by allowing employers to check employees 
and job applicants against federal data to determine eligibility. In ways simi-
lar to the Indian aadhaar scheme, E- Verify promises neutrality and admin-
istrative efficiency; however, it delivers new regimes of exclusion and conse-
quent precariousness for those already marginalized. Employers are relatively 
free to decide whether they should check a worker, which grants them power 
as immigration decision makers.
Drawing on several years of ethnographic research in New Jersey, Goldstein 
and Alonso- Bejarano’s work shows us the ways in which a biometric (and le-
gal) security infrastructure nests in the material and spatial realities of every-
day life. E- Verify contributes to exclusion and to self- disciplining — migrants 
caution one another as to how to avoid the gaze of the authorities. Indeed, 
taken in isolation, the ethnographic accounts of migrants’ experiences read 
like descriptions of life under totalitarianism, where the slightest transgres-
sion results in dire consequences. “Don’t litter,” one migrant advises a friend! 
However, alongside the exclusion and self- disciplining one finds the emer-
gence of shadow populations and, unsurprisingly, fake identities, the conse-
quence E- Terrify.
The production of new regimes of evidence in security contexts is certainly 
striking where biometrics are deployed to manage marginal populations such 
as migrants. However, biometrics — from the Ancient Greek bios and metron, 
denotes the recognizing and measurement of life itself using intrinsic physi-
cal or behavioral traits — is closely connected to the contemporary drive for 
(and obsession with) forensic knowledge. At the Mediterranean borders of 
Europe, where many thousands of people lose their lives each year, forensic 
knowledge is both a technoscientific “solution” and a problem. In chapter 4, 
“ ‘Dead- Bodies- at- the- Border’: Distributed Evidence and Emerging Forensic 
Infrastructure for Identification,” Amade M’charek writes about the border 
security response to dead migrant bodies. Border security deploys high- tech 
solutions that seek to identify and police the frontiers of the eu with every-
thing from biometrics to surveillance drones. But what of those who die en 
route? Dead bodies are both evidence of a failed response to a geopolitical 
crisis and a very specific set of problems of evidence for the forensic infra-
structure of identification.
M’charek’s detailed discussion of border forensics shows us the uneven 
distribution of forensic knowledge. In popular consciousness, forensics is an 
exact science, and police today even complain about the so- called csi effect 
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whereby the public attribute enormous exactitude to forensics. Of course, 
in the wake of natural and other disasters that involve residents of wealthy 
countries, enormous efforts are made to identify remains. Not so with dead 
bodies at the border. Indeed, the bodies of migrants are a gap in knowledge 
and infrastructure. The geographical origin of a body is often unclear; there 
is no reference population against which to check a dna or even a dental 
profile. Moreover, because bodies are recovered after long periods in the sea, 
the epidermis tends to have detached and with that goes the possibility of 
fingerprinting. “Forensics has to be invented anew,” a leading practitioner 
tells M’charek. What, however, will the emerging forensic infrastructure 
look like? M’charek argues that the hundreds of dead migrant bodies found 
at the shores of Europe will offer a new type of evidence for an emerging 
infrastructure: the dead- body- at- the- border is also evidence of the price paid 
in human lives for Europe’s border management regime.
In chapter 5, “The Transitional Lives of Crimes against Humanity: Foren-
sic Evidence under Changing Political Circumstances,” Antonius C. G. M. 
Robben and Francisco J. Ferrándiz further explore the ways in which forensic 
evidence and truth- making activities are problematic and yet promise cer-
tainty to an uncertain world. Their specific example is forensic knowledge as 
embedded in public discourses on justice. They deploy two case studies: the 
recovery of evidence from historical Death Flights in Argentina and Civil War 
exhumations in Spain, showing the intertwinement of different types of evi-
dence in efforts to reclaim the past and redeem the victims of crimes against 
humanity. In their analysis, we must also attend to the contested necro politics 
of evidence. The early chapters in this volume attest to the drive to know hu-
man life in order to secure it and thereby produce an order of things, but the 
Death Flights in Argentina and civil war in Spain are episodes marked by 
great efforts to conceal, “disappear,” and distort evidence. As Michael Taussig 
remarked in his analysis of totalitarianism in South America, one sometimes 
finds “the chaos that lies on the underside of order and without which order 
could not exist” (Taussig 1986, 4).
In their chapter, Robben and Ferrándiz emphasize the enormous potential 
of forensic knowledge of the body as a basis for cultural recovery, truth, jus-
tice, and reconciliation. However, this emerging infrastructure in Spain and 
Argentina is not without its problems. Of course, here again we see the csi 
effect of overly optimistic impressions of science, but these different cultural 
and legal contexts also inject politics into ostensibly neutral practices. They 
conclude that these new body- evidence relations have the capacity to disrupt 
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other ways to mourn, seek justice, and produce the truth without the “truthi-
ness” of forensic science.
While the first five chapters deal with processes of fixing truth via the 
process of interpreting and manipulating materials and bodies, the remain-
ing four chapters of the volume discuss (in)security produced by bodies of 
evidence that remain in the shadow of alchemy- like half- knowledge, pre-
diction, gossip, or even lies. Future crime scenarios, classified information, 
and knowledge gained through spying, torture, or intelligence are mobilized 
as evidence for real or potential threats that demand action. The not- fully- 
realized- evidence of threat scenarios blurs the line between reality and de-
lusion, while producing real material effects through targeted intervention 
or increased policing activities. Here power materializes as the ability to act 
also on unconfirmed or nonpublic information, creating security regimes 
that render insecure not only populations but also police officers, soldiers, 
and judges who must decide which leads to follow in a realm where informa-
tion fades into fantasy.
Chapters 6 and 7 turn to contemporary policing in Europe and North 
America. Chapter 6, “Policing Future Crimes,” by Mark Maguire, opens with 
a discussion of the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, in 2014 
in order to highlight questions of evidence in police encounters with com-
munities. Anthropologists continue to explore and expose the racialized and 
often- violent dimensions of urban policing around the world. However, the 
ethnographic focus on encounters that are observable to the naked eye tends 
to miss larger transformations in international policing that aim to police fu-
ture events by cancelling them out before they occur. Today, around the world, 
important experiments are ongoing in what is termed predictive policing — a 
specific assemblage of anthropological theories, geographical information 
systems, and data science. Many police forces welcome these technoscien-
tific experiments — seeing them as “silver bullets” (see Robben and Ferrándiz 
in this volume) targeting intractable problems — while in other jurisdictions 
these experiments are resisted or reconfigured in interesting ways. For some, 
predictive policing is a mask disguising older forms of discrimination and 
profiling. After all, they are based on social data gathering, mapping, and 
statistical reasoning that carry their own histories and biased assumptions, 
especially about what is essential or typical in human behavior. However, Ma-
guire proposes that we should approach predictive policing on its own terms: 
as a technically mediated form of criminal anthropology with its own body of 
evidence. New algorithmically produced future scenarios create new forms of 
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evidence that position police personnel in a situation of having to contemplate 
the relevance of computer knowledge and whether indeed it is safe to hand 
over decision-making responsibly to mathematical models, or retain trust in 
personal experience and direct sensual data.
Issues about the status of knowledge and its usefulness as evidence are also 
the central concern for Gregory Feldman in chapter 7, “ ‘Intelligence’ and ‘Evi-
dence’: Sovereign Authority and the Differences That Words Make,” an essay 
on the intelligence gathering of an undercover squad of European police dedi-
cated to tackling human trafficking. These are individuals bonded together 
as they make real decisions on the ground, and in so doing they produce 
their own codes of action. These actions show an ethics as police bring intel-
ligence forward as evidence, or they may leave it in its own category of what is 
known but not necessarily actionable. These are two very different studies of 
contemporary policing, then, but they are still complementary. For Maguire, 
predictive policing operates by means of an anthropological theory of human 
life itself, one sometimes disputed by the evidence of actual police work on 
the ground. For Feldman, evidence — that thing that police are expected to 
produce — cannot label the full range of knowledge and practices of policing. 
Both anthropologists are exploring ways to say more about the in/securities 
that drive decision making in contemporary policing, more than institutional 
studies or algorithmic innovations can possibly say.
The final two chapters of this volume concern the so- called War on Terror. 
In chapter 8, “The Secrecy/Threat Matrix,” Joseph P. Masco draws on his re-
cent work on The Theater of Operations (2014) to again track the transforma-
tion of the U.S. Cold War national security apparatus into the counterterror 
apparatus. For Masco this transformation represents a shift in the “secrecy/
threat matrix” and thus in evidential relations with the world. Masco shows 
us that evidence is of vital importance in the War on Terror because the “se-
crecy/threat matrix” renders knowledge and evidence as suspect categories 
(see Nash 1997, 25). In such a world only affect lives free — fear, desire, and 
fantasy are the ghosts driving the counterterror machinery.
“If you want to buy, I am selling!” exclaims a desperate prisoner at Guan-
tánamo hoping to escape torture if he offers what the tormentor wished to 
hear. In chapter 9, “What Do You Want? Evidence and Fantasy in the War on 
Terror,” Joseba Zulaika replays this statement as a way to hammer home the 
catch- 22 of security labor. The observer is caught in a web of delusional narra-
tives produced in reaction to desperate security forces seeking to uncover the 
secrets of the dangerous Other. The violent search for hidden “truth” is cou-
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pled with a culture of secrecy. The state protects its own knowledge and fails 
not only democracy but also its own desire for accuracy and well- informed 
decision making. Security agents make decisions based on a threat scenario 
backed by claims to secret knowledge, knowledge that will forever remain in 
the shadows and will thus never achieve the status of evidence per se.
The essays by Joseph Masco and Joseba Zulaika bring back to mind the 
specifics of the presentation made by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in 
2003 to justify regime change in Iraq. In front of the United Nations and the 
world’s media, he briefly lifted the veil of secrecy and showed the world the 
“veil of transparency” instead (West and Saunders 2003, 20), offering frag-
ments of intercepted phone calls, poor- quality images, and inferences, all 
while intoning, “My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up 
by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we’re giving you are 
facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence. . . . This is evidence, not 
conjecture. This is true. This is all well- documented” (Powell 2003, 2).
To create the knowledge- effect, conflict or inconsistency must be avoided 
or, if necessary, denied. The demand for transparency is thus accompanied 
by a new culture of secrecy. And if Joseba Zulaika shows us in this volume the 
horror of extracting evidence from fantasy through torture, Joseph Masco’s 
work explores the broader body of evidence, information, and secrets that 
the War on Terror has brought into play, and with it a phantasmagoria of 
security and fear, real and fake, terror and suspected terrorists. We are re-
minded thus of early anthropological inquiries. After all, Sir James Frazer’s 
The Golden Bough was an effort to explore the human tendency toward “pry-
ing into the future” often by “pulling at strings to which nothing is attached” 
(Frazer [1890] 1994, 734, 55). Indeed, even the more sickening efforts to extract 
evidence during the War on Terror point directly to the space between truth 
and fantasy and the work that people might perform in that space. Having 
read Frazer’s book, Ludwig Wittgenstein remarked that a person might stab 
the effigy of an enemy before battle but they also sharpened their blade — “We 
act like this and then feel satisfied” (Wittgenstein 1979, 14). Evidence in action 
brings a particular world into play but not necessarily the truth. As security 
performs its control over the shadowy phantasmagoria of threats to the world, 
it brings to light practical actions and evidence- making processes. Indeed, 
bodies as evidence in security contexts are not necessarily about the truth. 
As Masco (2014) reminds us, in the contemporary moment the war against 
terrorists is in fact the “War on Terror,” a potentially never- ending conflict 
with an emotion.
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Using evidence as a conceptual tool, all of the chapters in this volume 
cut to the heart of contemporary (in)securitization. The volume is composed 
of essays in dialog that show how the body has come to be the bearer and 
signifier of security itself, and how new bodies of evidence are growing and 
showing themselves to be powerful and transformative. Although the term 
“security” is often deployed with terminological inexactitude, this should not 
excuse it from critical anthropological analysis. Indeed, as we noted at the 
outset, security and insecurity name proliferating forms of governance and 
evidential regimes. By turning our attention to bodies as evidence, we are able 
to show how these ostensibly diverse aspects are indeed connected: the body 
as reference, as enemy, as carrier of insecurities, as the agent of irritation, and 
the ever evading and liquid focus of regulation. Bodies as Evidence shows that 
security, and all the politics and measures that surround it, is unthinkable 
without the content added by bodies. We must consider efforts to categorize 
the body and hence classify populations, efforts to thus know life itself suffi-
cient to develop discourses on the nature of life and of death and predict how 
human bodies will behave in the future, and as a consequence rendering some 
lives as worthy and casting other lives to the insecure margins. The diverse 
examples in this volume will indeed show that the body is the substance of 
security and its unruly subject. Each anthropological contribution in this vol-
ume takes as its starting point that life will always exceed any assemblage of 
technologies or any governmental effort to work those technologies. Rather, 
an anthropological investigation of bodies as evidence — be they classifica-
tory, expert- driven or imponderable — is an inquiry into the foundations of 
social arrangements. In short, then, conceptually and from the basis of eth-
nographic discussions of everyday life and experience, this volume will add 
to the growing literature on anthropology and security but also contribute to 
the overall bodies of scholarship on security in novel ways.
Notes
1 In their edited volume, Modes of Uncertainty (2015), Paul Rabinow and Limor 
Samimian- Darash explore the central problem of uncertainty in the contem-
porary moment, especially the forms of uncertainty that one cannot reduce to 
traditional notions of risk or danger.
2 Francis Fitzgerald (1972) gives us a curious example of what happens when ev-
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idential regimes collide: when the first French steamship visited the coast of 
nineteenth- century Vietnam, the local Mandarins dismissed it as unseen, be-
cause their texts indicated that it was just a dragon. 
3 For an excellent treatment of the relational qualities of evidence in legal contexts, 
see Anthony Good’s (2007) Anthropology and Expertise in the Asylum Courts.
4 Jean and John Comaroff acknowledge the problems of perception versus reality 
in any discussion of global crime rates, especially seeing as the numbers can be 
run to different effects. A reasonably reliable summary is given by the United Na-
tions Office on Drugs and Crime (unodc). The unodc combine their own data 
with the World Health Organization’s Mortality Database to provide three- year 
moving average homicide rates across the world from 1955 to 2012. One sees two 
clear trends. First, homicide is declining in many parts of the world, especially 
in prosperous societies with low levels of inequality. Second, where homicide 
levels are increasing, one sees major societal disruption (see unodc 2013, 35). The 
point the Comaroffs make is that uneven crime rates and perceptions of crimi-
nality all speak to an underlying shift in societal divisions of labor and moral 
orders.
5 Daniel Goldstein’s recent Owners of the Sidewalk (2016) shows the extraordinary 
scale of the “informal economy” in Bolivia — up to 80 percent of the Bolivian 
population work in informal commerce. Owners of the Sidewalk is also about the 
“informal” security providers that have sprung up in cities and markets.
6 The work of Foucault on the governing of life itself is heavily influenced by his 
teacher Georges Canguilhem’s discontinuous history of science. Thus, “life has 
led to a living being that is never completely in the right place, that is destined to 
‘err’ and be ‘wrong’ ” (Foucault 1994, 15).
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ONE
The Truth of the Error
Making Identity and Security through  
Biometric Discrimination
Elida k. u. Jacobsen and Ursula Rao
As moderns, our task and our obligation is to be attentive to ways around 
knowledge that claims to be universal when it is contingent, unified when it is at 
best partial, and autonomous and sovereign when it is dependent and immature.
 — Rabinow, French Enlightenment: Truth and Life
This had to be a fraud! Or could you imagine a family with over 100 mem-
bers?,” the quality assurance officer Amit Chatterjee asked rhetorically. What 
has happened? The computer at the central data- processing unit of the Unique 
Identity Authority of India (uidai) showed an error. The automatic filter of 
the new biometric registration system highlighted more than 100 individu-
als as problematic because they had all been authorized by one single Head of 
“
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Family (HoF), indicating that this person had proof of being directly related 
to each individual.
During an interview, he recounted in an animated fashion the story about 
how their initial astonishment concerning the extent of the fraud had turned into 
curiosity and, rather than cancelling the enrollments straight away, the team 
decided to travel to the region and find out what had happened. When they 
reached the distant border region in Mizoram, in the northeast of India, they 
found to their surprise the “biggest family in the world,” totaling 184 mem-
bers.1 “Can you imagine a man with 39 wives?” Amit repeated dramatically 
and continued to marvel at how enrollment for India’s new biometric database 
has brought the team in touch with even the most remote people of India.
Today many countries are experimenting with biometric identification sys-
tems that use smart cards or central databases. With over 1.2 billion enroll-
ments to date, India’s aadhaar (Unique Identity, uid) is not only larger than any 
other similar project but is a “frontier case” that will influence developments 
in other countries, such as Indonesia or Papua New Guinea (Jacobsen 2012; 
Zelazny 2012; Gelb and Clark 2013b). According to the World Bank, it is also 
pioneering because it promises to achieve maximum interoperability by link-
ing a national id program to multiple sectoral interventions, such as welfare 
projects, security operations, or commercial applications (World Bank 2015). 
And indeed, the notion of interoperability captures well the ambition of the 
architects of uid, who launched the project in 2009 to provide a streamlined 
means of identifying India’s entire population and linking millions to national 
digital networks of information. The system is meant to biometrically enroll 
all residents of India and give every person a unique twelve- digit identifica-
tion number (aadhaar number) that is connected to a record containing their 
personal biometric data — fingerprints, iris scan data, and photograph — and 
to a skeleton set of social data — name, address, and gender. It can be used for 
online verification of identity at any time and any place. Proponents of uid are 
confident that the new technology will solve India’s identification crisis by sup-
plying reliable information to public and private service providers about who 
is who, thus making all transactions transparent and secure. Currently the 
aadhaar number is required for identification in most official contexts, such 
as applying for a passport, receiving welfare payments, or getting a bank loan. 
It can be used for instant activation of a sim card, purchasing a train ticket, or 
conducting internet transactions (Bhatia and Bhabha 2017).
India’s biometric project is participating in a global shift toward states 
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using new digital technology in the management of population flows. The 
contemporary world capitalist system not only depends on the rapid flow of 
people and goods, but also produces heightened concerns over the unwanted 
movements of illegal migrants, terrorists, or smugglers, persons who may 
pre sent a threat to national security and prosperity (Fuller 2003). Biometric 
technology provides automatized surveillance at crucial checkpoints in order 
to protect spaces of privileged sociality against unwanted entrants — in short, 
it is a means to separate “bad” flows from “good” flows (Aas 2006; Amoore 
2006; Lebovic 2015; Amicelle and Jacobsen 2016). While surveillance studies 
scholars analyze the increased usage of networked biometric technologies in 
managing risks and contingencies (Amoore 2006; Muller 2011; Jacobsen 2013; 
Lidén, Boy, and Jacobsen 2016), development studies literature emphasizes 
the role and societal effect of biometric technology for creating more efficient 
and fraud- free welfare states (Rao 2013; Donovan 2015; Singh and Jackson 
2017). The introduction of security logic into welfare contests follows on from 
neoliberal suspicion about wasteful states and worries over inefficient tar-
geting, corruption, and leakage. By tracking goods and people, governments 
seek to undercut false reporting or “double dipping” — the illegal diversion of 
limited resources that impoverish states and contribute to distributional in-
justice. Regardless of whether biometric surveillance systems face inward or 
outward — that is to say, to include the undocumented or to exclude unwanted 
foreigners (Breckenridge 2014) — they fulfill a key purpose of making trans-
actions traceable by employing a binary distinction. On the one side, there is 
the production of the documented person, the wanted traveler, or the needy 
citizen, which is mirrored on the other side by its opposite: the imposter, the 
fraud, or the criminal.
The attractive clarity of the binary logic of biometric classifications is dis-
turbed every time technicians or users encounter an error. An error appears 
as a red warning on the screen when fingerprints are unreadable or recorded 
data appears as incoherent. The story from Mizoram is a case in point that 
was resolved positively, unlike many other cases of data errors that have led 
to rejections of aadhaar registration because applicants wishing to enroll have 
washed fingers, damaged irises, or unlikely names. The “failure to enroll” has 
its complement in the “false reject” of verification, another categorical error 
that does not register in the yes/no logic of automated surveillance. The tech-
nically rendered reading of body parts is unable to account for the calluses 
on the hands of a hardworking farmer wishing to access his or her biometric 
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bank account, or to recognize poverty through the visual inspection of the 
worn, unbiometrifiable body of a beggar — more to the point, there is no room 
for the passionate stories of living people. From our ethnographic study of 
enrollment, we highlight how an individual status as “error” or “success” is, 
for the people concerned, a (new) form of social positioning that intersects or 
overwrites who they think they are or can be.
On the one hand, as the Indian project becomes interoperable and omni-
present, an identification error can deny and exclude individuals and fami-
lies from entitlements and sociality. On the other hand, the new universal id 
creates positive affirmations that can justify the undocumented immigrant 
or attach an address to the homeless laborer. In both cases of the “accept” or 
“reject,” people’s stories of living with biometrics demonstrate a contingent 
and unstable character of identity that may not adhere to the idealized truth 
of automated surveillance.
In this chapter, we read the ethnography of enrollment and early usage 
against the technical view of aadhaar as an efficient, reliable, neutral, and 
dispassionate means of sorting. We look at the acts of (biometric) registra-
tion and verification as practices that are founded on the idea of separating 
the truth from its error or fraud, in order to minimize the occurrences of the 
latter. In biometric governance, images of fingerprints and irises are “trans-
ported” to create certainty in relation to an individual’s status, which in turn 
produces specific nexuses between bodies, persons, and identities that deter-
mine people’s status vis- à- vis authorities, governments, or service providers. 
Yet, such “veridiction” of a bodily status takes place not in a valueless space 
of technological veracity, but rather in a dense social space saturated with 
visual information and narrative accounts. During biometric registration, 
and later at checkpoints of verification, the body and the appearance of the 
individual are continuously being regarded, problematized, and questioned, 
leading to a maze of visual, social, and technical information that may not 
cumulate in a coherent conclusion. As operators and users consider different 
types of evidence and prioritize information, they produce powerful narra-
tives of identity.
The anecdote from Mizoram illustrates how accounting for citizens and 
giving out unique numbers intertwines judgments of integrity with narra-
tives of identity. The filter of the quality management software picked up 
the decontextualized enrollment information because it contradicted stan-
dard expectations concerning family size, raising suspicion about fabrication 
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and fraud. It could be discounted only when inspectors saw with their own 
eyes a man who lives with thirty- nine wives. They saw the narrowness of the 
“margin of error” in the face of the breadth of human sociality. The error 
demanded additional investigation that led to a final adjudication, fixing a 
particular truth and revealing the regime of truth production. The aadhaar 
enrollment system subsequently “knew” this man not only as a unique body, 
or a male of a certain age, but as a networked person holding the status for 
being the father and grandfather of over a hundred children and the husband 
of thirty- nine women. Moreover, in the process of sorting, the man became 
“abnormal” according to the programed norm of the system.
It is precisely through the negotiated margins of the established “error” 
that the biometric system produces truth. The system creates a norm against 
which errors can be measured. Errors are not just technical faults but also a 
means of producing expert truths about bodies and populations, which fur-
ther give way to technical intervention and governmental planning. There-
fore, rather than the error being an unintended consequence of the biometric 
system, we argue that the making of “errors” is a constitutive part of the es-
tablished system of truth making. To evidence this, we begin with the nar-
ration of three cases of enrollments that exemplify how biometric technol-
ogy repositions people in ways that contradict fundamental aspects of their 
identity. The troubling inconstancies of these biometric encounters provide 
an entry point for reflections on the social contexts where biometric technol-
ogy operates and on the truth effects it produces. By truth effect, we mean 
a powerful statement of what will count as “truth.” When truth in the form 
of biometric reading collides with other accounts or evidence of identity, it 
places people in a space of tension between error and truth. The negotiation of 
judgments resulting from biometric reading illuminates troubling exclusions 
and confirms prior findings that technology and its deployment in social situ-
ations produce specific forms of discrimination often along well- established 
lines of marginalization (Thomas 2014). Moreover, and more fundamentally, 
we argue that identity and fraud are interlaced categories and, accordingly, 
destabilize — and ultimately make incongruous — binary identification sys-
tems that seek to install a stable form of verification of personal identity by 
linking data to bodily markers using a yes/no logic.
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On Technical Failure
The Dell computer screen is filled with the glaring brown- and- white im-
age of an enlarged iris. The eye blinks, making large black stripes in slow 
movements on the screen before the image freezes as the eye is captured and 
quickly stored on the hard disk of the computer. The digitalization of her iris 
scan, together with fingerprints and facial image, ceremoniously marks the 
birth of Ananya’s digital double. In a few weeks, she will receive a slip of pa-
per that attests to the delivery of her data double, a name given by the Unique 
Identity Authority of India counting twelve numerical digits. Ananya gets 
up from the chair (a white plastic chair that had seen better days), adjusts 
her purple sari, and steps aside for the next one in line, her husband, Polas. 
He is not so lucky. The facial image is easily captured, but when he places his 
fingers on the biometric capture box, the computer refuses to agree with the 
status of his fingerprints. “Error.” The letters appear repeatedly on the com-
puter screen. After the third rejection, the young female operator in jeans and 
T- shirt looks at him. “Sorry, you cannot be registered.” Whereas Ananya, his 
wife, is from East Bengal (today Bangladesh), it just happens to be that Polas 
himself is Indian. It is thus ironic that she now holds the digital key to po-
tential entitlements by the Indian government, while he is being refused. The 
aadhaar number that he was attempting to register for would provide him 
with a proof of identity and address, and he is hoping that it will be an easier 
means to gain access to rights and entitlements for persons below the poverty 
line. Polas is a hardworking painter who works ten hours a day for an aver-
age wage of three thousand rupees a month (approximately fifty U.S. dollars), 
painting temple walls with low- quality paint. He works hard, mixing the liq-
uid with his own hands, and oftentimes plucking old paint off temple walls 
with his bare fingers. No wonder his fingerprints are unreadable.
Technical errors are part of the enrollment process of India’s national bio-
metric system. Against the norm of the biometrically readable subject, con-
cerns over the unbiometrifiability of bodies had surfaced before in the heated 
debates about the feasibility of aadhaar. In a report, Dr. R. Ramakumar, an 
expert witness before the Lok Sabha Finance Committee, stated that “it has 
been proven again and again that in the Indian environment the failure to 
enroll with fingerprints is as high as 15% due to the prevalence of a huge popu-
lation dependent on manual labour” (Standing Committee 2011, 11). Others 
argue that the number is negligible (Nilekani and Shah 2015). The answer 
to the question of how many people might be excluded on account of poor 
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biomaterial remains safely in the dark, since the aadhaar system only counts 
positively those who are registered and has no category to acknowledge the 
existence of people who have been rejected. Citizens resist this form of tech-
nical neglect by insisting on registration or seeking imaginative solutions. 
For example, Polas keeps himself busy making calls to his friend who knows 
a person willing to use creative solutions to enroll people into the aadhaar 
scheme in exchange for an under- the- table compensation of a hundred rupees 
by doing night shifts in the basement of one of the older temples in the town. 
At night, he enters a room filled with half- moldy paper and waits nervously 
for the computer to come up. Then, in a matter of a few minutes, his eyes are 
scanned, his picture is taken, and a clause is added regarding his exception 
that states that it is unmanageable to register more than a single thumbprint. 
With the enrollment slip in his hand, Polas is hopeful that he will receive his 
aadhaar card. He is not yet disillusioned as are others who tried enrolling 
many times to no avail, such as, for example Pratap.
Pratap lives in Hauz Khas in South Delhi with his son and daughter- in- 
law and their kids. He likes helping them out, but on a specific day in March 
2016 he declines to pick up the kids from school because he urgently needs 
an aadhaar number and has high hopes that the recently opened enrollment 
center at the new branch of the Citizens’ Bank will finally provide him with 
this new identity. It is his third attempt. The first time he went to a mass en-
rollment camp. He followed the prescribed routine and waited for his card. 
After six months, when the card had not arrived, he consulted, like Polas, a 
private broker who promised to help him in return for a hundred rupees. An 
online inquiry showed that Pratap’s card had been rejected due to a “tech-
nical fault.” The precise reason remains unclear. The broker took Pratap to 
another enrollment station, said all will be fine now, and vanished. “It was a 
rip- off!” Pratap thinks now. In his hand, he holds the enrollment slip of the 
second attempt that too yielded no positive result. Looking at it, it becomes 
obvious that the reading showed very low accuracy for several fingers. Might 
this be the reason for his rejection? Confronted with the question, Pratap 
shrugs his shoulder and continues his personal story. At this point, he takes 
off his sunglasses and exposes a missing eye, explaining that he lost it in a 
battle in Cargill. “I am a wounded soldier and have fought for the nation,” he 
says proudly and without any sentimentality. Next, he takes out his army card 
and continues, “Here! See! This is the proof! I used to show this everywhere 
and it was always accepted. Now, no one wants to even see it. They are only 
interested in the aadhaar card.”
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Pratap moves forward in line and begins reenrollment. The computer op-
erator records the disability and crosses out one eye in the form. The iris scan 
of the second eye goes smoothly. However, the fingers pose problems. The ma-
chine alerts the operator to a low accuracy rate of 17 to 20 percent for most fin-
gers, and though he repeats the procedure seven times, he can never pass the 
minimum threshold of 60 percent. Despite the error, Pratap receives a new 
enrollment slip. Now he has to wait again and hope. It is unclear whether the 
quality check will eliminate his data once again. Without an aadhaar number, 
Pratap feels an acute sense of marginalization. The social pressure to produce 
it at the pension office, the passport office, or the hospital is strong, and not 
meeting it has effectively devalued his status as a veteran. He is furious and 
seriously aggrieved that he is no longer seen as what he is: a war survivor and 
hero who had given his life to the nation. Instead, now he is reduced to being 
a person without a number.
The Structural Violence of Ungovernable Bodies
In recent years, a burgeoning body of literature has developed sophisticated 
and fine- grained understandings of the role of citizen- state relations for pro-
cesses of identity making (van der Ploeg 1999; Hull 2012; Gelb and Clark 2013a, 
2013b). State agencies see citizens and engage the population by adopting clas-
sifications that distinguish them between insiders and outsiders, citizens and 
imposters, or deserving and undeserving poor (Scott 1998; Sharma and Gupta 
2006). These classifications are put into effect during the operationalization 
of policies, which structure the experiences of citizens with state representa-
tives and determine their social status and access to resources (Gupta 2012). 
In a recursive process, citizens accept, reject, or appropriate such categories 
into personalized narratives, thereby creating social positioning and a sense 
of self (Corbridge et al. 2005; Hunter and Sugiyama 2014; Markó 2016). This 
mutually enforced dynamic of identifying and being identified is powerfully 
illustrated by the earlier narrations.
The housewife Ananya experiences the empowering effect of ownership 
of an aadhaar number. It relieves her of a tension that had always impacted 
her life, the fear of being discovered and then dismissed as an illegal migrant. 
An official proof of existence can act as a protective shield, especially for vul-
nerable populations for whom it becomes a highly prized commodity loaded 
with affective value. The homeless citizen shares this fate with the illegalized 
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immigrant. Life on the streets is harsh, and it is aggravated by the hostility 
of the security personnel guarding gentrified cities (Rao 2013). The vagabond 
is easily identified and equated with the beggar or the criminal and thus at-
tracts the disciplining intervention of the police force. “If you show them 
your aadhaar card, they know ‘this is an official man’ and they leave you 
alone,” explains Bapu, a rickshaw driver from Bihar, concerning the utility 
of an aadhaar card. He comes to Delhi every year for a few months after the 
end of harvest season to earn extra income for the household and the farm. 
In turn, the veteran, who was refused an aadhaar card, experiences a disrup-
tion to his sense of personhood. He identifies as a soldier of merit and is lucky 
to have a document that proves his status and entitles him to a range of state 
services, among them a pension and free health care. The introduction of the 
new identity system threatens to interrupt his ability to connect officially to 
this status and his rights because his body remains illegible in a system that 
requires vital finger ridges and pure irises. His grievance is of a particular 
note and different from the alienation experienced by Polas. Pratap strongly 
feels that he has given his body to the nation and that his ailments are a direct 
outcome of his sacrifice. The same state that took his health and strength is 
now demanding a virgin body that should be available for biometric capture. 
In turn, Polas experiences his sense of marginalization in contrast to his wife, 
who despite being an immigrant could easily get the new identity document, 
while he as her supporter could not and thus had his identity as an effective 
Head of Family questioned in view of the fact that he could no longer be the 
main applicant on official documents that would benefit him or his family.
At one level, then, these stories illustrate the discriminatory effect of the 
inclusion/exclusion dyad typically observed in studies on biometric technol-
ogy; on another level, they reveal the inefficiencies or even absurdities of the 
binary logic of governance founded on bodily measures. A burgeoning body of 
literature substantiates the exclusionary effect of biometric governance, rang-
ing from security situations to projects for social inclusion. The finding that 
technology itself discriminates is complemented by the study of the political 
economy in which some groups are more likely to be targets of biometric sur-
veillance than others (Kruger, Magnet, and Van Loon 2008). B. Ajana (2012) 
provides a compelling example by showing how the Iris Recognition Immigra-
tion System at airports is “widening the gap” between welcome travelers and 
unwanted immigrants in the UK border zone, aggravating already substantial 
inequalities. Those who have access to a biometric passport, who have volun-
teered their biometric data, and who have established their status as trusted 
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persons and desirable subjects can move without friction through electronic 
portals, thus bypassing lengthy immigration queues. This preselection filters 
the attention of officers and narrows it down to “difficult” cases, enhancing 
airport efficiency and the grip on persons declared to be illegal. In this volume, 
Daniel M. Goldstein and Carolina Alonso- Bejarano show how biometric sur-
veillance is exercised on specific racialized subjects whose migration status is 
put to the test. Shoshana Amielle Magnet (2011) analyzes programming and 
argues that biometric sorting is discriminatory because it builds on established 
social classification. Bodies are preselected according to stereotypical attributes 
of race and gender to reduce the size of the data set against which the unique-
ness of any particular body is established (see also Pugliese 2010).
These accounts contradict optimistic narratives that biometric technol-
ogy, in its new iteration as a universally applied system for electronic sorting, 
is natural and objective, and emerging in a fully emancipated manner that 
leaves behind the derogative assumptions about colonial subjects as deviant 
and deceitful that motivated the colonial sciences of anthropometry and dac-
tyloscopy (Sekula 1986; Cole 2001; Maguire 2009). Instead, biometric technol-
ogy continues to produce the deviant body, even if it is no longer based on a 
priori negative classification of people through the lenses of race ideology or 
the criminal justice system. Discrimination in the case of the aadhaar system 
results from the underlying assumption that biometric technology is uni-
versally applicable equally to all human beings and will function regardless 
of class, status, education, or any other social characteristics. The aadhaar 
system does not target specific groups for inclusion or exclusion. It does not 
confirm citizenship like a passport, the right to vote like a voter id, or the 
status of a welfare beneficiary as the ration card, the latter being widely used 
in India by poor people as an identity document. In this sense of delinking 
the processes of identification from the making of specific identity claims, it 
differs from most other identity projects in the world and produces the much- 
praised potential for interoperability. By simply recording the uniqueness of 
a person, aadhaar establishes what Nanden Nilekani calls a “thin” identity.
A few months after his appointment as chairman, Nandan met K. V. Ka-
math, then the chairman of icici bank, to deliver a presentation about 
Aadhaar and its uses. At the end of the talk an amazed Kamath declared 
that the entire scheme boasted of a “diabolical simplicity.” Part of the 
reason for this simplicity was purely practical — if you have to collect 1.2 
billion data sets that will be compared against each other every time a 
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resident uses their Aadhaar number it’s best to collect the least possible 
amount of information. Pragmatism also dictates that the path to success is 
easier if you provide a “thin” solution — one that does not infringe on turf 
that other government agencies lay claim to. Aadhaar provides a single, 
clearly defined piece of information — a person’s identity — and nothing 
more. (Nilekani and Shah 2015, 10)
This technical view of aadhaar as simply proving “uniqueness” through 
biometric identifiers, and as such saying nothing about a person’s identity, 
discounts the fact that in an environment of near universality of aadhaar, 
owning an aadhaar number in itself becomes a status that can be negatively 
contrasted to not having one, or being classified as an “error.” The discrimi-
nation of those not given an aadhaar number is amplified in a context of 
interoperability, whereby denial at one access point can lead to chains of ex-
clusion. The aadhaar identity is linked to an individual’s personal informa-
tion, and through this, “the uidai will be creating a transaction identity for 
each resident that is both verified and reliable” (uidai 2010, 33) because it is 
transported into a networked system of information exchange. As a power-
ful truth- telling practice, biometric- based verification thereby renders those 
bodies/identities that are not readable by the biometric machine into unveri-
fiable and unreliable identities and therefore outside the realm of legitimized 
knowledge, thereby making them categorically suspicious (Maguire 2009, 13; 
see also Hristova 2014). These errors of exclusion and inclusion speak to the 
topic of discrimination. However, they also point to the blind spot of biomet-
ric governance that undermines the goal of perfected population manage-
ment and universal interoperability of services.
The epistemological position underlying the universalizing aadhaar proj-
ect assumes a specific biometric norm that regards the human body as adher-
ing to this norm of possessing stable markers available for biometric inspec-
tion at any time and any place. Such a presumption sets humans up for failure 
since it ignores that “normality equals activity and flexibility” (Rabinow 1998, 
196). In his comparative discussion of Michel Foucault and Georges Canguil-
hem, Rabinow elaborates the dialectical relation between norm and error. 
Scientific modernity is invested in the formulation of “the normal” as a stable 
truth that may guide the interpretation of life and direct the activity of nor-
malizing the deviant through medical interventions or the reform activities 
of institutions such as the school, the clinic, or the prison. The notion of the 
normal and the activity of normalizing deny the dynamic power of life that 
THE TRUTH OF THE ERROR 35
is forever changing and adapting, or, in other words, the artifice of the norm 
turns life into an error (see also Maguire and Fussy 2016).
So what happens when the normalizing activity of scientifically measur-
ing an apparently stable truth runs up against the multiple mutation of life? 
It is acknowledged in the calculation of the error margins and is addressed 
through the continuous work of reclassifying and adapting the categories 
that may create new frameworks that will, however, continue to clash with 
endless variations of dynamic life (Bowker and Star 1999; Singh and Jackson 
2017). The work of structuring is a site of political and social struggle precisely 
because it imposes clear boundaries between phenomena. In our case, the 
lauded simplicity of the aadhaar’s biometric measure makes for an especially 
rigid system since the binary yes/no classification leaves no space for negoti-
ating the error — technical and social — at the margins. Accordingly, Ananya 
becomes legitimized as a resident despite the lack of official recognition of her 
status, while Polas and Pratap are now part of an unknowable shadow popula-
tion outside the gaze of a biometrically enabled state. They exist in what Mur-
ray calls the “negative space archive” of biometric governance:
Common to any introductory drawing class is the negative space drawing 
exercise. Such a drawing, of a chair, for example, develops not through a 
focus on the chair, but on the space around and inside the chair (between 
the legs and the slits in the back). The most well- known version of a nega-
tive space drawing depicts either two faces in profile looking at each other 
or a vase, depending on how one looks at it. Although “negative” space is 
described in relation to “positive” space (positive space is the shape of the 
chair as opposed to the shape of the space around the chair), a look at this 
type of drawing, at these types of spaces, makes clear that making mean-
ing of such a drawing depends on both spaces existing at once. (Murray 
2007, 350)
The illegible body of the negative space archive is troubling for a number of 
reasons. It turns people into “monsters” or aberrations from the norm (Mur-
ray 2007), and it creates an ungovernable population along lines that are un-
predictable or apparently unmotivated. The error shares a space with fraud, 
since a person refusing to show his aadhaar number or able to prove her iden-
tity biometrically could be an error or a fraud. He or she might be hiding her 
real identity or not have one. The system accepts and rejects in a manner that 
remains incomprehensible to citizens and operators alike, and depending on 
the result determines whether people can enter into relations with state agen-
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cies or private industry, buy a service, pay taxes, or receive welfare benefits. 
While the aadhaar number in most contexts may not be sufficient for claim-
ing a right or conducting a transaction, the lack of it produces a new status 
as an outsider. The magnitude of the concern clearly emerges when one adds 
to the issue of unbiometrifiable people the irregularities of the verification 
processes.
The errors of enrollment are complemented by the exclusions occurring 
during verification. People routinely using fingerprinting devices find them 
wanting in situations when they sweat, use cream or oil, or apply henna for 
decoration (Rao 2017). In winter, stiffness hinders a swift reading of finger 
ridges, and after- harvest calluses prevent verification; cooking also inflicts 
burns that often require days to heal. The exclusion is temporary for some 
and permanent for others. As published regularly in newspapers and dis-
cussed in a growing body of scholarship (Murray 2007; Masiero 2016; Singh 
and Jackson 2017), there is ample evidence of the regularly high exclusion er-
rors caused especially by fingerprinting.2 The erratic acceptance or rejection 
of people has massive consequences for governance. Only by ignoring the 
volatility of this process and its inefficiencies can organizations maintain the 
semblance of “good governance.” Amma’s story is a case in point.
Amma is a widow who lives in Southwest Delhi, where the ration office 
trials biometrically enabled distribution of rations to people living below the 
poverty line. She is well known in the neighborhood and an acquaintance of 
the ration shop owner, who had sold to her subsidized grains for more than 
twenty years. She is the proud owner of an aadhaar number, and though she 
also signed up for the new biometrically enabled system of ration distribu-
tion, she has discovered that the fingerprint reader at the ration shop cannot 
recognize her finger. She comes every month and fails every month. The pro-
cedure is shameful for the shopkeeper, who tries to deflect responsibility for 
Amma’s plight by invoking the need for family solidarity: “I keep telling her 
to bring a younger relative, but she does not listen.” This statement refers to 
the rule that biometric authentication of any member of family listed on the 
ration card would be sufficient to verify the entitlement. The elderly woman 
has two adult sons. Yet, she laments that both have abandoned her. Neighbors 
report that she is indeed one of the most destitute widows in the locality. The 
tension between the different ways of knowing the elderly woman cannot be 
solved. Locally she is considered destitute on two accounts: first, she has no 
income, and second, there is no male family member to look after her. Being 
a single elderly widow in India is a curse. Yet, at the ration shop, the pity of 
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neighbors cannot save her. Here she is reduced to an unreadable body who 
cannot effectively claim her right to food.
Amma’s experience of rejection by her sons is exacerbated by the negli-
gence of an uncaring state, deepening her marginalization so much so that 
it causes discomfort also to her neighbors and the shopkeeper. The stubborn 
monthly appearance of her visibly neglected, poor, and frail body deflates 
claims of objectivity attributed to biometric governance. In the official sta-
tistics presented on the home page of the Delhi National Food Security, this 
error hides behind a smoke screen of absent figures. The column intended to 
list the number of failed biometric verifications has been disregarded, with 
the explicitly stated purpose to make nontransparent the difference between 
people who did not wish to and those who could not collect their monthly 
food ration (Rao 2017). This comforting opacity between people who choose 
to ignore a service and those who are ignored by the service melts away when 
shopkeepers, business correspondents, or it personnel come face- to- face with 
people and their claims, alternative stories, and paper evidence. In this situ-
ation, governments are unable to trace by which logic services are given or 
refused, and corporations can simply not sell biometrically enabled products 
to certain customers. Errors from the perspective of the service providers 
are a perverse inefficiency that translates into a loss of income, governmental 
opacity, or distributive injustice.
Our focus on life histories demonstrates the way the biometric system 
produces a sociological margin of error among those who live a particularly 
harsh life. When the idealized technonorm of the stable and legible body 
runs up against live bodies — which age, get hurt, or sweat — governance be-
comes uncertain. While maintenance of biomaterial as well as cleaning and 
preparing the body can enhance the success of biometric readings, it cannot 
bring about readings that tally with all the expectations. Life produces an 
excess of moments, conditions, and instances that cause a breakdown of the 
body- machine link. The body is or is not what it has become through the life 
lived by a person. This failure of bodies to comply with a specific technology 
complicates the effect of biometric technology, and it damages the idealized 
dream of biometric sorting as a purely technical and thus objective process. 
The notion of biometric identification as free from human manipulation was, 
as a matter of course, always going to be a fiction. All processes of sorting are 
based on classifications. Handing them over to new technical routines might 
hide the underlying distinctions, but they do not remove discrimination. By 
highlighting the classificatory work of the “error,” we have illustrated the 
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consequences of ignoring the negative space hidden in the archive of India’s 
aadhaar project. Truth emerges through a process of discriminating people 
who fail in view of algorithmically rendered norms, thereby creating exclu-
sions and blind spots. These mark the background before which some people 
can be legitimized. The “error” therefore is not the fault of the system or an 
unpredictable blunder; instead, it serves the purpose of bringing to the light 
the truth of which bodies pass and which do not.
Conclusion
Eight years after the introduction of aadhaar and the distribution of more 
than 1 billion aadhaar numbers, the significance of the system cannot be over-
stated. Officially, aadhaar is a voluntary system, but, in practice, it is difficult 
especially for the vulnerable to navigate complex bureaucratic systems with-
out this biometric proof of identity. Today, aadhaar is mandatory for welfare 
schemes, such as access to subsidized rations or propane gas cylinders. The 
Modi government is ready to make it a required part of the tax return applica-
tion and even children now need an aadhaar card to get a birth certificate or 
register at school. The rationale is that building a secure database will serve 
as a deterrent to fraud and exclude fake identities from any access to state ser-
vices. The “biometric imaginary” (Donovan 2015, 817) configures biometric 
surveillance as a necessary, suitable, and effective way of streamlining gov-
ernance by making transactions transparent (Sarkar 2014). However, rather 
than solving the identification crises, the deployment of biometric devices 
produces new worrying ambiguities and thus an alternative disorder.
Here we have been concerned with the production of the universalized 
norm of biometric identity and the errors that a specific practice of biomet-
ric verification produces. The application of biometric technology requires 
a particular kind of normalized body that may be at odds with the bodies 
of living people, which constantly adjust, change, or get mutilated over the 
course of harsh and complicated lives. The rejection of some bodies during 
the mandated technological rendering creates temporary or permanent ex-
clusions and belies the notion that the national biometric system will treat 
everyone equally. The life of the unreadable and unverifiable body is, indeed, 
a life that, albeit filled with experiences that are real, represents nothing in 
the biometric system. It gets cast aside as flawed and potentially suspicious, 
while simultaneously acting as a mirror of truth to the biometric system, 
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since unreason is the foundation for reason. The binary sorting of bodies into 
true and false produces a new foundational truth, where the lives lived in the 
erroneous margin are judged not only by the nontruth of error — the techni-
cal exclusion — but also by the judgment of unruly, unregistrable lives. The 
unruly life that is judged an error is also filled with images and visualities of 
the life of unreadable bodies — that is to say, a widow, or man having too large 
of a family — thus being caught in games of truth and error. By declaring that 
these erratic results stand in for an objective truth, those who pass, or do not 
pass, have been brought to the light of governmental reason.
Notes
1 Subsequently the family received substantial amount of public attention. See, for 
example, Daily Mail Reporter (2011).
2 See, for example, Malhotra (2017); Viswanath (2017); or Venkatanarayanan (2017).
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TWO
Injured by the Border
Security Buildup, Migrant Bodies, and Emergency 
Response in Southern Arizona
Ieva Jusionyte
Introduction: Body on the Line
His body was bisected by the line — la línea divisora, the dividing line, is 
what many here call the international boundary separating Mexico from the 
United States. Unable to move forward or retreat, the man was stuck, trapped 
under the border fence on the hill about two hundred yards south of the Mor-
ley pedestrian crossing between Nogales, Sonora, and Nogales, Arizona. That 
late afternoon about a decade ago, a group of Mexicans managed to fold up 
the metal sheets — formerly used by the military as aircraft landing pads in 
the Vietnam War — just enough to be able to crawl onto the U.S. soil. But he 
was not among those who succeeded in what the law designates an “illegal 
entry.” Emergency responders from both sides of the border were dispatched 
to the scene to rescue the trapped man.1
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Temo, one of the volunteer firefighters, the bomberos, in Nogales, Sonora, 
said that when they arrived they found twenty- something- year- old wedged 
halfway through the fence. His upper body was in Arizona, but his legs — they 
remained in Sonora. He pleaded with his rescuers, armed with hydraulic 
tools, popularly known as “the jaws of life,” to pull him back into Mexico. He 
didn’t want to end up in the United States, where the Border Patrol was wait-
ing to take him into custody. The bomberos tried, but without success. “We 
couldn’t get him out here [to Nogales, Sonora]. We had to push him over there 
[to Nogales, Arizona].” “Barefoot.” Apparently, when the man got stuck under 
the fence, he shouted at the passersby to help him out, hoping that someone 
would pull him back into Mexico. Instead, they stole his sneakers.
“Qué chiste!” What a joke! Temo laughed, telling me about this incident, 
one among many he has witnessed during his career as an emergency re-
sponder on the U.S.- Mexico border. Before joining the bomberos, Temo spent 
fourteen years volunteering for the Mexican Red Cross. His passion has al-
ways been rescue — confined- space rescue, high- altitude rope rescue, water 
rescue. He was assigned to the central station, the closest firehouse to the bor-
der. The day of our interview Temo was on twenty- four- hour shift, and our 
conversation kept being interrupted by the dispatch calling him on the radio.
How are the marks that security enforcement on the U.S.- Mexico border 
leaves on the bodies of unauthorized migrants used both as evidence of their 
victimhood, entitling them to medical care, and their illegality, warranting 
detention and deportation? This chapter looks at the injured body of the mi-
grant as contested evidence entangled in overlapping, yet divergent regimes of 
power and knowledge in emergency medical care and security enforcement. 
Paramedics who work for local fire departments in southern Arizona are of-
ten called to help people who bear the direct consequences of increased secu-
ritization and militarization of the region: unauthorized entrants who break 
their legs when trying to jump over the fence or who suffer from severe de-
hydration and even heat stroke while crossing hazardous desert terrain in an 
attempt to avoid checkpoints on all northbound roads. The law requires pre-
hospital medical service providers to screen, treat, and stabilize anyone who 
seeks emergency medical care regardless of her or his legal status. Yet, crimi-
nalization of migration and security buildup on the U.S. Southwest border 
have created tensions between federal, state, and local authorities and taxpay-
ing residents regarding limited resources and uncompensated costs incurred 
rescuing border crossers. These disagreements have led to a redefinition of 
access to lifesaving treatment. Unauthorized border crossers who call 911 
INJURED BY THE BORDER 45
routinely get redirected to the Border Patrol instead of the local fire and res-
cue departments. Prior to receiving medical attention, they are often placed 
into Border Patrol custody and later deported straight from the hospital — 
 if they are taken there in the first place.
I begin this chapter with an overview of research and scholarship on the 
risks and dangers that unauthorized migrants face when they try to cross the 
border from Mexico to the United States. The hazards have changed — they 
have intensified — as a direct consequence of new border security infrastruc-
tures and surveillance technologies that the Border Patrol developed and put 
in place along the international boundary. The U.S.- Mexico border has be-
come the frontline in the “war on drugs” as well as what looks like a “war” on 
undocumented migration — in fact, from the federal agency’s standpoint and 
often in practice, the two are inseparable. Using data collected during eth-
nographic research in fire and rescue departments along the Arizona- Sonora 
border in 2015 – 16, I discuss how firefighters and paramedics navigate ethi-
cal, legal, and political directives when they are called to rescue injured bor-
der crossers. The most difficult, and controversial, part of their job becomes 
the ability to recognize when the scene is safe to treat the patient because it 
requires emergency responders to make rash distinctions between undocu-
mented migrants, or the “good guys” who deserve help, and drug runners, or 
the “bad guys” who pose danger to the rescuers themselves and should not 
be approached until they are in the custody of the Border Patrol. Through re-
peated encounters with injured border crossers, emergency responders have 
developed skills to read migrant bodies for evidence, enabling them to make 
ethical decisions about safe provision of medical care in potentially violent 
encounters along the border.
Injuries Are Not Accidents
Many life- threatening injuries in the U.S.- Mexico border space are not ac-
cidents. Rather, they result from structural conditions created by the escala-
tion of violence and security enforcement in the borderlands. Criminalization 
of immigration, which took off in the 1990s and was further radicalized by 
concerns with terrorism in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, led the U.S. 
government to designate its southwestern border with Mexico as a threat to 
homeland security, thereby justifying amassing law enforcement resources 
to protect it and waging in the borderlands what has been likened to “a low- 
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intensity warfare” (Dunn 1996). To deter unauthorized entry, the government 
has employed a combination of personnel, technology, and infrastructure, 
which have made crossing the border considerably more difficult.
Present border security policies are traced back to Operation Blockade / 
Hold the Line in El Paso, Texas, in 1993; Operation Gatekeeper in San Di-
ego, California, in 1994; and Operation Safeguard in Nogales, Arizona, the 
same year. These strategies focused on fortifying urban areas that had tradi-
tionally been the most popular crossing corridors for unauthorized migrants 
(Nevins 2010). The Border Patrol’s strategic plan, which the agency adopted 
in 1994, was aimed at deterring unauthorized entry by making towns less 
accessible — building a taller fence that is more difficult to scale without get-
ting seriously hurt and deploying more Border Patrol agents to watch over it. 
Known as “prevention- through- deterrence,” this strategy was expected to re-
direct migrants toward the inhospitable terrain of the Sonoran Desert, which 
was “less suited for crossing and more suited for enforcement” (usbp 1994, 
7). There would be no need (authors of the plan thought) to install a fence 
all along the U.S.- Mexico border. Further from the urban areas, the harsh 
environment itself would serve as an effective barrier and a discouragement. 
It didn’t happen exactly the way the Border Patrol predicted. The difficulty 
of this life- threatening journey did not dissuade migrants from trying to get 
across. Many were effectively rerouted away from border towns, as the strat-
egy had intended, and pushed into the desert, creating what scholars have 
called “the funnel effect” (Rubio- Goldsmith et al. 2006). But they were not 
deterred. Instead, they learned to adapt to the new circumstances and the 
increasingly dangerous itinerary.
In response to continuing unauthorized migration through the Sonora- 
Arizona border, earlier government policies were updated and expanded, 
first, through the Secure Border Initiative (sbi), and, most recently, by adopt-
ing the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan. The most visible and 
substantial investments in the latest stages of border militarization have been 
the physical and the so- called virtual wall to separate Mexican and predomi-
nantly Mexican American communities on both sides of the international 
divide (Heyman 2008; McGuire 2013). The U.S. Border Patrol, operating un-
der the Department of Homeland Security, uses advanced technologies of 
policing and detection, combining remotely operated infrared cameras, heat 
sensors, tower- mounted radars, and unmanned aerial vehicles (uavs, such as 
Predator- B drones). Statistical data is often unreliable in evaluating such mea-
sures in terms of their effectiveness at deterring or intercepting drug traffick-
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ing and human smuggling into the United States (Isacson, Meyer, and Davis 
2013). However, it has been demonstrated that the trend of border militariza-
tion that began in the 1990s and escalated after 9/11 — including the adoption 
of “prevention- through- deterrence” as the primary immigration enforcement 
strategy, the increase in the numbers of the U.S. Border Patrol agents, and the 
parallel multiplication of the Mexican military — have all added to the escala-
tion of violence and resulted in a border- crossing experience that is extremely 
dangerous (Cornelius 2001; Rubio- Goldsmith et al. 2006; Jimenez 2009; Doty 
2011; Slack and Whiteford 2011; Infante et al. 2012; De León 2015 ).
Stringent security policies are directly linked to the routinization of mi-
grant deaths. According to a report prepared in 2009 by the American Civil 
Liberties Union (aclu), deaths of an estimated 5,607 unauthorized migrants 
over the last fifteen years were a predictable and inhumane outcome of border 
security policies (Jimenez 2009, 7 – 8). Migrants who are trying to cross into 
the United States are funneled into less policed but more geographically and 
environmentally difficult desert and mountain areas in Arizona. Increasingly, 
they have come to rely on guides linked to drug cartels, leading to robber-
ies, kidnapping, physical abuse, and rape (Jimenez 2009, 25). Some get lost or 
are abandoned by smugglers, especially when they are injured or in distress. 
Most deaths occur due to environmental factors, primarily from exposure 
to extreme heat or cold (temperatures can reach over 120 degrees Fahrenheit 
during summer days and drop below freezing during winter nights) and de-
hydration, as people typically never carry enough water to sustain themselves 
on a multiday crossing (De León 2012). Researchers and activists who work 
with recovering, identifying, and repatriating migrant remains note that be-
sides existing diseases, other common causes of death while crossing the bor-
der include blunt force injuries, train and motor vehicle accidents, gunshot 
wounds, natural disasters, such as fire and drowning in rivers and irrigation 
canals (Jimenez 2009, 24). Referring to these deaths as a result of “natural 
causes” or “unintended effects” of “prevention- through- deterrence” deflects 
official responsibility (Doty 2009).
There are specific patterns of injury and death that can be traced back 
to border securitization and militarization. For example, drawing on ethno-
graphic and archaeological data from the Undocumented Migration Proj-
ect in the Sonoran Desert, Jason De León (2012) has shown how material 
objects that migrants adopt to help them avoid being caught by border en-
forcement agents — black plastic water jugs, cheap sneakers, darkly colored 
clothes — act on people’s bodies, causing specific types of injuries. By exam-
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ining “use- wear” of objects that migrants take with them across the border, 
he argues that border crossing is a well- structured, dangerous, and violent 
social process (480). Jeremy Slack and Scott Whiteford (2011) have described 
how migrants are made vulnerable through encounters with the Border Pa-
trol, coyotes, bandits, and traffickers. They note that women, children, and 
monolingual indigenous migrants face the greatest risk. Wendy Vogt (2013) 
has discussed injuries experienced by Central American migrants, as their 
bodies become commodities in the economies of violence and humanitar-
ian aid during their journey across Mexico. Her research in migrant shelters 
documents stories of mutilation when people fall off the freight trains collo-
quially known as La Bestia, as well as rape and assault. These occurrences are 
not accidents — they must be understood as the result of structural, state, and 
local economies of violence and inequality.
Despite the risks, many migrants make it across the border alive, but be-
cause of severe injuries caused by the journey, they are in need of emergency 
medical care. In addition to heat exhaustion, dehydration, and hypothermia, 
they suffer spinal fractures and other orthopedic injuries resulting from try-
ing to jump the border fence, friction blisters, intestinal illness from drinking 
contaminated water in cattle tanks, and major traumas from human smug-
gling van rollovers and other transportation- related injuries. The close rela-
tionship between securitization of the border and increased number of medi-
cal emergencies treated by emergency medical services (ems) is illustrated 
by the following detail: Nogales International reported that when in 2011 the 
government doubled the height of the border fence in the city, the number 
of times fire department ambulances transported someone from the border 
spiked (Prendergast 2013).
To reduce the number of deaths, the Border Patrol created a special Search, 
Trauma, and Rescue Unit (borstar). Yet the role of borstar is rather con-
troversial because at other times border enforcement agents are the ones re-
sponsible for injuring migrants (Jimenez 2009; Isacson, Meyer, and Davis 
2013; Martínez, Slack, and Heyman 2013). To mitigate the deadly effects of 
security policies, humanitarian organizations, such as Humane Borders, Tuc-
son Samaritans, and No More Deaths, among others, took on the task of 
rescuing unauthorized migrants and providing them first aid (Magaña 2008; 
Doty 2009). Volunteers build water stations stocked with food, clothing, and 
first- aid kits and set up medical camps. They also patrol the desert on foot 
and in vehicles in search for migrants who need help. In situations, when their 
condition is critical — for example, the border crossers have altered mental 
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status, difficulty breathing, or snake bites — the volunteers try to persuade 
migrants to allow them to call 911 and transfer them to local medical facilities. 
Law enforcement officers at Arizona’s ports of entry also have prosecutorial 
discretion, which enables them to consider the person’s condition and use 
humanitarian parole to temporarily admit immigrants for health reasons, 
even when the patients do not have a passport and a visa allowing them to 
travel across the border.
But none of them — neither the Border Patrol agents, nor immigrations 
officers at the ports of entry, nor humanitarian aid volunteers — have the in-
discriminate provision of prehospital medical services as the official mandate 
of their job. In southern Arizona, this task belongs to firefighters, trained as 
emergency medical technicians and paramedics. The ethical framework that 
underlies the principles of healthcare distinguishes emergency responders 
from Border Patrol agents, who, even when trained in first aid, are primarily 
concerned with enforcing the law. Their affiliation with local governments 
also sets them apart from humanitarian volunteers who are not accountable 
to or representative of the state. How do these local public service employees 
negotiate their seemingly contradictory functions of being part of the state 
while at the same time rescuing those injured by that state’s policies?
Trauma and Ethics of Distinction
Let us return to the scenario recounted in the beginning of this chapter. Al-
though the man who got trapped under the fence in Nogales was not critically 
injured, his case illustrates the predicament that injured border crossers face 
when security logic and humanitarian ethics compete and overlap. In the late 
2000s, when this incident occurred, emergency responders were regularly 
dispatched to help people who tried to breech the border fence, which, in turn, 
mutilated their bodies. The most graphic of these were amputations caused 
by the sharp edges of the solid steel panels. Usually, they involved fingers that 
were cut off as border crossers tried to hold on to the top of the fence before 
jumping to the ground. This created a special type of jurisdictional problem. 
While the individual was now on U.S. soil, the person’s amputated fingers 
most often fell to the other side, into Mexico. Alex, a Mexican American fire-
fighter and emergency medical technician in Nogales, Arizona, remembers: 
“In some places they used to have openings at the bottom [of the fence] with 
grates on them for the water to go through. You could still see across and you 
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could see the fingers and the hands on the other side of the border [in Mex-
ico], and the people were over here [in the U.S.]. Sometimes we would reach 
over, grab the body part, and put it on ice.” The new slatted border wall, in-
stalled in 2011, is taller, reaching between eighteen and thirty feet. Those who 
try to climb over this bollard- style barrier, generally aided by a ladder on the 
Mexican side, may fall and fracture their legs or their spine. According to 
the prehospital emergency medical care protocols in southern Arizona, the 
mechanism of injury (a fall from a height of over twenty feet) qualifies these 
patients for air transport by helicopter to the University Medical Center in 
Tucson, the only Level 1 trauma facility in the region.
The fence is not the only mechanism of injury for transgressive migrant 
bodies. There are other tools in the Border Patrol’s infamous “prevention- 
through- deterrence” package. Policies of securitization and militarization on 
the U.S.- Mexico border tactically deploy both natural and manmade envi-
ronments — the weaponized terrain — to enforce the jurisdictional boundary 
between the two countries. This enforcement brutally manifests on the bod-
ies of those who do not have the required documents allowing them to cross 
through the designated port of entry. People who walk along the Nogales 
Wash through the underground tunnel get swept away by the turbulent water 
and may drown (Glionna 2016); those who clandestinely travel by rail suffer 
leg amputations if they fall onto the tracks under the moving train (Clark 
2011); many have been ejected from vehicles as their drivers tried to escape 
from the Border Patrol pursuing them on dangerously windy roads at night 
(Caesar 2009); and even more need medical treatment for dehydration, heat 
stroke, rhabdomyolysis, or hypothermia when they are exposed to extreme 
temperatures during the walk across the “hostile” desert terrain in rural areas, 
hoping to avoid checkpoints permanently installed on all northbound roads 
(De León 2015). Fire departments follow medical protocols that outline what 
mechanisms of injury and what signs and symptoms warrant transporting 
patients by air to the trauma center in Tucson. These are typically critical con-
ditions, in which any delay in surgery may be life threatening. The patient’s 
legal status in the country has no place in medical decision charts.
However, in the border zone, which extends a hundred miles north of the 
international boundary, policies guiding patient care at fire and rescue de-
partments in different counties and municipalities as well as the discretion 
of individual first responders affect whether the injuries that unauthorized 
migrants sustain are read only through a medical or also through a security 
lens. The law guarantees that anyone who is in critical condition in the United 
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States has the right to receive emergency treatment. But the border zone is 
what has been aptly called a “Constitution free zone,” where the location’s very 
proximity to the línea divisora, justifies the suspension of Fourth Amend-
ment Rights (Dorsey and Díaz- Barriga 2015, 208).2 Here, the application of 
the law is impeded by the physical terrain — remote, rugged, inaccessible — 
but also by the discourses and practices of state actors. Government agencies 
that articulate the border zone as “lawless,” where its representatives are seen 
as potentially vulnerable and thus permitted behaviors that would be marked 
as unlawful elsewhere in the United States, constitute the borderlands as an 
area endowed with these characteristics (see Pruitt 2014, 208).
The border fence that trapped the Mexican man separates the town of 
Nogales, Arizona, located in Santa Cruz County and estimated to have just 
over 20,000 residents, over 90 percent of them Hispanic or Latino, from its 
sister city, Nogales, Sonora, home to at least 300,000 residents. Together they 
are known to locals as Ambos Nogales (both Nogales), one community di-
vided by a wall. According to the data provided to me by the Nogales Fire De-
partment in 2015, about 10 percent of all emergency calls that they responded 
to were related to the border, whether it was to take over critical patients 
from the Mexican ambulances at one of the ports of entry or to help injured 
undocumented migrants. “We are not Border Patrol. Since he’s on this side 
of the fence, wherever it is, we had been told to treat that patient,” one fire 
captain explained. A thirty- year veteran of the Nogales Fire Department con-
tinued: “With that issue [referring the patient to the Border Patrol], you are 
making the ems people become involved with immigration enforcement.”3 
Yet he also noted that on those rare occasions when the Border Patrol is not 
yet on scene — usually they are the ones who find injured border crossers and 
request an ambulance — emergency responders have to call the Border Patrol 
because that is the only way for the fire department to receive compensation 
for the medications and supplies used to rescue, treat, and transport unau-
thorized migrants. Surprisingly, the federal agents are not eager to take cus-
tody of the “undocumented aliens” (udas), who, unless they are the guides 
or drug mules, are low on the Border Patrol’s list of priorities. The costs for 
reimbursing expensive helicopter rides from Nogales to Tucson have strained 
the federal institution’s budget, to an extent that firefighters I interviewed told 
me about numerous occasions in which the Border Patrol agents were avoid-
ing taking patients into custody. Local emergency responders arrived on the 
scene to find federal agents standing next to an injured “fence jumper.” But 
as in a badly staged performance, claiming that they had not witnessed what 
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happened nor had video footage to prove an unauthorized entry, agents acted 
as if they had no proof the person was in the country illegally.4
Nowhere is the tension between security politics, healthcare economy, and 
medical ethics as evident as in Arivaca, an unincorporated community of 
about seven hundred residents located eleven miles north of the border in 
southern Arizona’s Pima County, which is on a popular transit route through 
the desert between Nogales and Sasabe, used by undocumented migrants 
and drug smugglers alike. When I conducted fieldwork there in 2015, Arivaca 
had two emergency medical responders per shift covering a territory of over 
six hundred square miles. They were called to rescue migrants who fell into 
abandoned mine shafts, broke their bones when falling down steep crevices 
in the desert, or lost a lot of fluids during prolonged exposure to extreme 
heat. They helped men and women, old and young. But the small fire district 
with a very low budget could not afford to transport and treat such large 
numbers of injured migrants, and since Arizona has exhausted Medicare’s 
Section 1011 funds, which allowed them to be compensated for emergency 
treatment provided to unauthorized border crossers, their only recourse for 
getting reimbursement for patient care has been through the Border Patrol. 
Therefore, when called to help undocumented migrants, paramedics ask the 
Border Patrol to provide a transport authorization request (known as tar) 
number, which they include in the patient care reports and which their de-
partment later uses to send a bill to the federal agency. A Border Patrol vehicle 
then follows the ambulance to the hospital, which is often at least an hour 
away. Unless they are transported by helicopter and need trauma surgery 
at the University Medical Center in Tucson, patients who are in the Border 
Patrol’s custody are taken to the hospital’s southern campus and placed in a 
special security unit. Once released, unauthorized migrants are processed 
for deportation.
There is no law that obliges emergency responders to contact the Border 
Patrol when they provide treatment to unauthorized migrants. Most do it 
because of financial considerations. Some others ask for agents to provide 
security because they are concerned about their own safety. But in order to 
decide whether to call the Border Patrol, firefighters and paramedics must 
first recognize that their patient is in the country illegally. This recognition 
is not synonymous with racial profiling, though it often reinforces existing 
stereotypes. Rather, the skills of decoding coordinates of the call and reading 
signs of the bodies as evidence of illegal entry develop through years of re-
peated encounters with injured border crossers, allowing emergency respond-
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ers to identify those who could cause them harm, such as armed bandits or 
drug traffickers.
Even far from the international boundary, emergency responders with lo-
cal experience know with a great degree of confidence when the patient they 
are treating is an unauthorized border crosser. It comes down to location (on 
or off the road, home vs. “out there”), time of call (day or night), appearance 
(“tattered clothing” and the condition of their shoes), and, often, language 
(Spanish). Commonly, they further distinguish between undocumented mi-
grants and drug smugglers. “We’ve been around for so long that we know 
when they are drug runners or when they are just coming to find a job,” Car-
men, a Hispanic paramedic with the Tubac Fire District, explained to me in 
2015. Undocumented migrants “have been out there for days and days.” They 
are often very dehydrated; they are sick. “And most of the drug runners . . .  
are still kind of clean, they don’t stink as bad, and they are hydrated. . . . And 
of course they have the red lines here, where they carry the [drug] packs. So 
they’ll complain about their shoulders.”
In remote rural areas, and particularly when the first responders are fe-
male, they call law enforcement for their own safety and, considering that 
the closest sheriff’s deputy can be half an hour to an hour away, the Border 
Patrol usually shows up first. “It’s not the illegals that I am afraid of. It’s the 
drug runners,” said Tangye, a female Anglo paramedic and an interim chief 
of the Arivaca Fire District. “The illegals, they are tired, they are grateful for 
the help.”5 But paramedics feel less safe in the presence of drug smugglers. “A 
lot of those people [drug smugglers] carry guns. We don’t carry [bullet- proof] 
vests. We don’t carry guns, of course.” I spoke to Carmen the day after the 
press reported that two Mexican nationals (part of a five- man “rip crew” that 
crossed illegally into the United States seeking to steal drugs from smugglers 
in the vicinity of the nearby Peck Canyon) had been convicted of murder-
ing Border Patrol agent Brian Terry: “It’s not required for us to call Border 
Patrol — that’s not my job. But when you see them there . . . and we don’t know 
what they really want, you just get that gut feeling from some of them that 
you don’t trust them, unfortunately, a lot of them you don’t. Especially when 
you know that they were doing something wrong already. And at night. In 
the middle of nowhere. We don’t have radio service there. We didn’t have 
cell phone service. There’s nobody else out there. It’s just my partner and 
I.” Carmen said this to explain why, when she and her partner saw a group 
of people waving at them in a remote canyon, possibly asking for help, they 
didn’t stop the ambulance but called the Border Patrol instead, informing the 
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agents about the situation. She didn’t know whether they found the group, nor 
whether anybody was hurt.
Despite their skills at recognizing types of border crossers, recently emer-
gency medical responders have been struggling to tell them apart. The bound-
aries separating border crossers into the categories of migrants/patients and 
smugglers/criminals have been blurred since more migrants are now forced 
to carry drug loads as a form of payment for the crossing. It’s not easy to sort 
out who is who in the border zone, and rescue workers are torn between their 
mandate to help anybody and everybody and the number one rule of arriving 
on an emergency scene: scene safety. Thus, in some departments, paramedics 
will not respond to areas that are known corridors used by drug and human 
smugglers without the escort of the Border Patrol, even if this means delay-
ing medical care or compromising its ethics. In this “Constitution- free zone,” 
where invoking security justifies the bending of the laws, more and more 
often local fire departments are not even contacted to provide emergency 
medical services to injured border crossers. In 2015, the aclu criticized Santa 
Cruz and Pima Counties for violating the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment when the sheriffs’ departments “selectively referred” 
911 calls from migrants in distress directly to the Border Patrol, bypassing 
local first responders.
Uncertain State Actors
Firefighters occupy a legally and ethically ambiguous position vis- à- vis unau-
thorized migrants that they encounter along the U.S.- Mexico border. As em-
ployees of local governments they carry the insignia of power and authority, 
but they are also witnesses to the human trauma and suffering that federal 
and state policies cause on the fringes of the post- 911 security state. In their 
work as emergency responders, where they are charged with identifying and 
treating critical injuries, this task is complicated because firefighters have to 
read the signs displayed on the bodies of migrants through mismatched ethi-
cal and legal lenses and weigh them against their own concerns about per-
sonal safety and security.
A firefighter slogan proudly asserts, “We walk where the devil dances,” 
indicating that by the very nature of their job — to rescue, treat, and trans-
port people who are critically ill or injured — first responders live in a routine 
state of emergency. But they work in zones of risk and rescue that are un-
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evenly produced by broader political and socioeconomic processes. Nowhere 
is this more visible than on the U.S.- Mexico border, which since the 1990s 
has become a primary target of the “war on drugs,” the criminalization of 
migration, and the heightened security buildup. A number of policies on fed-
eral and state levels — including, but not limited to anti- immigrant legislation 
(Arizona’s sb 1070), the transfer of immigration enforcement to local police 
departments through 287(g) and the Secure Communities Program, surveil-
lance expansion under the Secure Border Initiative, and multiplying internal 
Border Patrol checkpoints on the roads leading away from the border — affect 
the lived experiences of local firefighters and paramedics, both limiting and 
expanding the scope of their work. On the one hand, it is now more difficult 
to maintain old commitments between communities on both sides of the bor-
der, such as assisting Mexican first responders with large fires and other mass 
casualty incidents in sister cities divided by the fence (Jusionyte 2015b). On the 
other hand, as we have seen, first responders are often called to help people 
who bear the direct consequences of increased border securitization and mili-
tarization: migrants who suffer traumatic injuries from trying to jump over 
the steel wall that separates urban neighborhoods, or who become dehydrated 
or hypothermic while crossing hazardous desert and mountain terrain in an 
attempt to avoid detection at checkpoints.
The issue is further complicated by the scarcity of resources in southern 
Arizona and the rising costs of healthcare in the United States. Researchers 
have documented how their illegal status in the United States affects migrants’ 
interactions with local government institutions, often limiting their access to 
vital public resources (Coutin 1999, 2000; Golash- Boza 2012; Menjívar and 
Abrego 2012; De Genova 2013; Dowling and Inda 2013, among others). In the 
context of state and local initiatives to police immigrant communities that 
extend deep into the interior of the country, such as the 287(g) and Secure 
Communities Program (Coleman 2012; Stuesse and Coleman 2014), they be-
come “entrapped” (Núñez and Heyman 2007). Their precarious position and 
insecurity prevent them from seeking legal, social, and medical services. This 
situation is acute in communities adjacent to the border, which, as transit 
spaces, are characterized by deep ambivalence toward migrants. Residents 
and local law enforcement personnel often regard migrants in terms of their 
illegality and reputed association with violence, thereby lacking legitimate 
claim to rights and limited resources within the communities through which 
they cross (Vogt 2013). In some areas along the U.S.- Mexico border, calls for 
medical assistance at the border became “a growing burden” on the finances 
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and resources of fire and ems departments. This is true beyond Arizona. For 
example, a fifth of all calls that the Calexico Fire Department in California re-
sponded to in 2011 — 725 emergencies — were associated with the border. Cited 
in the New York Times, Chief Pete Mercado said the department’s only ambu-
lance would sometimes make ten trips to the port of entry in a given day: “For 
many of those, he said, the department is not able to collect payment, while 
the ambulance is rendered unavailable for other emergencies. . . . [According 
to Mercado:] ‘We’ve absorbed the cost for all these years. I can’t express how 
difficult it is.’ ” During interviews that I conducted with fire officials along the 
Arizona- Sonora border, many shared these same concerns.
Some organizations criticize the U.S. federal government for shifting re-
sponsibility of providing emergency treatment to local authorities, encum-
bered with shrinking resources, thereby placing disproportionate burden for 
its security and immigration policies on Southwest border counties.6 Medical 
emergencies related to escalating violence and security measures have had sig-
nificant effects on these communities and local fire departments (Dinan 2013; 
Jusionyte 2015a). Local first responders — firefighters, emts, paramedics — 
as well as nurses and doctors who work in area hospitals, comply with the 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, known as emtala.7 
emtala requires that hospitals and emergency personnel provide all patients 
who arrive in an emergency department with mandatory medical screen-
ing examinations; stabilize patients before transit if an emergency medical 
condition exists; ensure patient safety during the transfer process; and treat 
anyone who needs emergency medical care regardless of income or immi-
gration status.8 However, my fieldwork confirms what has been underscored 
by research conducted in other settings: that relationships among incon-
gruous international and state policies, federal law, medical ethics, disposi-
tion of frontline healthcare personnel, and “illegal” patients are fraught with 
tension (e.g., Rosenthal 2007; Willen 2007; Heyman, Núñez, and Talavera 
2009; Castañeda 2011; Chavez 2012; Holmes 2012; Marrow 2012; Willen 2012; 
Holmes 2013; Huschke 2014) and require distinguishing between universal-
izing juridical arguments about formal entitlement to health rights and situ-
ationally specific moral arguments about deservingness (Willen 2007). These 
studies examine difficulties that migrants encounter accessing general health-
care services in host countries. Although many of them discuss emergency 
situations, in which the government mandates provision of lifesaving care to 
any patient regardless of his or her legal status, they do not focus on medical 
first responders who work primarily on critical injuries and largely outside of 
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the hospitals. The burden of reading bodies marked by violence and disease 
as either worthy of immediate help or a potential source of danger for first 
responders falls on them.
Historically developed within the military, only fairly recently has pre-
hospital medicine become a civilian field of healthcare, staffed by paid pro-
fessionals and volunteers (Haller 1992; Hutchinson 1996; Zink 2006). Since 
the 1970s their presence in neighborhoods across the United States, often in-
tegrated with the fire departments, has become routine. The history of the 
U.S. fire service written by social historians (Maclean 1992; Chetkovich 1997; 
Tebeau 2003) traces how firefighters, who risk their lives protecting life and 
property of others, became cultural icons of heroism, respected as the guard-
ians of the community. The development of rescue squads in particular en-
tails “the melding of men and technology into an efficient, lifesaving ma-
chine” (Tebeau 2003, 287), balancing on tensions between rationalism and 
expressiveness, efficiency and passion, modernity and tradition. Their role in 
responding to the 9/11 attacks, when 343 firefighters died under the collaps-
ing towers in New York City, has further solidified their iconicity as national 
heroes in the “war on terror” (Rothenbuhler 2005; Donahue 2011). Politically, 
administratively, and infrastructurally, fire and rescue departments across 
the United States have been incorporated into civil defense and federal emer-
gency management systems. Yet recent anthropological studies of homeland 
security and national preparedness (Lakoff 2007; Collier and Lakoff 2008; 
Lakoff 2008; Fosher 2009; Masco 2014), though they bring attention to emer-
gency response infrastructures, focus on the broader scale of strategic plan-
ning and protection of the body politic against catastrophic events rather 
than on the lived experiences of people who deal with emergency situations 
on a daily basis.
As other healthcare workers, prehospital emergency responders fit within 
the broader category of street- level bureaucrats, who wield considerable dis-
cretion in the day- to- day implementation of public programs (Lipsky 1980; 
Maynard- Moody and Musheno 2003; Proudfoot and McCann 2008). Anthro-
pologists interested in the contemporary state have studied contradictions 
between the formal and the pragmatic in government bureaucracies, as well 
as the broader tensions between law and cultural norms (see, among others, 
Herzfeld 1992, 1997; Feldman 2008; Chalfin 2010; Gupta 2012; Hull 2012; Fas-
sin 2013; Jauregui 2013). In the borderlands these “disemic” processes (Herz-
eld 1997) can be acutely visible, as Josiah Heyman’s (2000; 2002) extensive 
research at the ports of entry on the U.S.- Mexico border demonstrates. Emer-
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gency responders who rescue unauthorized migrants in southern Arizona 
also experience conflicts between state policies, on the one hand, and their 
professional, moral, and ethical obligations, on the other, which places them 
in an ambiguous position with respect to the law and to the state as political 
authority (Jusionyte 2015a).
Emergency medical technicians and paramedics have an exceptional 
status: in their work they disregard questions of legality and criminal back-
ground of their patients, which distinguishes them from other agents of the 
state who are more strictly bound to the law; yet they also occupy a peculiar 
symbolic and political niche in the national security apparatus. Emergency 
responders work at the fractures of what Pierre Bourdieu (1994; 1999) calls 
“the bureaucratic field” — the “splintered space” of the neoliberal state, where 
the state’s “left hand” (in charge of social functions: public education, health, 
housing, welfare) and its “right hand” (responsible for enforcing the economic 
discipline: the police, the courts, the prison) are struggling against each other 
over the definition and distribution of public goods (Wacquant 2010). Accord-
ing to Loïc Wacquant (2010, 201), these two hands are enmeshed in relations 
of antagonistic cooperation.
Ethnographic data from fieldwork that I conducted in fire and rescue de-
partments on the U.S.- Mexico border shows how this internal struggle un-
folds in practice. More and more often first responders, who rescue and treat 
unauthorized border crossers, are caught between the imperative of the state, 
or “security logic,” and the obligations of medicine, the “humanitarian rea-
son” (Fassin 2012). They operate at the point of friction between border en-
forcement and social- humanitarian policies. But, as we have seen, their de-
cision making is not limited to this conundrum of laws versus ethics, of the 
framework of security versus their humanitarian mandate. In remote areas 
along the U.S.- Mexico border, including the long stretches of the Sonoran 
Desert — inhospitable territory where the passage north is controlled by nar-
cos and bandits (Martinez 2014) — emergency responders navigate situations 
that hurt migrants but that also pose danger to those dispatched to rescue 
the injured. Their concern for safety adds another layer of complexity to an 
already difficult scenario of violence, security, and rescue that unfolds in the 
borderlands.
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Conclusion
Neither security infrastructure, such as a higher and longer border fence, nor 
anti- immigrant policies deter unauthorized migrants from attempting to cross 
the international boundary separating Mexico from the United States. Moti-
vated by prospective employment in agriculture fields, construction indus-
try, or domestic services; seeking to reunite with family members; or fleeing 
violence and poverty, they continue to breach the security perimeter, despite 
the government’s stepped- up attempts to reinforce it in the aftermath of 9/11. 
This does not mean that the Border Patrol’s strategy of “prevention- through- 
deterrence” has failed. Although migrants still get across, the buildup of se-
curity has made their journey from northern Sonora into southern Arizona 
particularly dangerous, even deadly. Funneled to travel through the most 
hazardous physical terrain, usually at the mercy of drug traffickers and ban-
dits who control the routes where the law and its enforcement stretch thin, 
unauthorized border crossers experience traumatic injury and disease: leg 
and spinal fractures, amputations, severe dehydration, kidney failure, and 
rape. The patterns of injuries that migrants incur on the Sonora- Arizona bor-
der have been so consistent that they provide evidence of failing immigration 
and security policies, implicating the state as the perpetrator of violence.
In this chapter I sketched out what happens once unauthorized migrants 
are subjected to competing ethical and legal mandates that regulate the ac-
tions of emergency responders. In southern Arizona, the ill and injured — 
 whether they are long- term residents of towns and ranches or travelers in 
transit to their destinations farther north — receive prehospital medical care 
from paramedics employed by the city or county fire departments. Although, 
as public service workers, they are incorporated into the post- 9/11 state ap-
paratus and obliged to follow the political and legal directives that prioritize 
homeland security over government’s social functions, emergency respond-
ers understand their mandate to be that of saving lives, regardless of whether 
the people they rescue, treat, and transport are U.S. or foreign citizens and 
whether they are in the country with or without the permission of the federal 
authorities.
However, as the traumatic injuries that migrants experience have become 
routine while the costs of healthcare in the United States continue to rise, 
residents in border communities have become concerned about insufficient 
resources available to provide lifesaving treatment to everyone in need. The 
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federal government, which created the policies and infrastructures that for-
tified the border, does not have a mechanism to deal with the social and 
economic effects of “prevention- through- deterrence” on counties and mu-
nicipalities that provide emergency medical services to those injured by this 
security strategy. As tensions regarding resources for treating unauthorized 
migrants in Arivaca, Nogales, and other communities in southern Arizona 
rise, emergency responders have been forced to participate in immigration 
policing — their only option for having the federal government pay for the 
medical services provided to undocumented border crossers has been to call 
the Border Patrol and ask the federal agents to take their patient into custody.
In this new role, not written into law but widely adopted in practice, emer-
gency responders interpret the signs on the bodies for evidence of illegal bor-
der crossing. They note the types and degrees of injuries; they look and listen 
for social clues; they decode time and space coordinates — all in an attempt 
to find clues of criminality and pointers of risk. None of these are decisive 
proof of unauthorized entry or of threat to the safety of firefighters and para-
medics, not even when they are sent to remote patches of the borderlands 
that have fallen under the control of powerful criminal groups and violent 
bandits. Bodily evidence is not conclusive, and making patient care decisions 
based on appearances is both ethically and legally problematic. Yet, because 
of social pressure, financial concerns, and safety considerations, emergency 
responders who work in the criminalized and marginalized U.S.- Mexico bor-
derlands have learned and now routinely deploy their skills to sort patients 
into several sociolegal categories, which unofficially complements decision 
making based on medical protocols. Inadvertently distinguishing the docile 
bodies of injured migrants from potentially threatening bodies of their guides 
or from those of drug smugglers further deepens the schism that exists be-
tween evidential regimes underlying federal law, medical ethics, and security 
logics.
Notes
 This ethnographic project was supported by grants from the National Science 
Foundation, the Wenner- Gren Foundation, and the Humanities Scholarship En-
hancement Award at the University of Florida.
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1 Unless noted otherwise, the stories are based on ethnographic interviews I con-
ducted with emergency responders during fieldwork in southern Arizona and 
northern Sonora between May 2015 and June 2016.
2 According to Dorsey and Díaz- Barriga (2015), citizens who live in the Rio Grande 
Valley of Texas do not have the right “to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers and effects,” which is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Border Patrol 
and Texas Department of Public Safety (who now act as the Border Patrol due to 
287[G] legislation) can pull citizens over and search cars without cause.
3 The Border Patrol is usually first on scene, so firefighters and paramedics rarely 
have to decide whether to call them.
4 If the Border Patrol has no documentation (such as camera footage) of an indi-
vidual entering the country through an unauthorized passage, they don’t have 
to take the person into custody, and they often avoid doing so to save costs. 
Firefighters began writing down the badge numbers of agents and the registra-
tion plate numbers of their vehicles, so that they could later prove that they were 
present, allowing the department to bill the Border Patrol for the call. However, 
at the federal government’s request they can no longer take down this informa-
tion, because that could be “compromising their safety,” if, for example, the notes 
were leaked and the media found out which agents were present on scene.
5 No emergency responder I have interviewed has ever been threatened or as-
saulted by an undocumented migrant.
6 According to a September 2002 report prepared by United States / Mexico Bor-
der Counties Coalition and mgt of America, “Medical Emergency: Costs of Un-
compensated Care in Southwest Border Counties,” in the early 2000s the costs 
of providing emergency medical care to undocumented migrants reached $200 
million, accounting for an estimated 25 percent of Southwest border hospitals’ 
and an undetermined percentage of emergency medical service’s (ems) uncom-
pensated costs (mgt of America 2002).
7 More detailed information on emtala can be found on the website adminis-
tered by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (cms 2012).
8 Another law from 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (prwora), limits Medicaid benefits for undocumented im-
migrants to emergency health services and non- Medicaid funded public health 
assistance (such as immunizations, communicable disease treatment).
References
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1994. “Rethinking the State: On the Genesis and Structure of the 
Bureaucratic Field.” Sociological Theory 12(1): 1 – 19.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1999. “The Abdication of the State.” In The Weight of the World: 
62 IEVA JUSIONYTE 
Social Suffering in Contemporary Society, edited by Pierre Bourdieu, 181 – 88. 
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Caesar, Stephen. 2009. “Rollover Kills 8 in suv near Sonoita.” Arizona Daily Star. 
June 8.
Castañeda, Heide. 2011. “Medical Humanitarianism and Physicians’ Organized Ef-
forts to Provide Aid to Unauthorized Migrants in Germany.” Human Organi-
zation 70(1): 1 – 10.
Chalfin, Brenda. 2010. Neoliberal Frontiers: An Ethnography of Sovereignty in West 
Africa. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Chavez, Leo R. 2012. “Undocumented Immigrants and Their Use of Medical Ser-
vices in Orange County, California.” Social Science & Medicine 74(6): 887 – 93.
Chetkovich, Carol. 1997. Real Heat: Gender and Race in the Urban Fire Service. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Clark, Jonathan. 2011. “Migrant Teenager, Run Over by Train, Has Hope for Recov-
ery of Crushed Foot.” Nogales International. March 21.
cms (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services). 2012. “Emergency Treatment 
and Labor Act (emtala).” March 26. https://www.cms.gov/Regulations- and 
- Guidance/Legislation/EMTALA/.
Coleman, Mathew. 2012. “The ‘Local’ Migration State: The Site- Specific Devolution 
of Immigration Enforcement in the U.S. South.” Law and Policy 34(2): 159 – 90.
Collier, Stephen, and Andrew Lakoff. 2008. “Distributed Preparedness: The Spatial 
Logic of Domestic Security in the United States.” Environment and Planning D 
26(1): 7 – 28.
Cornelius, Wayne A. 2001. “Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unintended Conse-
quences of U.S. Immigration Control Policy.” Population and Development 
Review 27(4): 661 – 85.
Coutin, Susan Bibler. 1999. “Citizenship and Clandestiny among Salvadoran Immi-
grants.” polar: Political and Legal Anthropology Review 22(2): 53 – 63.
Coutin, Susan Bibler. 2000. Legalizing Moves: Salvadoran Immigrants’ Struggle for 
U.S. Residency. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
De Genova, Nicholas. 2013. “Spectacles of Migrant ‘Illegality’: The Scene of Exclu-
sion, the Obscene of Inclusion.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36(7): 1180 – 98.
De León, Jason. 2012. “ ‘Better to Be Hot Than Caught’: Excavating the Conflicting 
Roles of Migrant Material Culture.” American Anthropologist 114(3): 477 – 95.
De León, Jason. 2015. The Land of Open Graves: Living and Dying on the Migrant 
Trail. Oakland, CA: University of California Press.
Dinan, Stephen. 2013. “Federal Government Leaves Border Towns with Unpaid Am-
bulance Bills.” Washington Times. November 12.
Donahue, Katherine C. 2011. “What Are Heroes For? Commemoration and the Cre-
ation of Heroes after September 11.” Anthropology News 52(6): 6.
Dorsey, Margaret E., and Miguel Díaz- Barriga. 2015. “The Constitution Free Zone 
in the United States: Law and Life in a State of Carcelment.” polar: Political 
and Legal Anthropology Review 38(2): 204 – 25.
INJURED BY THE BORDER 63
Doty, Roxanne Lynn. 2009. The Law into Their Own Hands: Immigration and the 
Politics of Exceptionalism. Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press.
Doty, Roxanne Lynn. 2011. “Bare Life: Border- Crossing Deaths and Spaces of Moral 
Alibi.” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 29(4): 599 – 612.
Dowling, Julie, and Jonathan Xavier Inda, eds. 2013. Governing Immigration through 
Crime: A Reader. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Dunn, Timothy J. 1996. The Militarization of the U.S.- Mexico Border, 1978 – 1992: 
Low- Intensity Conflict Doctrine Comes Home. Austin, TX: cmas Books, Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin.
Fassin, Didier. 2012. Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
Feldman, Ilana. 2008. Governing Gaza: Bureaucracy, Authority, and the Work of 
Rule, 1917 – 1967. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Fosher, Kerry B. 2009. Under Construction: Making Homeland Security at the Local 
Level. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Glionna, John M. 2016. “Arizona Forensic Sleuths Labor to Identify Migrants Who 
Perished in Sonoran Desert.” Phoenix New Times. March 9.
Golash- Boza, Tanya Maria. 2012. Immigration Nation: Raids, Detentions, and De-
portations in Post- 9/11 America. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
Gupta, Akhil. 2012. Red Tape: Bureaucracy, Structural Violence, and Poverty in In-
dia. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Haller, John S. 1992. Farmcarts to Fords: A History of the Military Ambulance, 
1790 – 1925. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
Herzfeld, Michael. 1992. The Social Production of Indifference. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.
Herzfeld, Michael. 1997. Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation- State. New 
York: Routledge.
Heyman, Josiah McC. 2000. “Respect for Outsiders? Respect for the Law? The 
Moral Evaluation of High- Scale Issues by US Immigration Officers.” The Jour-
nal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 6(4): 635 – 52.
Heyman, Josiah McC. 2002. “U.S. Immigration Officers of Mexican Ancestry as 
Mexican Americans, Citizens, and Immigration Police.” Current Anthropology 
43(3): 479 – 507.
Heyman, Josiah McC. 2008. “Constructing a Virtual Wall: Race and Citizenship in 
U.S.- Mexico Border Policing.” Journal of the Southwest 50(3): 305 – 33.
Heyman, Josiah McC, Guillermina Núñez, and Victor Talavera. 2009. “Healthcare 
Access and Barriers for Unauthorized Immigrants in El Paso County, Texas.” 
Family and Community Health 32(1): 4 – 21.
Holmes, Seth M. 2012. “The Clinical Gaze in the Practice of Migrant Health:  
Mexican Migrants in the United States.” Social Science and Medicine 74(6): 
873 – 81.
Holmes, Seth M. 2013. Fresh Fruit, Broken Bodies: Migrant Farmworkers in the 
United States. Berkeley: University of California Press.
64 IEVA JUSIONYTE 
Hull, Matthew S. 2012. Government of Paper: The Materiality of Bureaucracy in Ur-
ban Pakistan. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Huschke, Susann. 2014. “Fragile Fabric: Illegality Knowledge, Social Capital and 
Health- Seeking of Undocumented Latin American Migrants in Berlin.” Jour-
nal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 40(12): 2010 – 29.
Hutchinson, John F. 1996. Champions of Charity: War and the Rise of the Red Cross. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Infante, César, Alvaro J. Idrovo, Mario S. Sánchez- Domínguez, Stéphane Vinhas, 
and Tonatiuh González- Vázquez. 2012. “Violence Committed against Migrants 
in Transit: Experiences on the Northern Mexican Border.” Journal of Immi-
grant Minority Health 14(1): 449 – 59.
Isacson, Adam, Maureen Meyer, and Ashley Davis. 2013. “Border Security and  
Migration: A Report from Arizona.” Washington Office on Latin America.  
December 5. https://www.wola.org/analysis/border- security- and- migration 
- a- report- from- arizona/.
Jauregui, Beatrice. 2013. “Beatings, Beacons, and Big Men: Police Disempowerment 
and Delegitimation in India.” Law and Social Inquiry 38(3): 643 – 69.
Jimenez, Maria. 2009. “Humanitarian Crisis: Migrant Deaths at the U.S.- Mexico  
Border.” Report by the American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego and  
Imperial Counties and Mexico’s National Commission of Human Rights. 
aclu. October 1. https://www.aclu.org/legal- document/humanitarian- crisis 
- migrant- deaths- us- mexico- border/.
Jusionyte, Ieva. 2015a. “First Responders Want to Help Migrants, but Immigration 
Policy Gets in the Way.” Guardian. September 21.
Jusionyte, Ieva. 2015b. “US, Mexico Depend on Each Other in Emergencies.” Ari-
zona Daily Star. December 10.
Lakoff, Andrew. 2007. “Preparing for the Next Emergency.” Public Culture 19(2): 247 – 71.
Lakoff, Andrew. 2008. “The Generic Biothreat, or, How We Became Unprepared.” 
Cultural Anthropology 23(3): 399 – 428.
Lipsky, Michael. 1980. Street- Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Pub-
lic Services. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Maclean, Norman. 1992. Young Men and Fire. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Magaña, Rocío. 2008. “Bodies on the Line: Life, Death, and Authority on the 
Arizona- Mexico Border.” PhD diss., University of Chicago.
Marrow, Helen B. 2012. “Deserving to a Point: Unauthorized Immigrants in San 
Francisco’s Universal Access Healthcare Model.” Social Science & Medicine 
74(6): 846 – 54.
Martínez, Daniel, Jeremy Slack, and Josiah McC. Heyman. 2013. “Part I: Migrant 
Mistreatment While in U.S. Custody.” In Bordering on Criminal: The Rou-
tine Abuse of Migrants in the Removal System. Washington, DC: Immigration 
Policy Center.
Martínez, Oscar. 2014. The Beast: Riding the Rails and Dodging Narcos on the Mi-
grant Trail. London: Verso.
INJURED BY THE BORDER 65
Masco, Joseph. 2014. The Theater of Operations: National Security Affect from the 
Cold War to the War on Terror. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Maynard- Moody, Steven, and Michael C. Musheno. 2003. Cops, Teachers, Counsel-
ors: Stories from the Front Lines of Public Service. Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press.
McGuire, Randall H. 2013. “Steel Walls and Picket Fences: Rematerializing the U.S.- 
Mexican Border in Ambos Nogales.” American Anthropologist 115(3): 466 – 80.
Menjívar, Cecilia, and Leisy J. Abrego. 2012. “Legal Violence: Immigration Law and 
the Lives of Central American Immigrants.” American Journal of Sociology 
117(5): 1380 – 1421.
mgt of America. 2002. “Medical Emergency: Costs of Uncompensated Care in 
Southwest Border Counties.” Report published by the United States/Mexico 
Border Counties Coalition, Washington, DC.
Nevins, Joseph. 2010. Operation Gatekeeper and Beyond: The War on “Illegals” and 
the Remaking of the U.S.- Mexico Boundary. New York: Routledge.
Núñez, Guillermina Gina, and Josiah McC. Heyman. 2007. “Entrapment Processes 
and Immigrant Communities in a Time of Heightened Border Vigilance.” Hu-
man Organization 66(4): 354 – 65.
Prendergast, Curt. 2013. “Border Ambulance Leaving City with $250k in Unpaid 
Bills.” Nogales International. October 25.
Proudfoot, Jesse, and Eugene J. McCann. 2008. “At Street Level: Bureaucratic Prac-
tice in the Management of Urban Neighborhood Change.” Urban Geography 
29(4): 348 – 70.
Pruitt, Lisa R. 2014. “The Rural Lawscape: Space Tames Law Tames Space.” In The 
Expanding Spaces of Law: A Timely Legal Geography, edited by I. Braverman, 
N. K. Blomley, D. Delaney, and A. Kedar, 190 – 214. Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni-
versity Press.
Rosenthal, Anat. 2007. “Battling for Survival, Battling for Moral Clarity: ‘Illegality’ 
and Illness in the Everyday Struggles of Undocumented hiv+ Women Migrant 
Workers in Tel Aviv.” International Migration 45(3): 134 – 56.
Rothenbuhler, Eric. 2005. “Ground Zero, the Firemen, and the Symbolics of Touch 
on 9/11 and After.” In Media Anthropology, edited by E. Rothenbuhler, and  
W. and M. Coman, 176 – 87. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Rubio- Goldsmith, Raquel, M. Melissa McCormick, Daniel Martinez, and Inez Mag-
dalena Duarte. 2006. “The ‘Funnel Effect’ and Recovered Bodies of Unauthor-
ized Migrants Processed by the Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner, 
1990 – 2005.” Report by the Binational Migration Institute, University of Ari-
zona, Tucson, AZ.
Slack, Jeremy, and Scott Whiteford. 2011. “Violence and Migration on the Arizona- 
Sonora Border.” Human Organization 70(1): 11 – 21.
Stuesse, Angela C., and Mathew Coleman. 2014. “Automobility, Immobility, Alter-
mobility: Surviving and Resisting the Intensification of Immigrant Policing.” 
City and Society 26(1): 51 – 72.
66 IEVA JUSIONYTE 
Tebeau, Mark. 2003. Eating Smoke: Fire in Urban America, 1800 – 1950. Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
usbp (U.S. Border Patrol). 1994. “Border Patrol Strategic Plan 1994 and Beyond:  
National Strategy.” Homeland Security Digital Library. July. https://www.hsdl 
.org/?abstract&did=721845.
Vogt, Wendy A. 2013. “Crossing Mexico: Structural Violence and the Commodifi-
cation of Undocumented Central American Migrants.” American Ethnologist 
40(4): 764 – 80.
Wacquant, Loïc. 2010. Crafting the Neoliberal State: Workfare, Prisonfare, and So-
cial Insecurity.” Sociological Forum 25(2): 197 – 220.
Willen, Sarah S. 2007. “Toward a Critical Phenomenology of ‘Illegality’: State Power, 
Criminalization, and Abjectivity among Undocumented Migrant Workers in 
Tel Aviv, Israel.” International Migration 45(3): 8 – 38.
Willen, Sarah S. 2012. “How Is Health- Related ‘Deservingness’ Reckoned? Perspec-
tives from Unauthorized Im/migrants in Tel Aviv.” Social Science and Medicine 
74(6): 812 – 21.




Securitized Immigration and Biometric Surveillance  
in the Workplace
Daniel M. Goldstein and Carolina Alonso- Bejarano
With the emergence in the United States of what Nicholas De Genova (2007) 
has termed “the Homeland Security State” and the rise of the undocumented 
noncitizen as the state’s particular object of regulation and control, policy 
makers and ordinary citizens alike now regard immigration to the United 
States as a major threat to national or “homeland” security (Chavez 2008; 
Inda 2011). Especially since the events of September 11, 2001, public discourse 
and law enforcement conflate undocumented immigrants with “terrorists,” 
constructing them as challenges to the sovereign territory of the United States 
who invade the country through clandestine border crossings, most notably 
at the U.S.- Mexico frontier (Miller 2005; Hing 2006). In addition, the undoc-
umented are imagined as a threat to national populations, the “legal” citi-
zens and residents whose interests are imagined to be in direct opposition to 
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those of the undocumented, who are thought to steal U.S. jobs, overtax U.S. 
social institutions, and contaminate the bodies and minds of U.S. citizens 
with their diseases and alien ways. All of this is captured in the concept of 
“illegality,” understood not merely as a legal designation but as an “existen-
tial condition,” identifying a particular kind of person thought to be different 
from, and threatening to, the social mainstream (Menjívar and Kanstroom 
2015, 2; see also De Genova 2002). The illegalization of millions of undocu-
mented people resident in the United States has produced “shadow popu-
lations,” communities of the undocumented living in distinct and separate 
worlds made invisible and insecure by immigration law, even as they remain 
important contributors to U.S. economic production and consumption (U.S. 
Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy 1981; Chavez 1998; 
Coleman and Stuesse 2014). U.S. immigration law and its enforcement thus 
produce an ingenious contradiction, in which the very people who are sup-
posed to be the cause of national insecurity are themselves rendered among 
the most insecure people in national space.
Meanwhile, in response to the perceived threat posed by the undocu-
mented, legislators have introduced a variety of laws represented as efforts 
to confront the “problem” of immigration. The most visible signs of these 
are at international borders, understood as the front lines in the unending 
war on terror. At these geopolitical frontiers, laws and technologies both old 
and new effect increased surveillance of foreigners trying to enter the United 
States, and enable the Customs and Border Patrol to capture and detain those 
apprehended crossing without authorization (Cornelius 2004; Levi and Wall 
2004; Maguire 2009; Maguire and Fussey 2016). Additionally, the focus of im-
migration law enforcement has expanded from the nation’s borders to include 
the spaces within those borders, part of the “securitization of immigration” — 
a shift in national security policy that “reconceptualizes security as the col-
lective management of subnational or transnational threats and the policing 
of borders and the internal realm, rather than just the defense of territory 
against external attack” (Faist 2002, 9; see also Bigo 2002; Bourbeau 2011). 
So, even as the U.S.- Mexico border has in recent years been increasingly mil-
itarized, with clandestine border crossings becoming ever- more risky and 
deadly, the policing of daily life in the cities, suburbs, and small towns of the 
United States has also intensified, incorporating new programs and technolo-
gies of detection and screening that allow for greater policing of immigrant 
bodies and that recruit new segments of the citizen population to enforce 
immigration law. This raises levels of anxiety and fear among immigrants 
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who drive cars, send their children to school, walk the streets, or work out-
side the home.
Mathew Coleman and Angela Stuesse (2014) have suggested that we con-
sider these varied forms of immigrant policing — both within and at the edges 
of national space — in terms of geopolitics and biopolitics, concepts that schol-
ars of immigration typically differentiate but that here are better understood 
as working in concert to produce and regulate immigrant shadow popula-
tions. Whereas border control is a geopolitical (or, for Coleman and Stuesse, 
a topographical) system by which transborder movement is regulated (to-
day through a strategy of “prevention through deterrence,” which forces im-
migrants into rougher and more dangerous terrain, intended to discourage 
immigration; De León 2015), the biopolitical (or topological) regulation of 
immigrants reaches beyond the specific site of the border, penetrating the 
interior of the nation and impacting immigrant daily life. Border geopolitics 
represents a “hard” system of enforcement, involving the building of walls 
and detention centers and making the United States into a “zone of confine-
ment” (Coutin 2010), contained by razor wire, metal fences, and concrete, 
and thus ever more difficult to enter (and re- enter). Interior biopolitics, on 
the other hand, includes “soft” forms of immigrant regulation, unlocalized 
and immanent, which shape the behavior of undocumented people within the 
United States while dangling the continual threat of removal. “Soft” tactics 
of immigrant policing include hindering immigrants’ ability to drive to work 
or to transport their children to school, limiting their “automobility” and 
making their lives more difficult (Stuesse and Coleman 2014). Immigrants 
have to alter their behavior to accommodate these interventions; and while 
some may elect to “self deport” (see Kobach 2008), the majority remain in the 
shadows, ever- more constrained in their options and liberties. The biopolitics 
of immigrant control target behavior modification rather than deportation, 
threatening removal without actually removing anyone: “interior enforce-
ment in the main,” Coleman and Stuesse say (2014, 52), “works by using the 
looming threat of territorial banishment as a result of traffic enforcement and 
other social reproduction- specific policing, in conjunction with the specter 
of lethal geopolitical infrastructures like the U.S.- Mexico border, to regulate 
the ways in which resident undocumented immigrant communities learn to 
socially reproduce as well as work.”
In this chapter, we examine the biopolitical regulation of immigrant be-
havior through another form of “social reproduction- specific policing,” this 
one centered on the immigrant workplace. Our focus is a web- based biomet-
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ric technology called E- Verify, which allows employers to determine their 
applicants’ and current workers’ eligibility to work in the United States. Since 
the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (irca) of 1986, fed-
eral law has prohibited employers from knowingly hiring people not autho-
rized to work in the United States. Meanwhile, lawmakers have struggled to 
balance the popular demand to protect the nation from the perceived immi-
grant threat with the demands of U.S. capital, which requires a steady supply 
of cheap undocumented labor (Zlolniski 2006). E- Verify serves these contra-
dictory interests. An instrument for what is known as worksite employment 
eligibility enforcement (Newman et al. 2012), E- Verify introduces the threat of 
deportation into the jobsite by promising to reveal the presence of an undocu-
mented worker to the state. It instills fear in undocumented people, discour-
aging them from pursuing their rights as workers while granting employers 
new disciplinary powers to pacify workers who threaten to do so (compare 
with previous studies, e.g., Heyman 1998; Zlolniski 2003). As a biometric tool, 
E- Verify deputizes private- sector employers as immigration control officers, 
empowering them to determine who is and who is not eligible to work and 
whether or not to expose the ineligible to the gaze of the state (Stumpf 2012). 
The technology sorts laboring bodies by their legal status, augmenting un-
documented workers’ vulnerability to exploitation without actually removing 
them from the space of the United States. At the same time, E- Verify conveys 
to the citizen public the appearance that the government is “serious” about 
immigration enforcement. Through E- Verify, the workplace becomes another 
site of immigrant surveillance and recognition, exploiting undocumented 
people’s “legal nonexistence” to enhance their vulnerability and submissive-
ness (Heyman 2001; Coutin 2003; Horton 2015). E- Verify signals legislators’ 
compliance with the politically popular goal of deporting all undocumented 
immigrants while maintaining the increasingly precarious subclass of non-
citizen workers required by U.S. business interests.
Scholars of immigration have debated whether immigration law is in fact 
intended to serve as labor law — that is, whether federal policy on immigra-
tion is designed with immigrant impact on labor markets explicitly taken 
into consideration (see, e.g., Delgado 1993; Heyman 1998). Clearly, E- Verify 
represents a direct intervention by the U.S. government in the sites where 
immigrants work; the fact that use of E- Verify is expanding even though the 
technology fails to achieve its stated objectives (discussed below) suggests 
that “immigration policies [and, we would add, technologies] that appear 
self- contradictory and ineffectual . . . are actually quite effective at maintain-
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ing a large and vulnerable undocumented work force” in the United States 
(Gomberg- Muñoz and Nussbaum- Barberena 2011, 367). Furthermore, as our 
ethnography shows, E- Verify is successful at instilling fear in the undocu-
mented noncitizen — not least of all due to the lack of understanding about 
E- Verify among the immigrant population — and immigrant workers modify 
their behaviors in response. E- Verify, it can thus be argued, represents an ef-
fective biopolitical tool for a “soft” immigration policing, enacting policy pre-
scriptions and controlling threatening populations through the deployment 
of biometric technology that gestures to the “hard” enforcement of the geo-
political border and so functions in collaboration with it. E- Verify screens out 
ineligible workers while neither detaining nor removing them from national 
space; it inspires fear in the objects of its attention, shaping consciousness and 
bodily praxis without providing the recognition that might convey rights or 
underwrite claims for citizenship or national belonging.
E- Verify: Biometric Surveillance in the Workplace
E- Verify, while a relatively recent innovation, is not unprecedented as a form 
of biopolitical regulation. Beginning in the late 1970s but intensifying in the 
1990s, federal authorities expanded policing of the U.S.- Mexico border as its 
principal strategy to control undocumented immigration into the country 
(Nevins 2002). The plan was to fortify the border itself through the “hard” 
technologies of enforcement: stronger and higher fencing across a wider ex-
panse of terrain; increased surveillance through lighting, video cameras, and 
heat- sensitive detection equipment; and a significant increase in Border Pa-
trol personnel. This approach to immigration control was authorized through 
federal legislation like the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act (iirira) of 1996, which criminalized violation of U.S. im-
migration laws and expanded the range of people who could be deported on 
the basis of such violations (Dowling and Inda 2013). Already ten years earlier, 
authorities had begun to turn their attention to the regulation of immigrant 
life within the territory of the United States itself. Most significant was the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (irca), which Jonathan Xavier 
Inda (2013, 303) says, “helped set in motion the contemporary practice of tar-
geting ‘criminal aliens’ for deportation.”1 The act not only increased funding 
and support for enhanced border enforcement in the U.S. Southwest while au-
thorizing the “expeditious” deportation of “criminal aliens”; it also criminal-
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ized the hiring of undocumented workers, imposing sanctions on employers 
who knowingly employed the undocumented (Rosenblum and Kandel 2011), 
making the workplace another site of immigrant policing.
In the aftermath of 9/11, the expansion of immigrant regulation into the 
heartland of the United States intensified (Meissner et al. 2013), a process that 
Cecilia Menjívar (2014) calls the “insourcing” of the border. This effort was 
framed by the Department of Homeland Security (dhs) in terms of secur-
ing the homeland against terror, which required “developing a ‘continuum 
of border security,’ treating the territorial boundaries of the United States 
and the interior as a seamless security space” (dhs 2010; Inda 2013, 299). One 
mechanism for this already in place was section 287(g) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1965 (added under section 133 of iirira in 1996), which 
allowed local and state police departments to partner with Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ice), essentially deputizing them as immigration offi-
cers within their own districts. This was supplemented by the program called 
Secure Communities (2008), the Obama administration’s signature immigra-
tion control policy, which ran until 2014. Secure Communities allowed ice 
to penetrate the ordinary spaces of immigrant life, extending federal reach 
via technology into local policing jurisdictions (Coleman 2012). Under Secure 
Communities, all those arrested for any offense were biometrically screened 
for immigration violations; a positive “hit” for such a violation resulted in ice 
issuing a detainer, a request to local authorities that the individual be held 
for up to forty- eight hours to allow ice to determine if an order of removal 
should be issued. Laws and programs such as irca and Secure Communi-
ties are best understood as biopolitical technologies in societies of control 
(Deleuze 1992; Coleman and Stuesse 2014). They are regulatory apparatuses 
through which the everyday lives of people — but especially immigrants of 
color — are subjectivized for intervention and management, biometrically se-
lected for detention and deportation (Gold 2012), and disposed of for the pu-
rification and well- being of the social body.
The employment provisions of irca extended the border into the work-
place, a process that has intensified through the use of E- Verify. E- Verify is a 
web- based platform that enables employers to check the work eligibility of job 
applicants and current employees using the data on the federal I- 9 employ-
ment eligibility form, which is to be completed by all job applicants at the time 
of hiring. The system checks individuals against databases of the dhs and the 
Social Security Administration to confirm that an individual is legally autho-
rized to work, mainly by establishing that they have a valid name and Social 
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Security number (uscis 2015). In 2010, E- Verify added a “photo matching” 
tool, a biometric component intended to provide another layer of certainty to 
the determination.2 The E- Verify website is remarkably free of politics, and 
no reference is made to immigrants or immigration. We have not even been 
able to find a statement describing what the E- Verify program is intended 
to achieve. The website does, however, contain a strong privacy statement, 
rather striking under the circumstances, claiming that “E- Verify is commit-
ted to protecting your privacy and civil liberties with the same rigor that dhs 
places on protecting our homeland” (uscis n.d.). The intended audience here 
is clearly citizens, whose “privacy and civil liberties” are apparently threat-
ened by undocumented job seekers stealing their employment opportunities.
Problems with E- Verify abound. The system is often criticized as unreli-
able because it depends on inaccurate databases, imposes undue financial 
burdens on employers, and leaves immigrant workers vulnerable to subjective 
determinations about their legal status (Patel 2010). While the system func-
tions adequately to identify U.S. citizens, noncitizens with work authorization 
are much more likely to experience false denials of permission to work (Wes-
tat 2012). Moreover, other critics of the system argue that its implementation 
results in employment discrimination based on race or national origin (Liao 
2013), as “some employers may be more reluctant to hire any worker who fits 
whatever profile the employer may associate with undocumented workers” 
(Good 2013, 4283). Others fear that E- Verify presents an obstacle to the free-
dom of movement for workers and employers, and subjects many dimensions 
of U.S. citizens’ lives to government control (Harper 2012; Kravets 2013).
At first glance, E- Verify seems to be an effective tool for discouraging em-
ployment of the undocumented and for encouraging immigrants to relocate, 
either to states that don’t mandate E- Verify or to another country entirely. 
However, on closer examination it becomes clear that the technology does 
little to impact the overall labor market. In Arizona, for example, where 
E- Verify was first implemented on a statewide scale under the Legal Arizona 
Workers Act (lawa), the reduction in the size of the undocumented work-
force had no positive corollary for native U.S. workers in terms of employ-
ment: Studies found that low- skilled, non- Hispanic, native- born white men 
in Arizona in fact experienced a 4 percent lower employment rate, a decline 
that the investigators statistically linked to the E- Verify law (Bohn, Lofstrom, 
and Raphael 2015).3 In addition, the Arizona law contains a loophole that ex-
empts independent contractors from the E- Verify requirement. Even as they 
found a significant decline in the number of unauthorized workers hold-
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ing formal jobs in Arizona, Bohn, Lofstrom, and Rafael (2015) also noted an 
8 percent increase in “self- employment” among unauthorized workers, sug-
gesting that many of the people forced out of the formal sector found work 
in an expanding informal sector (Lofstrom, Bohn, and Raphael 2011; Men-
jívar and Enchautegui 2015). As these jobs tend to contain fewer wage and 
benefits guarantees, the resulting situation is all the more precarious for un-
skilled, undocumented workers and their families, many of whom remain in 
Arizona in conditions of augmented vulnerability and invisibility. The effect 
of mandated E- Verify in Arizona appears to be a deepening of precarity for 
marginal workers; overall, “there is evidence that undocumented workers are 
being pushed further to the periphery of the labor market in the wake of” the 
move to E- Verify and other forms of enhanced immigrant policing (Hall and 
Greenman 2015, 407).
Notably, E- Verify augments the employer’s role as a frontline enforcer of 
immigration policy while posing little risk to the employer of the undocu-
mented. As with irca before them, E- Verify laws contain sanctions (includ-
ing fines and loss of business license) for employers who don’t use the tech-
nology or who hire the undocumented; in practice, again as with irca, these 
stipulations of the law are rarely enforced. In Arizona, E- Verify compliance 
among employers remained “spotty” five years after it became mandatory in 
the state, with only 43 percent of employers enrolled in the system, and only 
19 percent among businesses employing fewer than five people (Henke 2013). 
Virtually none of the noncompliant employers had been sanctioned. Legal 
scholars (e.g., Lee 2009) speculate that the state prefers to ignore employer 
violations of the law in exchange for the role that employers now play in iden-
tifying undocumented immigrants for removal. The result of this collusion 
between state and private enterprise is that employers have become “immi-
gration decision makers,” free to decide whether or not to run employees 
through the E- Verify system and thereby reveal their presence to the authori-
ties. This is a one- way street, however: “unencumbered by fear of being pun-
ished, employers can threaten to report workers for removal, whereas work-
ers do not possess any similar ability to blow the whistle on employers” (Lee 
2009, 1105 – 6). Undocumented workers, of course, are not “unencumbered 
by fear”; to the contrary, the threat of being run through E- Verify is often 
enough to cow a worker seeking her rights under federal labor law, which 
protects all workers regardless of immigration status (Hall and Greenman 
2015). The vulnerability of undocumented workers to the threat of exposure 
is further heightened during difficult economic times (which, incidentally, 
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tend to coincide with upticks in the passage of harsh employment laws [Ellis 
et al. 2014]), when employers gain even greater leverage over their workers 
due to the scarcity of other local options (Menjívar and Enchautegui 2015). As 
Sarah Horton (2016) has noted, employers can also create “denounce- ability” 
in their workers by requiring them to work under someone else’s identity pa-
pers, making them vulnerable to charges of “identity theft,” a situation only 
worsened by the threatened use of E- Verify (see also Stuesse 2010). These facts 
demonstrate the negative impact of E- Verify on workers, who are discouraged 
from organizing or making demands on employers who could threaten them 
with deportation. Employers, meanwhile, benefit from enhanced control over 
more disciplined workers, and enjoy the lower costs associated with the shift 
to a more informal workforce.
E- Verify, then, combines the “hard” federal threat of jail and removal with 
the “softer” state incitement to hide, relocate, or self- deport. Although E- Verify 
is not technically about immigrant removal, the existence of the militarized 
border, though not locally present, is a persistent reminder of the precarious 
situation of the undocumented and the potential for deportation if they step 
out of line. Fear and anxiety are the common responses to this situation, feel-
ings that are intensified by the crosscutting, mutually reinforcing laws across 
legal scales: “Federal laws control who comes in and who is expelled, and 
policies at the state and local levels shape how immigrants live once they are 
in the country, in effect, complementing each other. Indeed, a key feature of 
the U.S. immigration regime today is its multilayered character, composed of 
federal, state, and local legislation with each layer magnifying the power and 
control of the other layers” (Menjívar and Enchautegui 2015, 111). E- Verify in 
this context operates in conjunction with other laws and practices to push 
undocumented workers out of the legal employment market and into under-
ground settings where they are even more exploitable. The terror and anxiety 
found in such settings is typical of what one might expect to find among the 
“shadow populations” of the United States.
The Dream Will Turn into a Nightmare”: E- Verify in Hometown
Our ethnographic analysis of E- Verify and its effects is based in a place we 
call “Hometown, NJ” a pseudonym that resonates ironically with the ubiq-
uitous “homeland security” agenda, and indexes the Bruce Springsteen song 
“My Hometown.” (Springsteen was born and raised in central New Jersey.) 
“
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Hometown is a small borough with a population of about 15,000 residents. 
Over the course of four years (2011 – 2015), we engaged in a research project 
in activist anthropology, a disciplinary stance and mode of conducting re-
search that is explicitly collaborative and constructive in its approach (for a 
small sample of the literature, see Speed 2006; Hale 2008; and Stuesse 2015). 
Thus, the research questions and methodology were developed in consulta-
tion with local advocacy organizations and with undocumented immigrants 
themselves, and were designed to focus on issues of particular concern to 
them in order to develop understandings that would serve the community 
in its struggles. We trained local individuals to participate in data collection, 
and two undocumented women became particularly close, serving as paid 
collaborators in the project. Using an ethnographic methodology of quali-
tative data collection, our four- person team (the authors of this chapter and 
two undocumented residents of Hometown) recorded over 100 individual and 
focus- group interviews and wrote thousands of pages of field notes describ-
ing our daily activities of participant- observation. Additionally, the four of 
us worked as volunteers in two local advocacy organizations, participating in 
the day- to- day work of legal advocacy and assisting people to cope with the 
challenges of living undocumented; Goldstein served for two years on the 
executive committee of one of these organizations.
New Jersey is an interesting state in which to study immigration, in part 
due to its history as a collection of autonomous municipalities, complicat-
ing any attempt to generalize about the state as a whole.4 In terms of immi-
gration law, some New Jersey towns are highly securitized, with restrictive 
municipal ordinances that limit undocumented immigrants’ ability to work, 
rent property, or own businesses, while others are “sanctuary cities” that ex-
hibit a welcoming stance toward immigrants. The state is thus a patchwork 
of contiguous and sometimes overlapping political, legal, and social milieus 
through which immigrants move in the course of their daily rounds of work, 
school, socializing, and home. For immigrants, this patchwork is particu-
larly critical in terms of immigration law: as discussed above, state and mu-
nicipal laws operate in concert with federal law, and there is a substantial 
degree of variation across localities (Provine and Varsanyi 2012; Menjívar and 
Enchautegui 2015). New Jersey is a popular destination for immigrants arriv-
ing to the United States. On a per capita basis only California and New York 
have larger nonnative populations; New Jersey ranks fourth in the nation (af-
ter Nevada, California, and Arizona) in the percentage of its workforce that is 
undocumented (Fine et al. 2014), and as a whole it is a relatively tolerant state 
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as far as immigration law is concerned. The state legislature, for example, has 
consistently voted against requiring E- Verify statewide (initiatives to man-
date its use failed in the legislature in 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014). But there 
is substantial variation across municipalities, a fact to which undocumented 
workers must attend as they travel between jobs or simply shop for groceries 
in an unfamiliar town.
Floating like an island in the middle of a vast suburban sea of what used 
to be farmland, Hometown Borough is a close- packed cluster of colorful 
wood- frame houses and stone storefronts centered around an old Town Hall. 
Parts of Hometown look like classic middle America. There is a historic Main 
Street, a stately courthouse with white pillars fronting a trim green lawn, and 
many beautiful old homes with porch swings and American flags. Not far 
from the Jersey Turnpike and the Garden State Parkway, Hometown is a bu-
colic place for commuters to reside, an escape from the workday in New York 
City. More recently, Hometown has also emerged as an ideal place for the 
settlement of undocumented immigrants who live in the borough and work 
in the surrounding suburbs. Indeed, a predominantly white town where racial 
minorities were almost exclusively African American until the mid- 1990s, 
in the past twenty years Hometown has seen a so- called “illegal invasion” 
(Kelsey 2007) and is now about 50 percent Latino (mostly Mexicans, but also 
Peruvians, Guatemalans, and others).
Relations between Hometown residents and the newcomers have not his-
torically been cozy. In January 2004, a group of local residents and Latin 
American immigrants filed a suit in federal court against the borough on be-
half of its Latino day laborers. The suit argued that an antiloitering ordinance 
passed in 2003 prohibiting workers from congregating in public spaces to wait 
for work was unlawful. In April 2004 a federal judge ruled in the plaintiffs’ 
favor, stating that the borough was violating Latino workers’ right to seek 
employment. In the aftermath, Hometown Borough has become a relatively 
safe place for immigrants to reside. The people — Latino, African American, 
and white — who came together to fight the municipality subsequently formed 
Casa Hometown, an immigrant rights advocacy organization that offers vari-
ous services to immigrant workers and their families in central New Jersey. 
The police no longer harass workers in the muster zone, and the municipal-
ity has ceased its midnight “home inspections” intended to surprise people 
crowded into unauthorized housing. Many of the undocumented people we 
know in Hometown express a strong sense of security about living there. 
They try to avoid unnecessary contact with the police and with situations 
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that might bring them unwanted exposure to the federal immigrant detec-
tion system, but many of them believe that “as long as you don’t go breaking 
the law the police will leave you alone.”5 Many others express a surprising 
confidence in the local authorities and even told us about instances in which 
they called the police on someone else (in most cases a patrón who refused to 
pay them their salary at the end of the day), arguing that the police are there 
to protect their rights as well.
But Hometown Borough is part of the New Jersey patchwork of munici-
palities, and the policies and politics of one town have implications for oth-
ers. Hometown Borough is an island in the sea of Hometown Township, the 
neighboring town that completely surrounds the Borough of the same name. 
Or, to mix metaphors, Hometown Borough is the hole in the Township’s do-
nut, and the two places couldn’t be more different (compare with Coleman’s 
[2012] work in North Carolina communities). Whereas Hometown Borough 
(in the aftermath of the federal lawsuit and the changing demographics that 
followed) is now relatively tolerant of immigrants and is less than 40 percent 
white, Hometown Township is 85 percent white and immigrants are only 
welcome insofar as they are there as contracted laborers. Immigrant residents 
of the Borough do not like to enter the Township for fear of being stopped 
by the police on any imaginable pretext. Driving with a broken taillight, for 
example, or riding with too many people in the car, or riding a bike on the 
sidewalk, or “loitering” (i.e., waiting for work in the parking lot of a conve-
nience store) can be enough to get you arrested. And once you are arrested, 
you are fed into the ice computer, and from there it is a short step to deten-
tion and deportation.6
Nor do people entirely trust the police of Hometown Borough. Despite 
some people’s willingness to call the police in emergencies, other immigrant 
residents of Hometown are less trusting, adopting a range of behavioral self- 
monitoring techniques to limit their contact with the authorities and so 
minimize the risk of detection, detention, and deportation. Some of these 
self- disciplinary practices are learned passively through observing other im-
migrants, or one’s parents and friends. Others are explicitly taught. Experi-
enced immigrants instruct new arrivals on how to comport themselves to 
avoid detection. A Mexican immigrant named Mayer says that when he first 
came to Hometown, his cousin taught him the rules. 7 Don’t drink, he told 
him, because alcohol can make you noisy, or violent, and either way the cops 
may be called. Don’t go to parties for the same reason. Don’t shoplift — it may 
seem like a small thing, but if you are caught you can be deported. Don’t go 
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out after dark, when your presence on the street may attract attention. Make 
sure not to litter. And so on. Undocumented workers learn the regulatory ge-
ography of the New Jersey patchwork and know in which towns they are safer 
and in which they are more in danger of detection (e.g., through more aggres-
sive policing practices). The emphasis in all of these trainings, both formal 
and informal, is preparedness, a message echoed locally by workers at Casa 
Hometown and at the national level by organizations like the National Day 
Laborer Organizing Network (ndlon) and Domestic Workers United (dwu).
Despite their best efforts to avoid detection, undocumented residents of 
Hometown — like undocumented people nationwide — have recently begun to 
encounter new forms of regulation in the workplace through the imposition 
of E- Verify, which can electronically invade spaces that immigrants previ-
ously perceived as “safe.” New Jersey does not require employers to use E- 
Verify, but many elect to use it for the benefits it grants them as employers, as 
discussed above. This creates another quasi- legal patchwork overlaid atop the 
jurisdictional patchwork that already constitutes the political geography of 
the state, though one that is harder for potential workers to identify and map 
out in their self- disciplining. The challenge lies in anticipating whether or not 
they will be screened upon applying for a job, or whether or not their current 
employer might decide to adopt E- Verify and require worker screenings. Of 
course, many undocumented people do have documents. Some of these docu-
ments are fakes that people purchased upon their arrival in the United States, 
and which enable them to pay income and Social Security taxes, but more of-
ten people borrow or buy the papers of a citizen or legal resident, sometimes 
giving a percentage of their earnings to the owners of the documents (Horton 
2015).8 Indeed, acquiring someone else’s valid papers can be seen as a rational 
response to the possibility of encountering E- Verify in the workplace, though 
this strategy is not without risks. As one interviewee told us, “a solution to 
[E- Verify] is to buy someone’s Social Security number. But then that can be 
even worse because using someone else’s Social is a crime. If you are caught, 
the dream will turn into a nightmare.”9
The fear of encountering E- Verify comes partly from not knowing if a 
fake or purchased Social Security number is adequate to the test of the bio-
metric database. Although E- Verify is not explicitly designed to deport un-
documented immigrants, people who spend their lives in fear of immigration 
authorities and deportation are threatened by a program that requires them 
to present their Social Security card to their employer and risk being “outed” 
as undocumented. Silvia, a longtime undocumented resident of Hometown, 
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described the fear she felt when asked by her employer of thirteen years to 
present her Social Security card so her information could be entered into 
E- Verify; she told us that she “became very afraid of immigration. After thir-
teen years it was a difficult decision to present my papers.”10 Silvia decided not 
to quit her job but instead submitted the fake Social Security card she bought 
twenty years ago, right after arriving in Hometown. Miraculously, her Social 
Security number was accepted by the system and she was able to keep her job. 
But the terror and anxiety she felt in the encounter were very real.
Not everyone is as lucky as Silvia, though. Many people lose their jobs 
once their data is processed; others simply resign when asked for their papers. 
Losing their jobs due to E- Verify further destabilizes people’s employment 
security, pushing them into more insecure situations as they choose to re-
main in New Jersey. People in Hometown describe how their encounters with 
employment eligibility verification forced them to move from one job to the 
next, changing positions each time an employer threatened to use E- Verify, 
or to search for jobs where the employer wouldn’t be using the technology. 
Clementina, another undocumented resident of Hometown, recently got a job 
working at a fast- food restaurant. Fortunately, she says, this restaurant does 
not use E- Verify; but the nearby McDonald’s does, and many of her friends at 
that place fled their jobs in advance of being screened. As in Arizona, where 
lawa has pushed many undocumented workers out of formal jobs and into 
the informal economy, New Jersey residents also move from formal, full- 
time jobs to contracted, temporary work. These jobs usually consist of do-
mestic or construction day labor and are significantly more precarious than 
the stable — if barely adequate — biweekly paychecks offered by more formal 
employers.
Informal workers are especially vulnerable to wage theft and on- the- job 
injuries, a situation made even more precarious by the use of E- Verify. Flavio, 
a longtime Hometown resident who works as a day laborer doing construc-
tion, was fired by his boss after having a work accident. This is not an un-
common occurrence: employers often deny workers their right to compensa-
tion for work injuries by dismissing them, believing that the worker will not 
pursue her or his rights for fear of being exposed as undocumented. E- Verify 
makes this practice even easier to employ. As Flavio said: “[My boss] told me I 
wasn’t fired due to my accident. He said he is now using E- Verify and I needed 
to show him my Social if I wanted to keep my job.”11 Regardless of his undocu-
mented status, Flavio knew he had the right to receive compensation after his 
work accident, but his employer’s request for a valid Social Security Card was 
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enough to discourage him. “People told me it was just an excuse to fire me,” 
Flavio told us, “but I decided to leave things at that and look for another job.”
These feelings of insecurity and anxiety are not only linked to the fear of 
being detained and deported, but to economic worries as well. Although de-
portation figures largely in the scholarly literature on immigration, economic 
insecurity is a powerful force shaping the behaviors and politics of undocu-
mented immigrants. Juana, who lost her job at a fast- food restaurant due to 
E- Verify, told us, “this really affected me both emotionally and economically. 
I have three kids and I had a good job that helped me provide for them. I now 
have to start from zero and get used to a totally different job. I was making 
sixteen dollars an hour. Going back to making eight dollars an hour deeply 
affects me and my family. . . . I didn’t [even] receive any compensation from 
my employer after working for her for seventeen years.”12 And this was not 
only her loss, Juana says. In her own words, “with E- Verify we lose because we 
can’t provide for our families, employers lose because they won’t have people 
to work for them, and the state [of New Jersey] loses because even if we have 
fake papers we still pay taxes every month. If we Hispanics stop paying taxes, 
New Jersey has much to lose.”13
The fear that accompanies E- Verify is intensified by people’s lack of knowl-
edge of the legal system, and the resulting uncertainty and confusion further 
contribute to people’s insecurity. Apart from the ngo Casa Hometown and 
some private law offices, there are few venues for undocumented people in 
Hometown to learn about immigration policies and laws. As a result, they 
are often confused as to what exactly E- Verify is. Clementina, for example, as-
sociates the McDonalds’ workers “Fight for $15” campaign for a higher mini-
mum wage with the company’s use of E- Verify: “They got rid of all of their 
undocumented immigrants and now people working for 7 dollars an hour 
have papers and are asking for their rights.”14 Not coincidentally, Clementina 
associates E- Verify with the loss of or inability to claim workers’ rights. An-
other interviewee named Roberta told us that “E- Verify is a tool for deporta-
tion. It is a law that allows cops to ask for your papers at any point.”15 When 
we asked Yuri if she’s ever had to deal with E- Verify, she proceeded to tell us a 
story about her place of employment, a local nursery and garden center, being 
raided by ice: “E- Verify sent my employer an email saying they’d be check-
ing everyone’s papers and then they showed up at my work asking for our 
documentation. Two months later ice agents returned and demanded that 
the employer fire twenty- one of us whose Social Security numbers turned out 
to be false.”16 What is interesting about this story is that E- Verify is unrelated 
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to physical ice raids (though it is connected to what have been called “silent 
raids,” in which ice electronically audits employer records to identify undoc-
umented workers; see Menjívar and Enchautegui 2015, 109). What Yuri per-
ceived to be E- Verify was a routine workplace raid, probably (as her employer 
ventured) in response to a disgruntled former employee’s finger- pointing. 
Within the complex network of local and national immigration legislation 
that undocumented people in Hometown have to navigate on a daily basis, 
E- Verify takes on a life of its own in the minds of the people it targets. In this 
context, E- Verify, like the highly securitized U.S.- Mexico border, does not 
keep people away from Hometown but rather makes them more afraid — and 
therefore more prone to exploitation and abuse.
Conclusion
The border, as mentioned, has been insourced or interiorized, so that it is now 
everywhere in the United States, an immanent frontier of politics and control 
situated not merely at the edges but inside the body of the nation. But as our 
ethnography shows, the border has also been interiorized within the bodies 
of undocumented people themselves. Authorities seeking to manage the im-
migrants’ presence in the United States have targeted their internal worlds for 
disciplining, deploying sophisticated regulatory regimes to terrorize undocu-
mented people and thus influence their behavior (compare with Willen 2007). 
This terror is all the more intense as these regulatory technologies become 
increasingly pervasive in daily life.
E- Verify is one technology by which this interiorization is accomplished. 
It is part of the biopolitics of immigrant policing, a form of “soft” regulation 
that pushes undocumented people into shadow populations and underground 
economies, where they are made even more vulnerable, their labor rendered 
even cheaper and more accessible to the needs of U.S. capital, their ability 
to demand their rights as workers inhibited. As Ruth Gomberg- Muñoz and 
Laura Nussbaum- Barberena have observed (2011, 366; citing Delgado 1993, 
58), “cheap labor is not necessarily docile labor,” and E- Verify as a biopolitical 
instrument is effective in generating worker docility. The production of ter-
ror is critical in this regard: Through technologies such as E- Verify, the state 
can penetrate the inner world of the undocumented immigrant to effect a 
particular policy outcome by inducing fear of deportation within the subject 
and causing them to make choices that appear to be agentive but are in fact 
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highly overdetermined. In this, E- Verify and other immigration- related tech-
nologies, laws, and programs are not unlike other forms of neoliberal govern-
mentality (Inda 2013), which strive to inculcate particular subject dispositions 
marked by qualities of self- regulation and individual responsibility — here, 
the immigrant is even expected to become the primary actor responsible for 
her own removal.
Although the securitization of immigration is a phenomenon of the twenty- 
first century, the political power of fear has a long history as part of the public 
discourse about immigration in the United States (Ngai 2004). Indeed, if fear 
of the terrorist, criminal, undocumented immigrant has been mobilized in 
the United States to rally support for the increasing securitization and interi-
orization of the U.S. border, fear of detention and deportation has also been 
mobilized to keep the noncitizen and her family in place. But if technolo-
gies such as E- Verify are intended to terrify, they are also unlikely to make 
the undocumented give up the promise of finding prosperity for themselves 
and their families in the United States. What this reveals, however, are the 
ways in which state- sponsored security discourses and programs cultivate 
fear among all segments of the population, citizen and undocumented alike, 
contributing to a climate of racism, uncertainty, and despair with which ev-
eryone must cope.
Notes
1 “Criminal aliens” is the term used by immigration authorities to refer to an un-
documented immigrant who has been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor 
(Inda 2013, 293).
2 There has been some debate in the media about whether or not E- Verify actually 
constitutes a biometric program, given that it largely relies on name and Social 
Security number to establish a person’s identity. Others argue that these are in-
deed biometrics, and the inclusion of the photographic requirement seems to 
obviate any doubt. For more, see Jason Green (2013) and David Kravets (2013).
3 Unfortunately, this study (like most of the other studies reviewed in preparing 
this chapter) does not provide data on the employment effects of lawa on other 
categorical population groups (e.g., African Americans, Native Americans). This 
seems to be something of a pattern with strictly quantitative analyses of E- Verify.
4 For a comprehensive history of New Jersey, see Maxine Lurie and Richard Veit 
(2012).
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5 Field notes.
6 Although federal policy under the Priority Enforcement Program (pep), which 
went into effect in July 2015, is now intended to target only the most dangerous 
or criminal immigrants, the decision on whether or not to process a detainee 
through ice remains at the discretion of local or state police and judges. Thus, in 
a place such as Hometown Township, it is likely that detention and deportation 
rates will remain similar to what they were under Secure Communities.
7 All names are pseudonyms, to protect the identities of our undocumented re-
search collaborators.
8 These facts run contrary to the common belief that the undocumented do not 
pay taxes on their salaries. On the contrary, undocumented workers pay bil-
lions of dollars annually in income taxes using false documents or those of other 
people, including Social Security taxes to which they will later have no claim 
(American Immigration Council 2011). Many undocumented workers also have 
a legitimate Individual Taxpayer Identification Number (itin) that they receive 
from the government and with which they pay income taxes.
9 Interview, Hometown Borough, September 23, 2014.
10 Interview, Hometown Borough, September 23, 2014.
11 Interview, Hometown Borough, September 18, 2014.
12 Interview, Hometown Borough, October 10, 2014.
13 Interview, Hometown Borough, October 10, 2014.
14 Interview, Hometown Borough, September 18, 2014.
15 Interview, Hometown Borough, September 18, 2014.
16 Interview, Hometown Borough, October 22, 2014.
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“Dead- Bodies- at- the- Border”
Distributed Evidence and Emerging Forensic 
Infrastructure for Identification
Amade M’charek
The so- called Arab Spring began in Tunisia in 2010 with a wave 
of pro- democracy protests. In March of the following year, in the 
company of my young daughter (Aziza) and my best friend we 
went to visit my father in the town of Zarzis in the south of the 
country. Upon arriving, in the morning, and being curious about 
the changes that had taken place, I suggested driving to the city. 
My father came running, urging us to take blankets, matresses, 
water, and bread with us. I frowned. “Well, you see, we have all 
these refugees from Libya and they need help.” Together we started 
filling our small van with stuff from our house. At the next store we 
bought bread and water.
Arriving in the city center, we first visited a school where hun-
dreds of men, guest workers from Egypt who had to leave Libya, 
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were hanging around waiting to hear whether there would be a 
flight home. Outside, local Tunisians were carrying huge pots with 
the lunch meal inside the school. After delivering half of the goods, 
we drove further to a cultural center nearby. Many more people 
were hanging around — apparently tired or restless. We entered the 
center and we found ourselves in the main theater room — filled 
with men: sleeping, walking about, or having conversations in a 
dim voice.
I quickly found myself in an animated discussion with a grow-
ing group of men, first talking about the situation in Libya, then in 
Tunisia, but soon they addressed a question to me in a harsh tone: 
where is the international community? A local Tunisian wondered 
why local people were the sole caregivers for the refugees. The open 
discussions about politics were new to the ear, but the problem of 
refugees within the international order was already evident.1
In Europe, attention quickly turned away from political transformations, jus-
tice, or democracy and toward concerns over security. Indeed, the world watched 
as the hopes of the Arab Spring crashed on the rocks of European shores in 
the form of the bodies of refugees fleeing disruption and violence. In large 
part, security concerns drive the European response to the refugee crisis: ef-
forts to secure Europe using various identification technologies, from travel 
documents to surveillance drones. However, eu border control also includes 
humanitarian policies and aspirations, and, between border security and hu-
man security, we find the problem of the dead migrant’s body. Over the past 
number of years, several thousand persons have perished en route to Europe. 
On the one hand, the dead bodies are a problem of evidence in the context of 
forensic identification. On the other hand, the dead bodies are the evidence 
of failed politics and policy. In this chapter I attend to the emergent forensic 
infrastructure surrounding dead- bodies- at- the- border, and explore the ethics 
of care for borders and for bodies- at- the- border in contemporary Europe. In 
this sense, the chapter resonates with and pushes further the line of reasoning 
about surveilling injured migrants extended by Ieva Jusionyte in this volume.
I propose that when encountering dead- bodies- at- the- border, forensics as 
it stands offers a messy and contingent set of logics, tools, methodology, and 
devices. The analysis of an emerging forensic infrastructure and of its selected 
deployment for identifying migrants’ bodies offers a different but important 
perspective on the human crisis unfolding in the Mediterranean. This chap-
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ter discusses who is included or excluded from processes of identification, 
and explores the significant points of contestation and the measures used to 
protect the eu border against transgressions by the bodies of Others. I show 
how the refugee crisis has shifted the focus of hegemonic political discourse 
in the eu away from the vulnerabilities of migrants or even citizens to the vul-
nerability of borders. The obsession with borders- at- risk produces a division 
between living and dead migrants. While Europe includes the living through 
biometric surveillance and a system for the stringent management of identi-
ties, dead bodies are often left unattended or are quickly buried. They appear 
as illegitimately stretching the limited resources of receiving countries. More-
over, their stages of decomposition challenge the wisdom of forensic science, 
while their significant numbers challenge current border protection regimes. 
The dead body then is not just a provocation, or reminder of the human crisis, 
but an active participant in processes of rethinking what counts as evidence 
and what evidence might unfold about concrete histories and more general 
the human condition.
Vulnerable Borders
One month after the commencement of the “Arab Spring,” the European exter-
nal border control agency, frontex, sent out a press release headed “Hermes 
2011 starts tomorrow in Lampedusa” (frontex 2011). Joint Operation Hermes 
began when frontex responded to a request by the Italian government for 
assistance in dealing with the Mediterranean migration crisis. One of the roles 
taken on by frontex was the surveillance of vessels carrying migrants on 
the open seas and measures to prescreen intercepted migrants. The joint op-
eration also involved Europol, the European police agency, which helped the 
Italian authorities to identify possible criminals among those who reached 
the Italian coasts (Carrera et al. 2012). Immediately, one could see a blending of the 
categories of migrant and criminal. An Italian governor even argued that they 
were “illegal, clandestine, wearing brand- name sneakers and Western looking 
jackets and holding mobile phones in their hands” and thus should not be con-
sidered eligible for international protection (Campesi 2011, 6).
Giuseppe Campesi (2011) has argued that the initial emergency was “fabri-
cated” by Italy in order to draw on eu assistance. However, the eu embraced 
the emergency to implement far- reaching policies for the future management 
of the European borders. One of the policy aims was to upgrade the Schengen 
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Information System (sis) to allow for new eu- wide automatic biometric entry/ 
exit monitoring (within the eu). Another far- reaching technology aimed at 
the external borders of Europe is eurosur, introduced in the late 2013 as
a pan- European border surveillance system with three main objectives: a) 
to reduce the number of irregular migrants entering the eu undetected, 
b) to reduce the number of deaths of irregular migrants by saving more 
lives at sea, and c) to enhance the internal security of the eu as a whole by 
contributing to the prevention of cross- border crime.
eurosur could form a “system of systems” giving all the Member 
States’ border- control authorities access to a secure and decentralized 
information- sharing network resulting in a full picture of events at the 
eu external borders. (frontex 2012)
The Mediterranean border is the testing ground for this system of systems. On 
May 30, 2013, the Greens in the European Parliament issued a press release to 
coincide with the Parliament and European Council agreement on eurosur:
The general focus of the eurosur system [aims] to seal off Europe’s bor-
ders, using intrusive new technologies (like drones and satellites). This 
skewed approach to immigration misses the point. eurosur aims to pre-
vent refugees even setting off from North Africa towards Europe, with 
cooperation agreements with countries in the region either established or 
planned to ensure this. In practical terms, this means the eu is effectively 
shifting its borders to countries that lack an asylum system and may not 
even be signatories to the Geneva Convention. (Keller 2013)
The Greens proposed that the monitoring system under eurosur could be 
used to come to the rescue of refugees in distress at sea, which would at least 
give the system a human face, so they argued. However, eu governments 
did not accept this proposal. While eu Member States will have to inform 
each other and frontex if they are aware of refugees in distress, there is no 
requirement to increase the use of patrol boats in areas that are dangerous 
for refugees. This makes it clear that refugees are configured primarily as a 
threat, while Europe and especially the European borders are increasingly 
perceived as vulnerable entities in need of protection.
The current configuration of migrants and borders is undergoing more 
radical change in response to the Syrian refugee crisis. In December 2015 the 
European Commission proposed a far- reaching “Border Package” in the form 
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of the European Border and Coast Guard, also called “the Agency” (European 
Commission 2015). The tasks of the Agency, which by now has become the 
synonym for frontex, go beyond the management of the external borders: 
it will have its own equipment and huge resources, such as a 1,000 perma-
nent staff members, aimed at identifying and addressing weak spots in the 
borders. The Agency, as the commission conceives it, will have a dazzlingly 
broad mandate, jeopardizing the sovereignty of individual Member States. 
This is the very reason that some Member States (especially in the southern 
and eastern areas of Schengen) have blocked the proposal. In practice, this 
meant that the proposal had to be watered down in some ways.2 However, the 
general direction of the proposal, especially seen in the light of current public 
debates in the wake of the terrorist attacks on Paris and Brussels, was assured, 
and it was thus implemented in October 2016. Critics have argued that the 
proposal is protecting borders rather than people (Online Focus 2015). How-
ever, it is also important to acknowledge that border management regimes 
are not simply about exclusions but also implicate European citizens. One of 
the mandates of the Agency is the intensification of the systematic surveil-
lance of European citizens entering and exiting the Schengen Area. At the 
border, biometric passport data may be compared to various databases, from 
the Schengen Information System and the Interpol Stolen and Lost Travel 
Documents Database to relevant national systems. The rationale for this? “It 
is estimated that five thousand eu citizens have traveled to conflict zones and 
joined terrorist groups such as isis. When they have come back to Europe, 
some of these returning foreign fighters have been involved in recent terrorist 
attacks” (European Commission n.d.). While the proposal concerns all Euro-
pean citizens, its focus today is certainly on the ethnic Other. This is explicit 
in the press release announcing the proposal for the Agency: “In response to 
the recent tragic attacks in Paris and the growing threat from foreign terror-
ist fighters, the Commission has swiftly taken action to accelerate work and 
implementation of measures under the European Security Agenda. Today’s 
proposal responds to the need to reinforce security controls at the eu’s ex-
ternal borders” (European Commission 2015). This measure will inevitably 
lead to ethnic profiling. Because whereas the checks at airport will be com-
prehensive, it is advised that “if, however, systematic checks at certain land 
or sea borders would have a disproportionate impact on the flow of traffic . . . 
Member States can, based on risk assessments, decide to carry out only tar-
geted checks” (European Commission n.d.).
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Obviously economic concerns, and one could say property rights, are made 
dominant over civil rights, that is, the rights of citizens to be treated equally 
by state authorities. More generally, casting the borders as vulnerable leads 
to a particular framing of the problems that have been surfacing in the Arab 
world and Europe since the early 2011. As a result, the border has become the 
matter of concern: the prime locus for managing the people wanting to enter 
Europe as well as those who are already in it, including European citizens. 
This focus on the border has taken a perverse bend in the deal between the 
eu and Turkey. While the policy language was about “providing better care 
for the refugees and improving the management of the stream of people,” it is 
common knowledge that on the ground in Turkey the situation for refugees 
from Syria has been devastating (frontex 2011). Rather than a concerted 
effort to improve the shelter and lives of refugees, the deal can be seen as an 
example of the externalization of the problem, that is, the problem of leaky 
European borders.
However, the problem resists externalization and is coming back at us in 
the form of recurrent media reports and, importantly, the bodies of people 
who have died in their attempt to reach European territory. They are the 
material evidence of a failed politics. As silent witnesses, they cannot be sub-
jected to the surveillance and governance of refugees. Their presence is a 
transgression in two senses. While they trespassed the border, they also an-
nounce eu’s politico- ethical failure.
Waste at the Border
In order to introduce the problem of people dying at the borders of Europe, I 
wish to ponder waste as an interesting object of evidence. Waste is precisely 
interesting because in its material form it mediates between various entities 
and worlds that tend to be kept apart, such as the living and the dead mi-
grants, Europe and its Others, care and surveillance. Waste is not simply a 
residue in need of expelling, but rather a recursive process and thus symboli-
cally and materially involved in the management of social relations; what is 
turned into “rubbish tends to have the ability to return” (Hetherington 2004, 
159). Here I want to attend to waste in the form of a collection of well- known 
objects that index specific relations and resist divides that are constantly per-
formed when thinking about the refugee crisis through the lens of borders.
In February 2016, I was in Thessaloniki (Greece) on a research visit. At the 
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time, between thirteen and fourteen thousand people were trapped in Ido-
meni Camp, a site to which we had not been granted access. Instead, we were 
taken on a guided tour to a freshly opened camp just outside Thessaloniki. 
As we were walking around, apart from the endless numbers of taxis ready 
to take refugees for extremely high prices to the border, everything seemed 
disturbingly normal. The camp was reminiscent of a camping site, where 
children were playing or being entertained while adults were hanging around, 
chatting or smoking cigarettes. I spotted a typical, golden- colored first aid 
blanket on the track in front of my feet. It was simply litter, laying about. 
Waste. All of a sudden, and with incredible force, the aluminum blanket ar-
ticulated the purpose of the place, providing refuge for people who had fled 
their countries. This power of litter made wonder about the work that waste 
is doing in the context of the so- called refugee crisis. From that moment on, 
I started to notice waste pictured in newspapers. Alongside the blankets, the 
orange- colored life jacket has now assumed an iconic force. These jackets, 
which are bought in their thousands in cities in Turkey and Libya, are now 
found on the beaches of Europe. I encountered a third instance of waste as I 
was doing fieldwork in the south of Tunisia. When I was at the office of the 
Tunisia Association for Fisheries and standing in front of a wall covered with 
pictures portraying dramas on the sea, I found myself staring at a picture that 
showed driftwood from the wreckages of boats used to transport refugees. At 
this moment, Slah Eddin M’charek, a leading figure in that association, de-
scribed a nearby island littered with driftwood, all from the shipwrecks. Slah 
Eddin told me first about the countless times that he and fisherman returned 
to the port just after sailing out, because rather than catching fish they would 
end up rescuing people from drowning. He also told me about the numer-
ous bodies that they found in the sea over the years. “You can smell the dead 
bodies from 800 meters or so,” he explained. “It is now getting better because 
the coast guard is doing a much better job, but the number of bodies that we 
were seeing and the smell. It was just horrible. I can’t describe the smell. Just 
repulsive.” So this is another instance of waste, namely smell.
One could say that these instances of waste are merely traces that require 
oral testimonies or authoritative voices as to reveal a convincing story of what 
happened. However, waste is also material evidence when it comes to borders 
and bodies.3 It is evidence of European borders and the bodies of people who 
did not make it into Europe. Waste also speaks to a methodological aspect 
of forensics. Not simply as a scientific (objectifying) method of ordering and 
connecting traces to events. Eyal Weizman, Tavares Paulo, and Susan Schup-
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pli (2010) have suggested viewing forensics as the art of bringing evidence in 
front of the forum. Here I want to expand this proposition by suggesting to 
view forensics as the art of paying attention — a way of pausing with mate-
rial traces and attending to the ways they hold desperate places and times 
together. Material traces thus do not simply represent something that has 
become invisible — for example, bodies that have sunk to the bottom of the 
sea — but are devices that are active, performative. Waste folds in itself vari-
ous practices that through forensic attention can be unfolded and taken into 
account. It might thus invite us to ponder movements and circulations of 
humans and things as well as the ways in which those circulations have been 
halted (M’charek 2016). With Kevin Hetherington (2004; see also De León 
2015) we could think of waste as an absent presence. What then are the ab-
sences that are folded into the presence of waste? Here I want to discuss three 
absences, but there are many more to ponder. One of the absences marked 
by the first aid blanket is the work of care that has been ubiquitous during 
the refugee crisis. Whereas state institutions seem surprised and reactive, 
citizens, in more or less organized fashion, reached out to refugees and ex-
tended care. This work of care and the scale on which it operates tend to be 
invisible (e.g. Puig de la Bellacasa 2011). Although I do not wish to romanticize 
care, because there are also enough examples in refugee camps and elsewhere 
where it has become problematic, its politics cannot be underestimated. The 
first aid blanket is a material evidence of care for people on the move. It is also 
material evidence of another version of care, namely, the care for the border. 
As indicated above, numerous political actors cast the borders of Europe as 
vulnerable and in need of more care. In this way, the blanket brings into prox-
imity the care for borders and the care for bodies that could not be stopped 
by, or could not even make it to, the border.
Whereas the blanket could be seen as evidence of care for that which can-
not be quantified in monetary terms, namely, life, the orange life jacket I 
want to briefly suggest, folds in itself the economics of human trafficking 
and of illegality. The piles of the jackets left behind testify to the incredible 
amounts of money that people have paid in their attempts to reach Europe. 
As Ruben Andersson (2014) argues, illegality is not only the product of border 
management regimes but is also productive of myriad entrepreneurial and 
economic relations. Attending to the life jacket — although it is paradoxically 
an object that is close to the individual body, and one that could be seen as an 
exemplary representation of that which is good — might, because of its visible 
excess (the piles and piles of these orange objects), point us to the economic 
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costs and revenues at stake. The life jacket thus holds together different val-
ues: the value of life and the economic value of migration.
Similarly, one might approach smell as waste and as evidence of death. It 
folds in itself both the high number of deaths as well as the attempts to pre-
vent people from dying, such as search and rescue operations of Mare Nos-
trum, the efforts of ngos such as Sea Watch, or the work of coast guards in 
different countries. Smell brings together bodies in a pertinent and visceral 
way. It brings together dead and living bodies. The bodies of dead migrants 
and of those who aim at stopping them from dying. The rest of this chapter is 
devoted to a discussion of the deaths at the border.
According to the Deaths at the Borders Database, 3,188 people died at-
tempting to reach Europe between 1990 and 2013.4 However, these numbers 
have increased dramatically since the uprising in the Arab world, and espe-
cially with the devastating ongoing war in Syria. The International Orga-
nization for Migration (iom) estimates that between 2011 and June 2016, at 
least thirteen thousand people died or went missing. And, again, the numbers 
went up dramatically in the second half of 2016. In a recent report, Médecins 
Sans Frontières (msf) shows that people are taking the deadliest route to Eu-
rope, namely, crossing the Mediterranean basin from Libya to Italy, due to a 
lack of other safer options (Médecins Sans Frontières 2016).
However, the large number of people dying in the sea is by no means new. 
For years, fishermen and other local people in Italy, Greece, Spain, as well 
as in Tunisia, Libya, and Morocco confronted the human tragedy of failed 
migration. Data show an increasing number of shipwrecks, but accurate fig-
ures on the bodies that wash ashore are hard to come by. As the Amsterdam- 
based migration scholars Tamara Last and Thomas Spijkerboer argue, “There 
is a general paucity of information about those who have died attempting 
to cross the southern external borders of the European Union (eu) with-
out authorization, especially when compared with the amount of data gen-
erated about the arrival, interception, rescue, detention and deportation of 
migrants — statistics that can serve to justify funding and intensification of 
border control” (Last and Spijkerboer 2014, 85). The lack of reliable informa-
tion hinders policy makers or makes it possible for them to avoid the issue. 
As Leanne Weber (2010) argues, the lack of official numbers contributes to 
the acceptance of border- related deaths through a regime of self- evidence, 
suggesting this is a “natural” consequence of certain processes or even indi-
vidual choices. As Tamara Last and Thomas Spijkerboer (2014) show, popular 
interest in and increasing public awareness of migrant deaths in the Medi-
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terranean are rather recent. A case in point is the shocking picture of the 
dead body of three- year- old Aylan Kurdi, found on a Turkish beach, which 
sparked a global outcry over the tragedy unfolding in the Mediterranean ba-
sin. Indeed, the international media attention led to the boy’s identification. 
But what of the identities of the thousands and thousands other dead people? 
As Iosif Kovras and Simon Robins (2015) have argued, while living migrants 
are some of the most heavily monitored individuals in the eu, dead migrants 
seem to merit almost no attention from the authorities. Thus, little has been 
said or done about the identities of the dead. Who are these people?
Dead- Bodies- at- the- Border
To whom do the dead- bodies- at- the- border belong? Although shipwrecks 
with high numbers of casualties constantly make the headlines in European 
media, and though this has contributed to a general framing of the refugee 
crisis as a humanitarian crisis, attention directed at the deaths tends to fade 
quickly. The question of who the dead are has thus received surprisingly lit-
tle attention.5 I raised this issue with representatives of the United National 
High Commissioner for Refugees (unhcr) and msf while in the south of 
Tunisia. Upon questioning about the contribution of msf to the management 
of bodies, Fadi Khatib, the coordinator of msf in Zarzis, kept elaborating on 
the first- responder training that his organization gives to local fishermen, 
together with training on hygiene and the use of protective suits and gloves. 
“Of course,” it occurred to me during this interview, “your concern is with 
the living; with public health, the prevention of infectious diseases that bod-
ies may cause. For you these bodies are containers of diseases.” Fadi’s face 
relaxed, “Yes, in fact that is our main concern, our main concern is with the 
living,” he answered. Given this lack of attention, one could say, the bodies 
did not enter the realm of forensics. They did not demand attention and en-
gagement from society.
The lack of accountability for dead- bodies- at- the- border stands in stark 
contrast to the painstaking work that Western authorities put in identifying 
the bodies of Western citizens in cases of disasters. A clear example is the 
Dutch concern with the body parts of the passengers on Malaysia Airlines 
flight mh17, which was shot down near the Ukraine on July 17, 2014. However, 
there are numerous other cases, such as the identification of the victims of the 
September 11 terrorist attack in the United States (Toom 2016), or the identi-
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fication of the victims of the Tsunami of 2004 in the Indian Ocean. As many 
commentators have observed with reference to the latter, there was a clear 
hierarchy seen in whose bodies were prioritized during the identification pro-
cess, and it is perhaps of no surprise that the bodies of Western nationals were 
at the top of the list (e.g., Merli and Buck 2015). There are also examples from 
conflict situations, such as the identification of the remains of the estimated 
eight thousand men and boys killed in the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina in 1995. Whereas the identification of Western victims of the 
tsunami was mostly based on dental examinations, in the case of Srebrenica 
forensic dna moved to center stage. In 2001, the International Committee of 
Missing Persons (icmp), the organization that was responsible for carrying 
out the identification process, received full political support and ample re-
sources to erect laboratories and started to use dna profiling alongside dental 
examination in order to identify the victims of the Srebrenica massacre (see 
Wagner 2008).6 The icmp identified more than 80 percent of the victims.
It is important to note that these cases not only concerned Western na-
tionals or politically fueled Western concerns such as the case of Srebren-
ica, but that, in contrast to the dead- bodies- at- the- border, in all cases there 
was a more or less clear idea about where the victims came from. Passenger 
lists were available (mh17), dental records and associated documents were 
available (the 2004 Tsunami), or evidence was given by family members who 
were looking for their relatives (Srebrenica). From a forensic perspective, this 
means that bodies or body parts could be compared to so- called reference 
data in order to conclude that a particular body belonged to a particular per-
son. Such reference data is mostly missing in the case of deceased in the Medi-
terranean Sea.7
The above examples highlight the issue of forensic infrastructure: the 
kind of organization that needs to be in place to manage bodies and to ar-
rive at identification. The work of the icpm in Srebrenica provided such an 
infrastructure but one that was organized around dna profiling. When it 
was introduced into the criminal justice systems of European countries and 
the United States, this technology was contested in terms of the reliability 
of dna (does it really identify per se?). Questions were also asked about the 
soundness of the technology, that is, the infrastructural requirements and 
the enrollment of the different actors in such ways as to ensure their proper 
contribution to the production of a dna profile (see M’charek 2000; Lynch 
et al. 2008; M’charek 2008; M’charek, Hagendijk, and de Vries 2012). When 
one thinks about a profile deemed legitimate in court, one has to consider the 
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movement of biological traces from the crime scene to police stations where 
they are registered, on to forensic laboratories where they are to be analyzed, 
and then on again to the courtroom where they are reported on and used as 
evidence in trial. All of the links in this chain had to be trained and reconfig-
ured in line with the infrastructural requirement of dna profiling (M’charek 
2008; 2016). To transform bodily substances into dna and dna into numbers 
and numbers into evidence that could help identify a suspect in court, the 
contributions of the different actors along the chain had to be standardized 
and routinized. It is these highly standardized procedures together with the 
mindboggling numerical substantiation of the evidence (so- called matching 
probability) that has contributed to the enormous success of forensic dna 
in criminal justice systems. Meanwhile, more than two decades later, it has 
become the gold standard in criminal investigation. In addition, dna profil-
ing has gained a solid position elsewhere, such as in the context of family 
reunification (Heinemann and Lemke 2013; C. G. M. Robben and Francisco 
J. Ferrándiz, this volume) and disaster victim identification (Wagner 2008; 
Toom 2016).8
However, as indicated above, in order to use dna to identify a person, one 
must compare the dna of that person to a reference population or to family 
members. However, in the case of the bodies of migrants and refugees there is 
no reference population readily available. Moreover, the geographical origin 
of the body is unclear (country, region, etc.), and even if this was clear, people 
have migrated from countries where the dna infrastructure is obscured be-
cause of a lack of data or a reference databank. Added to this, dead bodies at 
the shore pose new technical issues even when other forensic anthropological 
techniques are used. Indeed, they challenge established limits of forensic sci-
ence. When I attended the Seventh International Meeting of the New Medi-
terranean Academy of Forensic Sciences (nmafs) in 2016, the Italian forensic 
pathologist Cristina Cattaneo gave details about the problems of identifica-
tion (Cattaneo 2016). She noted cases in which victims had been in saltwater 
for long periods as a particular challenge: the bodies tend to be disfigured; pu-
trefaction and skeletonization further complicate the process. In cases where 
bodies have not been in the water for too long and if the process of skeletoni-
zation did not kick in, the epidermis tends to detach from the body leaving 
the skin unpigmented and rendering all cadavers whitish, even especially 
in dark- skinned people. In such cases, fingerprints are no longer available 
because of the detached skin. Odontology (forensic dentistry) is also unvi-
able, because there is nothing against which to compare a dental profile. And 
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the same fate seems to hold for dna. “We have to reinvent forensics anew,” 
Cattaneo stated. She gave the example of social media. Given the central role 
of the mobile phone and the use of social media such as Facebook and Insta-
gram, mining these media might provide forensic means of equal importance 
to more conventional identification technologies. “People send pictures home. 
A label on their clothing or a hair- do might help identify them.” If it would 
be possible to link a label on a trouser to a picture out there in the cloud this 
might be crucial for giving a name to a body, Cattaneo explained.
“Forensics has to be invented anew!” I wrote this statement down in my 
notebook during this meeting. It is of the greatest importance to open up the 
space of what we count as part of the forensic infrastructure and what we ex-
clude, what we constitute as knowledge and whose knowledge we privilege in 
the process of reinventing forensics. In short, we must ask this question: what 
will the forensic infrastructure of identification of dead- bodies- at- the- border 
look like? Rather than answering this question in a conclusive way, the follow-
ing will give some hints about this emerging infrastructure.
Emerging Forensic Infrastructures
It is surprising that the management of European borders is a concerted effort 
dealt with at the eu- level, whereas the identification of bodies is delegated to 
local authorities only. There is, however, an official process of identification 
used by eu countries around the Mediterranean Sea. It entails bodies receiv-
ing a unique identifying number that starts with the telephone country code 
(in accord with the Dublin Regulation to register migrants in the first country 
entered). Bodies are photographed (also paying attention to personal belong-
ings such as clothing, shoes, bags, watches, cell phones, etc.) and examined 
by a coroner; identifying markers have to be recorded (tattoos, freckles, inju-
ries or other bodily traumas) and dna samples taken. In practice, however, 
the situation looks less ordered. In many countries, bodies are simply bur-
ied without registration, sometimes piled into one grave. It often happens 
that there is no coroner available to examine the body. During warm seasons 
there is typically a lack of morticians (to carry the bodies) or too little room 
in the hospital- morgue to store the bodies until registration is completed. For 
example, in the southern Tunisian town of Zarzis the hospital- morgue only 
has six places, yet there were several cases in which more than twenty bodies 
were found at the beach of Zarzis. In addition, hospital personnel are hesi-
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tant to use an ambulance to carry the bodies because of possible health risk 
for their patients. In general terms, a proper management system that runs 
from finding the bodies on the beach to registration, examination, and burial 
is still to be established, resulting in bodies simply being buried without any 
additional information except for the date on which they were found.9 While 
the resources and procedures on the European side of the Mediterranean Sea 
are slightly better, Kovras and Robins (2016) describe a lack of properly de-
limited responsibilities:
The coast guard maintained that their responsibility is limited to collect-
ing the dead body and transporting it to the hospital, after which respon-
sibility lies with the district attorney. . . . The district attorney in practice 
assumes only a marginal role, typically declining any substantive investi-
gation on the assumption that death was not caused by criminal activity, 
and then signing the relevant documentation to permit burial. . . . The 
body remains at the local hospital with the coroner, whose duty is lim-
ited to the examination of the corpse to establish the cause of death and 
carry out the autopsy. . . . When asked about the next steps, the coroner 
had no answer; he only revealed that a swift burial was necessary, as the 
hospital has no facilities to store bodies for more than a few days. The 
director of social services at the hospital informed us there is no budget 
available for burying dead “illegal” migrants, only for treating living mi-
grants. . . . There is no standardized procedure to deal with a migrant body, 
and this policy vacuum legitimizes local authorities in denying their legal 
and moral responsibility to address the issue of identification. Most often 
relevant data found on the body — documents, tattoos, other identifying 
marks — are not systematically collected, analyzed and stored to support 
identification. Similarly, only a limited effort is made to collect other in-
formation — such as testimony from survivors of a shipwreck — that could 
advance this goal. (Kovras and Robins 2016, 41)
This long extract about the eu protocol shows the various actors who are in 
place to attend to the bodies of deceased migrants. However some actors and 
the crucial knowledge they could contribute are not included in the forensic 
infrastructure. For example, the information that could be provided by fel-
low travelers who survived the shipwreck, or the knowledge of fisherman or 
search and rescue volunteers, who are often first responders, is not included 
in the process of registration and identification.
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Furthermore, the lack of responsibility for identification as well as the ab-
sence of central coordination for the management of bodies have been an 
issue for years among the forensic community. In November 2013, the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross (icrc) organized a conference in Mi-
lan initiated in collaboration with forensic scientists in Milan and attended 
by participants from of European Mediterranean countries. The conference 
addressed the coordination of work in order to facilitate identification. One 
of the outcomes of the conference was the drafting of a number of recom-
mendations that are slowly shaping the infrastructure for the management 
of dead bodies.10 The recommendations appeared in the journal Forensic Sci-
ence International and aimed to improve “forensic analysis, documentation 
and identification of dead migrants; for ensuring their dignified manage-
ment and for bringing answers to the bereaved.” The following are the key 
recommendations:
• increasing the necessary political and institutional awareness and 
support, at national, regional and international levels, required for 
preventing and resolving the tragedy of unidentified dead migrants 
recovered from the Mediterranean Sea;
• improving the communication, coordination and cooperation of fo-
rensic and investigative agencies involved in the recovery, analysis, 
documentation and management of decedent migrants;
• ensuring the use of standardized procedures for the forensic analysis 
and documentation of the dead by all forensic and investigative agen-
cies and practitioners involved in the management of dead migrants;
• creating centralized databases with information on unidentified dead 
and the missing reported in the region. These databases should be 
searchable and accessible by various agencies, including humanitar-
ian organizations, for servicing the humanitarian plight of bereaved 
families;
• involving Governments and institutions of countries of origin of mi-
grants in the efforts to identify and repatriate their dead nationals.
(Cattaneo et al. 2015, e2)
In 2016, two initiatives have scaled up the process of identification. The first 
initiative was the initiation of a dna database in Athens. Headed by the foren-
sic geneticist Penelope Maniati, this lab is part of the Forensic Sciences Divi-
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sion (dee) of the Greek Police and aims to help identify deceased persons and 
make it possible for relatives to find out about their beloved ones by having 
their own profiles matched to the databank. A second initiative, which I will 
give more detail on, has been taken in Italy as collaboration between the spe-
cial commissioner for missing persons, Vittorio Piscitelli; Paolo Procaccianti, 
of the Institute of Legal Medicine Palermo; and Cristina Cattaneo, foren-
sic pathologist of Labanof Lab Milano. They initiated a large pilot project to 
convince the national and European authorities that it is possible to identify 
victims of shipwrecks and to set up working procedures for registration, sam-
pling, and storing of data in a conclusive manner. This pilot aims to identify 
the victims of a shipwreck in April 2015 in which a fishing boat packed with 
hundreds of people floundered 135 kilometers of the coast of Libya. Following 
a communication, the Italian Coast Guard radioed King Jacob, a 157- meter 
large merchant vessel nearby to provide assistance. However, upon seeing 
the vessel approaching, the migrants rushed to one side of the deck, causing 
their boat to capsize. The boat sank, and only twenty- eight persons could be 
rescued. Estimates suggest that eight hundred to nine hundred people went 
down with the boat. As part of this pilot project this very boat was boarded 
in July 2016 in the Sicilian port of Augusta by the Italian Marine force by 
sending a remote- controlled robot down, 370 meters below sea level down to 
tow the ship and the 169 cadavers that were scattered around the boat. The 
remains were recovered with the help of liquid nitrogen and kept in refrigera-
tor containers. Also, while the boarding of the ship has cost some nine mil-
lion euros, paid for by the Italian government, a large team of experts from 
different universities and labs have been working in their spare time, without 
any compensation, at the military site where the remains are stored. Eight 
hundred body bags, some probably containing remains from more than one 
person, have been secured.11 Bodies and body parts have been subjected to 
autopsies and registrations, and the analysis of the remains will take place 
in various Italian laboratories. However, the forensic work will not stop here. 
At the end of 2016, possible families of victims who did carry identification 
papers with them were contacted so as to help in the process of identification. 
This process will probably open up the space for other actors to become part 
of the forensic infrastructure, such as legal experts working on international 
law and human rights, or other social actors in the countries of origin.
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Conclusions
In the context of the “refugee crisis” and in the aftermath of Paris, vulner-
ability has been a recurrent theme. In fact, it figures prominently in Euro-
pean policy. It does not come as a surprise that it is not the vulnerability of 
the refugees or even that of European citizens that is central, but rather that 
of Europe’s borders. However, the vulnerabilities of the European borders, I 
want to suggest, help to make Other, and make invisible (out of our way and 
not our responsibility) the thousands and thousands of bodies that we so of-
ten find on our beaches. Attending to these bodies produces evidence. Obvi-
ously it produces evidence about the identity of the missing person. But more 
intensely so, it produces evidence about Europe’s border management regime 
and the costs thereof. To know these bodies is to know the humanitarian price 
of our territorial borders.
In this chapter, I have attended to the costs of the European border regime 
by proposing forensics not only as a set of logics (Andersson 2014) or a tool, 
but as a methodological approach, an art of paying attention, as to open up a 
field that is not neatly ordered, but rather messy and contingent.
Forensics as art of paying attention allows for two related interventions, 
which I have only begun to outline in this chapter. First, it helps us to at-
tend to the management of bodies and processes of forensic identification 
beyond the objectifying rendering thereof in mainstream forensics. That is, 
it allows us to bring into view an emerging forensic infrastructure that is ut-
terly creative because it needs to “make do” with the limited resources: lim-
ited knowledge about the subjects whose bodies are in need of identification; 
limited technologies that can be applied given the state of the bodies; limited 
monetary resources, technologies, and devices to work with. This results in 
a constant creative process, whereby the knowledge of fisherman about the 
wind and the currents of seawater becomes key in estimating where a body 
is drifting from and at what speed; or a film taken by some Syrian friends 
containing information about what they were wearing before sailing off from 
Libya to Lampedusa, can become crucial in determining whether it was the 
body of one of them that washed ashore in 2014 on a beach in Zarzis; or 
yet again a setting in which, given the lack of laboratory equipment, a take-
out coffee cup becomes a container in which the teeth of a dead subject are 
bleached before the forensic anthropological examination. All these odd ele-
ments have become part of a forensic process and begin to coshape forensic 
infrastructures. In some cases, this emergent infrastructure and the elements 
106 AMADE M’CHAREK 
that help to bring it about will be transient, whereas in other cases it might 
become more durable. Attending to this nitty- gritty process is not only im-
portant as a work of valuing and appreciating the identification work done 
against all odds, but it also allows for a critical evaluation of what knowledge 
comes to matter, that is, what knowledge and whose knowledge can become 
part of forensics and how we might do this otherwise.
The second intervention that is possible by taking forensics as art of pay-
ing attention is related to the main object of forensics, namely, material traces. 
The material traces that figure in forensic cases typically have a talent for 
joining desperate places and events and inviting scenarios around them as 
to produce a possible story about what could have happened. Both the insis-
tence on materiality and the invitation to bring things together that we are 
in the habit of keeping apart (Stengers 2005) allow us to tell a different story 
about what we have come to know as the refugee crisis. I thus suggested waste 
and litter as material evidence to think with and to resist a reduction of the 
problem of dead- bodies- at- the- border to a straightforward matter of identi-
fication or not identification. Waste might help us to hold the refugee crisis in 
close relation to Europe’s colonial past, or to bring into conversation the care 
for borders and the care of citizens for people who seek refuge in Europe, or 
to think together the price paid for a life jacket and that paid for a drone to 
survey the border. Keeping the messiness on board, staying with the trouble 
(Haraway 2016), may well help to produce a forensic infrastructure that is 
more apt for the kind of identification work at stake. In this way, mess, like 
waste, is a virtue and not a sin.
Notes
I would like to thank the editors of this volume, especially Ursula Rao and Mark 
Maguire, for feedback and guidance throughout the process. I thank the many 
respondents that I am encountering in my fieldwork in Tunisia and Italy. I want 
to mention Faysal Khnissi in particular for invaluable help during my fieldwork 
in Tunisia and for sharing his knowledge and network with me. Finally I would 
like to thank the European Research Council (erc) for supporting my research 
through an erc Consolidator Grant (fp7 – 617451- RaceFaceid- Race Matter: On 
the Absent Presence of Race in Forensic Identification).
1 Later in 2011, and to process the stream of refugees, the unhcr established the 
“DEAD- BODIES- AT- THE- BORDER” 107
refugee camp Choucha, a few kilometers from the Libyan border, which came to 
house up to 300,000 refugees. This camp would be closed down in June 2013.
2 For example, the Agency does not have its own equipment, but it has guaranteed 
access to the equipment of eu countries in advent of specific operations.
3 See also Ian Hacking (2006, 32 – 33), who argues that the evidence provided by 
things was lacking in our modern thinking. “The evidence of things is not to be 
confused with the data of sense, which in much modern epistemology, has been 
regarded as the foundation of all evidence.” And he continues: “The evidence of 
things is distinct from testimony, the evidence of witnesses and of authorities.” 
It is important to note here that this view on material evidence and the delega-
tion of agency to things is at the heart of much of work in science and technology 
studies and in particular in Actor Network Theory.
4 For this and more details on the human costs of border control, see http://www 
.borderdeaths.org.
5 While some work has been taking account of the numbers of the deceased, as 
Kovras and Robins (2016) convincingly argue, most of the work also in critical 
migration studies has been focusing on the surveillance of the flows of people 
and surveillance and biometric technology.
6 The icmp was initiated in 1996 as part of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which 
ended the fighting in the former Yugoslavia.
7 See also Claudia Merli and Trudi Buck (2015) on the lack of reference data for 
non- Western victims of the tsunami.
8 In fact, before forensic dna entered the criminal justice system, it was used 
for the first time in a family reunification case in the UK by Alec Jeffreys (see 
M’charek 2008).
9 To be clear, my research in Tunisia has just started, and I have only had the 
chance to do short site- visits and hold first conversations with various different 
actors involved.
10 Cattaneo, personal communication, September 17.
11 Cattaneo, personal communication, September 17.
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F IVE
The Transitional Lives of Crimes 
against Humanity
Forensic Evidence under Changing Political 
Circumstances
Antonius C. G. M. Robben and Francisco J. Ferrándiz
The photograph Death of a Loyalist Militiaman, popularly known as The Fall-
ing Soldier, was taken by Robert Capa during the Spanish Civil War. The 
photo depicts a combatant with a rifle in the hand of his outstretched right 
arm, his head tilted slightly toward his left, as he falls backward on a dry 
grassy slope near the hamlet of Cerro Muriano on September 5, 1936. The 
mortally wounded militiaman was recognized by a cousin in 1995 as twenty- 
four- year- old Federico Borrell García. His final resting place is unknown. 
This iconic image of warfare and human sacrifice has become the subject of a 
several controversies in the last forty years that are indicative of the intricate 
process of detection, construction, and interpretation by which evidence is 
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collected, and multiple traces of diverse nature are transformed into compet-
ing evidential narratives.
Doubts about the soldier’s identity, the place of death, and the circum-
stances under which Capa took the photo have been raised through the de-
cades. The suggestion was made in 1975 that the photograph had been staged 
by Capa during a pause in the fighting between Franco’s rebel forces and the 
Republican government troops, not at Cerro Muriano but about fifty kilo-
meters away near the town of Espejo. An alternative hypothesis was that the 
show maneuvers attracted hostile fire, and caused the tragic death of Borrell 
García (Knightley 1975, 212; Barca 2008).
In 2007, the documentary The Shadow of the Iceberg appeared in which, 
as the Spanish filmmakers called it, “an autopsy of the mythical photograph” 
was made (Doménech and Riebenbauer 2007). A geodesist inferred from the 
landscape that the picture was not taken at Cerro Muriano, and an astro-
physicist concluded from the soldier’s shadow that the photo was not taken at 
5 pm, as Robert Capa had said in an interview, but at 9 am. At this hour, how-
ever, there was no armed combat at Cerro Muriano. The forensic pathologist 
Fernando Verdú claimed that he could not ascertain a cause of death from the 
photo, and that the soldier’s backward fall could only have been produced by 
a high- caliber weapon, but that then there would have been a visible impact 
on the impeccable white shirt. Finally, a comparison between the facial fea-
tures of The Falling Soldier and a photo of Federico Borrell García showed, 
according to Verdú, that the fingers, earlobes, and teeth of the two men were 
different, and that therefore the militiaman on Capa’s image was not Borrell 
García (Doménech and Riebenbauer 2007).
How credible is the documentary’s evidence, and what does it say about its 
construction? The puzzle of The Falling Soldier begins already with the un-
sure conditions under which the photograph had been taken. Capa remained 
vague in interviews, but war correspondent John Hersey remembered an in-
formal meeting with Capa in which he explained how he had been crouching 
in a trench during heavy charges by Republican militias against a Nationalist 
machine- gun nest in Andalusia. Retold in Hersey’s words: “Finally as they 
charged, the photographer timidly raised his camera to the top of the parapet 
and, without looking, at the instant of the first machine gun burst, pressed the 
button” (Knightley 1975, 211).
There was also the suggestion that Capa’s lover Gerda Taro (née: Gerta 
Pohorylle) had taken the rectangular picture with her Leica camera because 
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Robert Capa (née: Endre Ernö Friedmann) generally used a Rolleiflex with 
its typical square picture format. Furthermore, the two photographers of-
ten published their pictures under Capa’s name, as both used pseudonyms. 
Unfortunately, the couple could not be consulted when the photo’s authen-
ticity was questioned. Taro had died in Spain in 1937 during a road accident 
involving a tank, and Capa was killed in Vietnam in 1954 when he stepped 
on a landmine. With the photo’s origin story lost and the evidence dispersed 
among municipal archives in Spain, the file cabinets of Magnum Photos in 
New York, the unknown burial grounds of Federico Borrell García and the 
dead militiaman, and perhaps the confidential testimony of a deceased eye-
witness to a son or daughter, we are left with a heterogeneous reservoir of ma-
terial remnants and inconclusive clues. Maybe Robert Capa’s brother Cornell 
and Richard Whelan, Capa’s official biographer, could have provided answers. 
Whelan (1985, 97) could have reassessed his earlier dismissal of the posed 
photo hypothesis, and Cornell Capa could have given full access to the series 
of photos made at Cerro Muriano. However, they refused an interview with 
the documentary filmmakers, suspecting them of a neofascist attempt to dis-
credit the iconic image. Whelan died in 2007 and was buried next to Robert 
Capa. Cornell Capa passed away in 2008.
The process of interpreting bodies as evidence is further complicated 
when not only the precise circumstances are unknown but when forensic 
traces have been erased deliberately. The World War II mass graves in Russia’s 
Katyn Forest come to mind readily as an example of the manipulation and 
misrepresentation of material evidence. German troops invading the Soviet 
Union during Operation Barbarossa located a number of mass graves near the 
city of Smolensk that contained an estimated twenty thousand people, among 
whom four thousand were officers of the Polish Army. The German Army 
supervised in April 1943 an international team of medical and criminology 
experts to exhume the graves. The investigation established that the victims 
had all been shot at close range. The Soviet Union was held responsible for the 
massacre. Soviet troops retook the forest six months later, and a commission 
was set to work in January 1944 that accused the Germans of slaughtering the 
Polish officers and civilians. The commission’s report entered the Nuremberg 
Trials as proof of Nazi atrocities on the Eastern Front. Documentary evidence 
of the Soviet responsibility for the Katyn massacre had to wait till the early 
1990s when Russia’s archives were finally opened (Paul 1991; Paperno 2001).
A second, much more recent, example concerns the massacre of around 
eight thousand Muslims in July 1995 near the town of Srebrenica in Bosnia- 
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Herzegovina. Serbian troops commanded by General Ratko Mladić had over-
run a battalion of Dutch troops stationed in the un enclave. The women and 
children were evacuated, and the men and boys were executed after the Dutch 
peacekeepers had left Srebrenica. The bodies were buried in mass graves that 
were opened several weeks later with heavy equipment to disturb the evidence 
of the massacre. The partially deteriorated bodies were disarticulated, and 
the remains commingled, before being buried at different sites for the sec-
ond time. The first forensic exhumation was carried out under the auspices 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (icty) in 
July 1996, which was investigating war crimes and crimes against humanity 
in the Balkans. These exhumations revealed the difference between crimi-
nal evidence and forensic evidence, and showed that the interests of a court 
seeking the conviction of perpetrators may be at odds with the humanitarian 
aim to identify the victims for their religious reburial by the surviving family 
members (Crossland 2013; Wagner 2015).
This chapter analyzes the complexity of collecting and interpreting fo-
rensic evidence about the victims assassinated during Argentina’s dictator-
ship from 1976 to 1983, Spain’s Civil War from 1936 to 1939, and the decades 
of authoritarian rule in Spain until Franco’s death in 1975. What makes the 
comparison of the Argentine and Spanish cases of exhumation presented here 
so interesting is how the transitional lives of the crimes against humanity de-
veloped in parallel or interactive ways, and how the combination of forensic 
exhumations, legal accountability, and political circumstances gave rise to 
different bodies of evidence. Political refugees fled Franco’s dictatorship to 
Argentina after 1939, and Argentines escaped from their country to Spain 
after the military coup d’état of 1976. Both regimes made great efforts during 
authoritarian rule to destroy the evidence of their crimes against human-
ity, and the two countries have collaborated and inspired one another since 
the mid- 1980s to find disappeared citizens; exhume mass graves; and pursue 
memory, truth, and accountability.
The concealment and destruction of evidence were common practice in 
the authoritarian regimes of Spain and Argentina, and only scattered traces 
remained in secret documents, personal testimonies, and circumstantial evi-
dence that, when placed in the proper context, could establish the crime. The 
crimes against humanity of both dictatorial regimes had therefore transi-
tional lives during the time span between the classification and destruction 
of evidence and the piecemeal historical and forensic reconstruction decades 
later. This chapter compares and contrasts the concealment and disclosure of 
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the mass killings of Spanish and Argentine citizens, which share the system-
atic disappearance of the victims of repression and the tenacious attempts by 
relatives to find their missing loved ones. The assassinations were concealed 
and the identity of perpetrators blurred for complex strategic, legal, and cul-
tural reasons. Anonymous burials instilled fear and uncertainty among the 
population, destroyed incriminating evidence, and denied the bereaved and 
the deceased culturally important funerary rites. Both cases reveal how evi-
dence was accumulated during decades of intermittent examinations spurred 
by unexpected political, forensic, and judicial developments.
In March 1996 there were large street demonstrations in Argentina against 
the continued impunity of known perpetrators of the disappearances. Am-
nesty laws had been passed in the late- 1980s, and convicted officers had been 
granted presidential pardons. The Spanish prosecutor Carlos Castresana 
was emotionally moved by when he saw the Argentine protests on television, 
and within days set a legal process in motion that eventually allowed Judge 
Baltasar Garzón to request in March 1997 the extradition of former Argentine 
dictator Leopoldo Galtieri in (Roht- Arriaza 2005, 2 – 3). The arrest of Chilean 
dictator Augusto Pinochet in October 1998 when he was visiting Great Britain 
for medical reasons became internationally Garzón’s most celebrated case, 
but the sentencing of Argentine Navy captain Scilingo in 2005 for his par-
ticipation in two death flights was his most significant achievement, and the 
start of a growing legal collaboration between Spain and Argentina in pursuit 
of accountability. Spain asked Argentina to help establish the fate of Spanish 
citizens who had been disappeared during the Argentine dictatorship. Con-
versely, a number of Spanish memory associations and victims — including 
the case of the Valley of the Fallen in Spain discussed below — filed in 2010 in 
Argentina a lawsuit against the crimes against humanity committed during 
the civil war and Francoism on the grounds of international law (known as 
Querella Argentina). This successful lawsuit has resulted in legal actions in 
Spain by Argentine judge María Servini de Cubría, involving testimonies by 
victims, requests for exhumations and identifications, and a demand for the 
detention and extradition of more than twenty Francoist torturers and pub-
lic officers. In other words, the two countries were prosecuting each other’s 
suspects who could not be indicted at home because of the reigning amnesty 
laws. The threat of extradition to Spain made the Argentine armed forces 
accept the derogation of the impunity laws in 2005 and, in effect, agree to 
their prosecution at home, while the extradition requests of Spanish suspects 
to Argentina helped at least raise the issue of impunity in Spain. So far, the 
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Spanish state has refused to extradite to Argentina the culprits identified by 
Servini de Cubría, alleging that their presumed crimes have expired under 
the 1977 Amnesty Law.
The detention of Pinochet and the legal attention of Spanish judges to Ar-
gentina’s perpetrators in the late 1990s influenced Spanish journalist Emilio 
Silva in the year 2000 to search for his grandfather who had been executed in 
1936. The remains were located in a mass grave near the hamlet Priaranza del 
Bierzo. Subsequently, Silva published an article entitled “My Grandfather Was 
Also a Disappeared” that showed the direct impact of Argentina’s exhuma-
tion movement on Spain. Within years, mass graves throughout Spain were 
exhumed by a grassroots movement propelled by family members and activ-
ists. The prominent place of Argentine relatives in finding their disappeared, 
not just in the tireless search and protest but as well in the monitoring of the 
exhumations, was also inspirational for Spain. The Spanish children and es-
pecially grandchildren who searched for their relatives stood at the edge of 
opened mass graves as forensic team members interviewed them about the 
ante mortem characteristics of the exposed skeletons. This procedure had 
been developed by Argentine forensic anthropologists during the late 1980s 
and was now adopted in Spain: the trust of the searching relatives was culti-
vated, and they became active research participants amid close attention to 
the political and legal implications of the identification process and the ex-
posure of crimes against humanity (Fondebrider 2015). Furthermore, Spanish 
and Argentine forensic anthropologists have collaborated in various exhuma-
tions and have exchanged information and expertise. In January 2016, the 
first exhumation in Spain ordered by Judge Servini de Cubría, oriented to find 
the body of Timoteo Mendieta, took place in the Cemetery of Guadalajara, 
a city close to Madrid, and the genetic samples were sent across the ocean to 
the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team, or Equipo Argentino de Antro-
pología Forense (eaaf), forensic anthropologists for identification. The dna 
testing in Argentina was negative for Mr. Mendieta’s presumed body and a 
new exhumation in the same cemetery has been requested from the Argen-
tinean Judge in early 2017, to the indifference and even feet- dragging of Span-
ish authorities. Exhumations and identifications have become transnational 
practices that are intertwined with human rights discourse and processes of 
transitional justice (Ferrándiz and Robben 2015).
Finally, the exhumation movements in Spain and Argentina and the pur-
suit of evidence of human rights violations transformed in the 2010s because 
of a shared cosmopolitan preoccupation with memory and commemoration, 
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where iconographies of human right violations travel back and forth. Start-
ing around 2008, transnational imageries of the disappeared started to pro-
liferate in public acts by the memorial movement in Spain. In 2010, Spanish 
activists and family members started to carry photos of the missing during 
weekly protests in the main square in Madrid (Ronda de la Dignidad de Sol) 
that are reminiscent of the weekly marches of the Mothers of the Plaza de 
Mayo in Buenos Aires; and echoes of the Holocaust are heard in the denun-
ciation of the Argentine and Spanish disappearances as genocide (Baer and 
Sznaider 2015; Ferrándiz and Silva Barrera 2016). The meanings of the bod-
ies of evidence have been changing under the ideological polarization in the 
two countries, and the growing globalization of memory and accountability 
have given rise to similar stakeholders, imageries, narratives, and discourses. 
Nevertheless, the relatives of disappeared citizens in Spain and Argentina 
have been struggling with the different political and legal consequences of 
the exhumations because of other historical circumstances, as will become 
clear in the ensuing analyses.
Death Flights in Argentina
The first reference to death flights in Argentina was made on March 24, 1977, 
in an open letter to the military junta by the journalist Rodolfo Walsh. Walsh 
was a prominent member of the Montoneros guerrilla organization, and 
he denounced the Argentine military on the first anniversary of the coup 
d’état of 1976, for “carpeting the bottom of the River Plate with dead bodies 
or throwing prisoners into the sea from cargo planes of the First Air Brigade” 
(Walsh 1995, 419). Walsh was killed the next day in an exchange of gun fire 
with a naval task group that tried to abduct him.
In hindsight, we know that Walsh was right, but what was the source of 
his information? Walsh was a Montonero intelligence officer, and probably re-
ceived the information from Montoneros who did their military service at the 
Buenos Aires city airport Jorge Newbery or at the secret detention centers of 
the Campo de Mayo Army Base and the Navy Mechanics School, or Escuela 
de Mecánica de la Armada (esma). One of them was the conscript Sergio 
Tarnopolsky, who was stationed at the esma and was passing information to 
Walsh. He and four family members were abducted by esma officers in July 
1976 and assassinated (cidh 1984, 85; Baschetti 2001, 38).
Next to presenting the direct evidence of testimonies, Walsh referred to 
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material evidence that we can now link to the death flights. Walsh described 
in his open letter how between March and October 1976 twenty- five muti-
lated bodies that he assumed had been thrown in the River Plate from Ar-
gentine naval vessels had washed ashore on the Uruguayan coast. He also 
mentioned that dozens of bodies had appeared on the Argentine shore (Walsh 
1995, 419). The information came from local newspapers that reported on the 
gruesome discoveries and from how the unidentified bodies were buried in 
local cemeteries.
The first detailed public testimonies about death flights were given by 
three Montoneros who had been held captive at the esma for more than one 
year and were sent into exile to Europe. Their eyewitness accounts were pre-
sented at the French National Assembly in Paris on October 12, 1979. The 
three explained that inmates were transported on Wednesdays, and occa-
sionally Thursdays. They were told by naval officers that they were going to 
other secret detention centers or to work camps near the Patagonian town of 
Rawson. All captives were placed under lockdown on these days, and they 
only heard the case numbers of the transferees being called out at 5 pm. The 
three exiled Montoneros described the atmosphere at the esma when a group 
of captives was destined for a death flight as follows: “A very tense climate 
reigned on the day of the transfers. We, the abducted, did not know whether 
or not it would be our turn that day. The guards took many more severe mea-
sures than usual. We couldn’t go to the bathroom. Every one of us had to re-
main strictly in his place, hooded and shackled, without making any attempt 
to see what was going on” (Martí, Pirles, and Osatinsky 1995, 40). Placed in 
a single file, the selected inmates were ordered to walk down the stairs to the 
building’s basement.
Where were the captives taken? The three Montonero witnesses discov-
ered their fate in February 1977, when Emilio Carlos Assales Bonazzola re-
appeared in the esma after having been put on transport earlier that day. He 
slept through the night and the following day, and then told them how he and 
twenty other captives had been taken to the infirmary in the basement and 
were supposedly vaccinated to prevent any contamination at their place of 
destination. Within minutes he was unable to move his limbs. Others began 
to vomit or fell unconscious. The group was loaded onto a truck and driven 
to Jorge Newbery Airport. When he was boarded into a Fokker aircraft, the 
guard asked for his name. Assales Bonazzola responded with his nickname: 
Tincho. “You have saved your life, kid,” the guard responded as he was taken 
from the plane and driven back to the esma (Martí, Pirles, and Osatinsky 
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1995, 42). Apparently, a secret detention center in Mendoza had requested to 
interrogate him, and he was taken there in March 1977. The testimony of 1977 
was confirmed in 1982 and 1988 by other esma captives (Daleo and Castillo 
1982, 33 – 34; Gasparini 1988, 106; Anguita and Caparrós 1998, 384; Robben 
2005, 267 – 69). The three ex- disappeared could now explain the rubber marks 
on the basement floor the day after a transport. The streaks had been made 
by the shoes of sedated captives hauled to the trucks waiting outside. When 
Coast Guard officer Gonzalo Sánchez commented once that the transferees 
would be thrown from planes flying above the ocean, they suddenly under-
stood why the clothes of transported captives were found in the storage room 
(Martí, Pirles, and Osatinsky 1995, 41 – 43).
How reliable were the testimonies of former disappeared captives who told 
about lengthy torture sessions, constant humiliation, and prolonged incar-
ceration in small cells — including cubicles of only 2 × 0.7 × 0.7 meters — while 
being handcuffed, shackled, and hooded? Were they not too traumatized to 
give reliable accounts of their experiences? Traumatic experiences create a 
mental overload that impedes a comprehensive cognitive encoding (McNally 
2003, 190). As Ana Douglass and Thomas Vogler (2003, 2) have explained, “it 
is by definition in the nature of a mental trauma to exceed and violate our 
normal mental processing ability and frames of reference. The more massive 
the traumatic impact, the more it will affect our ability to register it.”
The epistemological issue of testimony, truth, and trauma has been ana-
lyzed by Ruth Leys (2000, 298 – 307) in terms of a mimetic and an antimi-
metic position. The mimetic position maintains that people cannot describe 
traumatic experiences, because these never enter ordinary memory but are 
impressed straight on the brain. The experiences exist in sense memory as 
smells and sounds, or in dreams and flashbacks, but were not mediated cogni-
tively. Echoing Charlotte Delbo about her experience in Auschwitz, Lawrence 
Langer (1991, 6) distinguishes between mimetic deep memory and antimi-
metic common memory: “Deep memory tries to recall the Auschwitz self as 
it was then; common memory has a dual function: it restores the self to its 
normal pre- and postcamp routines but also offers detached portraits, from 
the vantage point of today, of what it must have been like then. Deep memory 
thus suspects and depends on common memory, knowing what common 
memory cannot know but tries nonetheless to express.” The antimimetic po-
sition claims that traumatic events do not restructure the psyche, and can 
therefore be expressed in a narrative account after enough emotional dis-
tance has been taken (Agger and Jensen 1996, 90 – 93). The ex- disappeared 
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could provide thus both sensorial and verifiable evidence, but, in the politi-
cal circumstances of 1979 when the Argentine military were still in power, 
they focused on a detailed documentation of the spatial layout of the esma 
building, the chain of command of the naval task force, the repressive op-
erations, and the maternity ward where pregnant disappeared women were 
held. The personal experiences of the three eyewitnesses were downplayed. 
Verifiable knowledge was more important to convince foreign governments 
to take action against the Argentine junta than emotional displays of senso-
rial evidence.
The military regime fell quickly from power after losing a war with a Brit-
ish expeditionary force over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands in June 1982. 
Elections were held in October 1983, and Raúl Alfonsín became Argentina’s 
new president in December 1983. He installed the National Commission on 
the Disappeared, or Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas 
(conadep). The commission gathered thousands of depositions, including 
some about death flights, but doubted their veracity. “This is scarcely credible, 
but is mentioned by many witnesses: some because they had heard about it, 
others because of direct references made by their captors. Then there were the 
bodies washed up by currents on the shore. It is indeed difficult to believe, but 
in the general context of this savage repression one can imagine that for those 
who practiced it” (conadep 1986, 221). The conadep report of 1984 included 
the testimony of the three esma survivors from 1979 quoted above, as well as 
two depositions. One witness said about the esma: “As far as we know from 
the comments of some Task Force officers, the ‘transfer’ prisoners were given 
an injection of pentothal, loaded asleep into the plane and thrown into the 
sea” (conadep 1986, 222).
Did the depositions provide reliable evidence? The truth commission 
created a trusting environment for witnesses to acknowledge their suffer-
ing, allowing them to share the harrowing experiences in their own way. The 
commission pursued testimonial evidence through personal depositions, and 
forensic evidence through exhumations. The poor quality of the forensic evi-
dence gave therefore precedence to emotional narratives that were persuasive 
because people empathized with the stories of enforced disappearance and 
were moved by the accounts of torture.
The death flights were also examined during the trial in April – December 
1985 against the nine junta commanders who had ruled Argentina between 
March 1976 and June 1982. The former captive Carlos Muñoz testified that 
esma officers had explained that transferees were injected with a sedative 
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and thrown from helicopters at sea (Muñoz 1985, 455). Others survivors gave 
similar testimonies, aware that they could be subjected to cross- examination 
by the defense lawyers. The public truth finding in Argentina’s inquisitional 
criminal law system was therefore fundamentally different from making a 
confidential deposition at the conadep. The judges questioned the witnesses, 
and would then allow prosecutors and defense lawyers to continue the oral 
examination. The difficulty with substantiating the allegations with docu-
ments, signed orders, confessions by officers, and forensic evidence explains 
why the testimonies about death flights were not pursued in the trial against 
the junta commanders.
The Argentine military maintained silence about the nature and extent of 
their repressive practices, let alone confessing to such an unforgiving crime as 
throwing people alive from planes and helicopters. Nevertheless, the retired 
police- inspector Rodolfo Peregrino Fernández told a human rights commis-
sion in March 1983 that planes of the Argentine Coast Guard were employed 
to launch abducted political prisoners into the sea. One officer told him that 
one time, “a prisoner had dragged the nco entrusted with his elimination 
in his fall into the sky” (Fernández 1983, 71). Somehow, this circumstantial 
evidence did not receive much attention, other than confirming what former 
esma captives had been saying since 1979. The self- incriminatory account 
of retired Navy captain Adolfo Francisco Scilingo in March 1995, made at a 
time when the Argentine military were immune from prosecution because of 
sweeping amnesty laws, did finally call the death flights to national attention.
Captain Scilingo approached the prominent journalist Horacio Verbitsky 
in late 1994 to express his chagrin about the treatment of veterans of the so- 
called war against subversion. He himself had been refused promotion and 
had resigned in 1986. Scilingo told Verbitsky that he had flown two missions 
in June and July 1977 with thirteen and seventeen esma captives, respectively 
(Verbitsky 1995, 180). He explained that the sedated captives were put on the 
plane, given an additional tranquilizer, and then prepared for their fall to 
death by multiple injuries or drowning:
They were undressed while being unconscious and when the flight com-
mander gave the order, dependent on the location of the plane, the hatch 
was opened and they were thrown out naked, one by one. This is the story. 
A macabre but real story that no one can deny. They did it with Skyvan 
planes of the Coast Guard and Electra planes from the Navy. In the Skyvan 
through the rear hatch that opens from top to bottom. It’s a large hatch 
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without intermediate positions. It’s closed or open, and therefore main-
tained in open position. The nco stepped on the hatch, a sort of swivel 
hatch, so that there would be an opening of forty centimeters towards the 
void. Next, we began lowering the subversives that way. (Verbitsky 1995, 58)
Eighteen years after Rodolfo Walsh first mentioned the death flights, Sci-
lingo’s confession finally completed a picture of the entire procedure from 
taking captives from their cells to their fall to death. The detailed account 
provided many new leads, and corroborated the veracity of testimonies that 
had been doubted, such as Police- Inspector Fernández’s hearsay about an offi-
cer almost falling to death. This officer was Captain Scilingo, and it happened 
on his first flight after the captives had been undressed: “Next, we began low-
ering the subversives that way. As I was quite nervous about the situation, I 
almost fell and tumbled into the abyss. . . . I slipped and they grabbed me” 
(Verbitsky 1995, 58). Luis Moreno Ocampo, the assistant prosecutor at the trial 
of the commanders in 1985, remembered hearing a different version from Sci-
lingo, namely that Scilingo did not slip but that he was almost dragged into 
the sky by an awakening captive: “Despite the injection, this prisoner woke 
up, and half- conscious resisted being thrown out and almost dragged him 
into the abyss” (Verbitsky 1995, 149). These different versions show that even 
self- incriminating evidence must be treated with suspicion because it may 
serve ulterior motives. Captain Scilingo turned himself into a victim who was 
ordered to carry out a gruesome task, almost died in the duty, and ended up 
being traumatized and expelled from the navy.
Scilingo was protected from prosecution by Argentina’s amnesty laws, but 
he was not safe from revenge by his former comrades. They abducted him, 
and carved the initials of three journalists with whom he had spoken into his 
face. He fled to Spain to testify in a trial, and was accused himself. He was 
convicted in 2007 to 1,084 years in prison for crimes against humanity, which 
translated into an effective term of twenty- five years. Furthermore, Scilingo’s 
impunity strengthened the resolve of the human rights movement to pursue 
the derogation of the amnesty laws.
Scilingo’s testimony about the death flights had convinced the Spanish 
judges and the Argentine human rights movement, but there was no docu-
mentary or forensic proof. An important break came in 2005. The Argentine 
Forensic Anthropology Team, or Equipo Argentina de Antropología Forense 
(eaaf), had gained access to the Judicial Archive in Buenos Aires, and dis-
covered that around sixty bodies had washed ashore on the beach of Mar 
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del Plata between 1976 and 1978. Some bodies were fingerprinted and buried 
anonymously at General Lavalle Cemetery (Río Negro 2005). A number of 
sets of fingerprints matched with the records of the National Identity Docu-
ment, or Documento Nacional de Identidad (dni), and the eaaf requested 
that the judge exhume the anonymous bodies at the cemetery. There were 
no bullet impacts that could explain the cause of death. The autopsy reports 
made by the police at the time listed polytraumatism as the cause of death 
(interview with Luis Fondebrider on July 3, 2015). Positive identifications were 
made in 2005 of five persons who had been disappeared in December 1977 and 
were seen alive at the esma (conadep 1986, 343). They were members of the 
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, including its founder, Azucena Villaflor de De 
Vicenti, and the French nun Léonie Duquet, who had been assisting the hu-
man rights organization.
The forensic examination of the five skeletons reached the following con-
clusion: “During the laboratory study the team established that the fractures 
on the bodies were consistent with those of people who had fallen from a great 
height onto a hard surface (even though water is not a ‘hard’ surface, when a 
body falls from a great height, it acts as a hard surface). This case is impor-
tant because it is the first forensic investigation providing evidence indicat-
ing that kidnapped people who had been seen alive in esma and remained 
disappeared were actually dropped into the ocean” (eaaf 2006, 18). The skel-
etal fractures resembled those of suicide victims who had jumped from high 
bridges (Abel and Ramsey 2013). The forensic evidence of death flights served 
multiple purposes: searching relatives whose disappeared loved ones were 
seen at the esma of Campo de Mayo military base realized that they would 
probably never find any remains; testimonies that had been doubted acquired 
truth- value; the history of the military regime could be rewritten; and when 
perpetrators and victims could be tied to particular flights, convictions could 
follow. The total number of dead from death flights has been estimated at 
2,000 – 3,500 captives (Somigiliana and Olmo 2002, 27).
The derogation of the amnesty laws in 2005 resulted in the resumption of 
the criminal trials against the Argentine military in 2006, but the forensic 
evidence about disappeared captives who had fallen to their death did not 
provide enough ground for legal action because the perpetrators could not 
be identified. Important new evidence arose in September 2009, when a wit-
ness declared that navy helicopter pilot Emir Sisul Hess had told him about 
his participation in the death flights at which captives had begged for their 
lives and fallen like ants into the sky (Martínez 2009). In November 2012, the 
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coast guard pilots Mario Arru, Alejandro D’Agostino, and Enrique De Saint 
Georges, the navy pilots Emir Hess and Julio Poch, and the naval mechanic 
Rubén Ormello were accused of their roles in the flights. Their identification 
allowed the prosecution to find documentary evidence in the flight records 
at Buenos Aires city airport Jorge Newbery. The logbooks from 1976 to 1978 
were analyzed in terms of four variables:
1.  duration (flights of more than 2.5 hours)
2.  destination (flights that departed from or arrived at Jorge Newbery 
Airport)
3.  nocturnal flights (flights between 6 pm and 6 am)
4.  purpose (e.g., training mission or transporting personnel)
Eleven flights were marked as suspicious, including one flight in which a Sky-
van pa- 51 aircraft departed at 9:30 pm on Wednesday December 14, 1977. The 
flight was operated by the coast guard pilots Arru, D’Agostino, and De Saint 
Georges, with the esma captives Azucena Villaflor de De Vicenti and Léonie 
Duquet probably on board — the two captives whose bodies washed ashore 
about one week later and were identified in 2005. The three pilots denied hav-
ing carried any passengers on this particular flight and stated that it had been 
a nocturnal training mission (Martínez 2011). The verdict was passed on No-
vember 29, 2017. Poch and Hess were found not guilty. Arru and D’Agostino 
were handed life sentences, and De Saint Georges died in February 2017.
The crimes against humanity in Argentina were of such complexity that 
the repressive structure became visible only gradually through the different 
types and instruments of evidential regimes employed during thirty years of 
democracy. The case of Argentina’s death flights demonstrates how a proces-
sual intertwinement of different types of evidence produced under chang-
ing political and technical circumstances forged complex personal, political, 
legal, and historical truths. The following case from Spain shows a different 
manifestation of this processual intertwinement of accountability, politics, 
and truth through an analysis of the politicization of the skeletal remains 
of Valerico Canales, a socialist militant executed and buried in a mass grave 
in 1936 and then exhumed thirty years later and reburied anonymously in a 
labyrinth of crypts.
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Impenetrable Ossuaries:  
Vanishing Evidence in the Valley of the Fallen
On October 11, 2003, a team of archaeologists located a lost mass grave in Al-
deaseca, a municipality in the province of Ávila, Spain. There, seven civilians 
from the neighboring village of Pajares de Adaja reportedly had been buried 
after having been executed by Franco’s paramilitary on August, 20, 1936, in 
the midst of the early, “hot terror” phase of the Spanish Civil War (1936 – 39), 
when a furious stream of blood crossed the country. This initial burst of vio-
lence gave way to what historians have labeled the phase of “legal terror,” in 
which killings of civilians continued at a slower pace and were preceded by 
administrative and legal procedures. While the Republican government tried 
to inhibit extrajudicial killings in the areas under their control, in the rebel 
(Nationalist) areas military justice took over, and mock war tribunals (con-
sejos de guerra) became responsible for the systematic repression of civilians 
(Casanova 1999). According to current historiography, around 55,000 civil-
ians were executed in the Republican rearguard during the war, and at least 
150,000 by militias working in parallel to the rebel, or “Nationalist,” army, 
including some 20,000 after the war (Rodrigo 2008; Preston 2012).
The end of the war and the advent of Franco’s thirty- six- year- long dic-
tatorship brought about the emergence of two radically dissimilar “spaces 
of death” (Taussig 1987), resulting in what Emilio Silva has called a long- 
lasting “funerary apartheid” (personal communication), one space of death 
constituted by the bodies of the winners and another containing the bodies 
of those considered loyal to the Republic and declared traitors to the coun-
try, despite their fidelity to a democratically elected government. The latter 
bodies were mostly erased from public memory and administrative or legal 
inscription, but were opened right after the war. Specific funerary legisla-
tion was passed to protect them, and instructions were distributed by the 
central government to organize the unburials and reburials, as well as the 
gathering of evidence of the so- called “red terror” committed by “Marxist 
hordes.” A large countrywide judicial case was opened, known as Causa Gen-
eral, where all rearguard crimes attributed to Republicans and their alleged 
perpetrators were listed. Many of them were executed or sent to jail. Forensic 
physicians were recruited to participate in the exhumations of Nationalists 
and help with building evidence of crimes and identifying the corpses. The 
emerging politicoreligious ideology of the new regime, National Catholicism, 
rooted its legitimacy in the sacrifice and martyrdom of those “fallen for God 
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and Spain” that were being exhumed. Most villages in the country listed the 
names of the fallen in preferential locations on the church’s outside walls 
for everyone to see, presided over by the name of the “martyr of martyrs,” 
José Antonio Primo de Rivera. Primo de Rivera was the founder in 1933 of 
the Spanish fascist party, Falange, executed in jail in the early months of the 
war, and reburied in 1939 in the basilica right above the Royal Pantheon in 
the Monastery of El Escorial, Spain’s ultimate imperial monument (Ferrán-
diz 2014, 145 – 74). By doing so, the dictatorial state symbolized its connection 
with Spain’s “most glorious times.”
The mass graves of the defeated were radically excluded from this unburial 
and reburial process that marked a high- profile celebration of the birth of the 
New Spain (Box 2010). By contrast, as a crucial ingredient of Franco’s Na-
tional security policy — based on widespread repression of the defeated (jails, 
concentration camps, fines, mistreatment of women) in the frame of an ad-
monitory blood pedagogy — they continued to multiply in the early postwar 
years in order to consolidate a topography of terror affecting almost every 
village: a safety network activated to inhibit any potential political dissidence. 
As places of exemplary memory, or fear memorials, the presence of the mass 
graves of defeat on the national landscape contributed not only physically, 
but also politically, symbolically, and socially, to the shoring up of the post-
war dictatorial regime under the rule of General Francisco Franco. The in-
vestment in terror expressed in thousands of mass graves across the country 
undoubtedly bore fruit in the dictatorship (Rodrigo 2008), though its bit-
ter legacy evolved and transformed with the Francoist regime, their original 
efficacy declining as the broad, heterogeneous social body of the defeated 
absorbed the impact. Even so, the unexpected twenty- first- century reappear-
ance of these graves in the national and international debate on the civil war, 
Francoism, and political repression shows that the wounds left in the social 
and political fabric by Franco’s military rebellion (1936 – 39) and dictatorship 
(1939 – 75) were very deep and affected several generations.
The year 2000 marked a major turning point in Spain’s funerary apart-
heid, when a mass grave containing the remains of thirteen people killed by 
Nationalists was opened in Priaranza del Bierzo (province of León) under 
the initiative of sociologist and journalist Emilio Silva, the grandson of one 
of the slain. The principal Spanish memorial association, Asociación para la 
Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica (armh), over which Silva has since 
presided, was soon created. A wave of exhumations followed. In 2017, this 
process has reached at least 450 mass graves, including the recovery of more 
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the 8,500 bodies (Ferrándiz 2013, 2014). These contemporary unburials of Re-
publican civilians have three main characteristics:
1.  They take place in a globalized information society that guarantees 
high media exposure. (Castells 1996)
2.  Although initially advanced by civil society — the grandchildren of 
the defeated — they eventually attracted some institutional involve-
ment, notably a Historical Memory Law (2007) passed by the Socialist 
government and around twenty million euros in public funding from 
2005 – 2012.
3.  The unburials are carried out through technical archaeological and 
forensic protocols allowing for a scientific evidentiary reinscription of 
the executions and the bodies. (Etxeberria 2012)
This production of knowledge about human rights violations is based on a 
rigorous methodology, evidentiary logic — scientific, but not legal because of a 
statute of limitations and Spain’s refusal to honor international human rights 
laws — forms of technical and digital imaging, scientific custody, electronic 
archive building, and the growing yet intermittent use of dna identification 
and its associated rationale of genetic kinship and statistical certainty (Baeta 
et al. 2015). Beyond these technical considerations, the scientific approach to 
opening and interpreting mass graves has gained considerable social pres-
tige, within the broader impact of what some researchers call the csi effect, 
namely the contemporary popularity of forensic serials in the mainstream 
media (Kruse 2010; Ferrándiz 2013). Many memory activists and victims’ rela-
tives started to consider that next to the exhumations, the largest price of the 
political agreements leading to democracy in Spain was the impunity of the 
crimes of Francoism for the sake of reconciliation — the Amnesty Law and 
the failure to reverse the institutional abandonment of the tens of thousands 
of Republicans executed and improperly buried in mass graves. Through this 
scientific evidentiary inscription (Crossland 2013), the penumbra which these 
dead bodies had inhabited for decades, defying oblivion not only during the 
dictatorship but also in the interstices of democracy and modernization, has 
given way to a regime of public presence and visibility unthinkable a few years 
ago. A transition has occurred from fugitive ghosts (Steedly 1993; Gordon 
1997) into openly visible civil war skeletons widely circulating in the public 
space and challenging solid legal and political pacts, such as the Amnesty Law 
of 1977 or the formerly exemplary Spanish transition to democracy.
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The exhumation in 2003 in Aldeaseca was an early case in this high- profile 
wave of unburials of Republican civilians mostly led by the generation of the 
grandchildren of defeat, though many sons and daughters, and later great- 
grandchildren, also joined in as the diggings picked up momentum. The Al-
deaseca exhumation was promoted by Fausto Canales — a retired engineer 
whose murdered father was a leader of the Socialist trade union (ugt) in 
Pajares de Adaja — with the support of archaeologists from a local memory as-
sociation. While the excavation was largely unsuccessful, it provided one ma-
jor evidentiary surprise that was to transform Spain’s perception of its most 
controversial monument: the Valley of the Fallen, built by Franco as the main 
memorial place of his victory in 1939. To the technical team’s astonishment, 
only a few small, left- behind human bones were found during the digging, as 
well as pieces of a broken skull. Enough evidence to prove that the mass grave 
had been there but . . . where had the bones gone? Who had visited the aban-
doned grave before the relatives and why? Fausto and his collaborators were 
at a loss to explain this unexpected development. The families made the joint 
decision to bury these remains together on August 28, 2004, in a monument- 
grave erected in the Pajares de Adaja Cemetery. Since then, an annual tribute 
is paid there to mark the date. Fausto and the other relatives placed the scat-
tered remains in a small urn to represent all those who were in the grave, in a 
fragmentary reproduction of the community of death — if they died together, 
they should be reburied together — and initially renounced any identification 
process of individual remains, including dna tests.
The archival investigations undertaken by Fausto Canales after the exhu-
mation fiasco indicated that the bodies had been moved to the Valley of the 
Fallen in 1959, without the families’ knowledge. He found diverse documen-
tation about the tasks of locating, excavating, and transferring the remains 
found in the grave. The documents included definitive proof that their sus-
picions were correct: the exhumations had been carried out by an expedition 
organized by the Avila Office of the Civil Governor, signed March 6, 1959. 
The report indicated that on March 1 of the same year, the Aldeaseca Grave 
had been dug for about two hours and that the grave was not easy to find be-
cause the people who knew of the existence of the remains had disappeared 
owing to the time elapsed. Further research on the case also permitted the 
localization in the valley memorial of a box (Columbarium No. 198) contain-
ing six unknown corpses from Aldeaseca and six others from another grave 
in the same area. These discoveries turned Fausto Canales into one of the key 
figures in bringing the monument into the spotlight in the search for people 
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who were disappeared during the civil war and Franco’s subsequent rule. The 
fact that an unknown number of Republican dead had been surreptitiously 
transported to the memorial during late Francoism came as a shock to many. 
Canales’s story perfectly reflects the astonishment experienced by relatives 
of Franco’s victims, who gradually discovered the fate of their next- of- kin, 
whom they now considered trapped in an exceptional and complex ossuary 
born of a religious, political, and symbolic delirium and offensively riveted 
to the graves of Falange founder Primo de Rivera and Franco himself, buried 
there in 1975. Since the evidence of the reburial of the corpses from Aldeaseca 
in the Valley of the Fallen became public, Canales has sought every possible 
legal means to retrieve his father’s body from what he considered a “cavern 
of horror,” including appeals to different Spanish judicial entities and even to 
the Strasbourg European Human Rights Court, so far to no avail (Ferrándiz 
2014). In what follows, I will briefly outline some crucial facts in the history 
of the monument and the mounting evidence that many Republican bodies 
were transferred to a place soaked in Francoist iconography and symbolism as 
part of a dubious reconciliatiatory gesture in the late dictatorship, and explore 
the difficulties in unmaking Francoism’s last stronghold.
It took Franco twenty years to build this huge mausoleum, barely thirteen 
kilometers away from the Monastery of El Escorial, where the Royal Pantheon 
is located. To do so, a mountain was drilled to build Christianity’s second 
largest basilica after Saint Peter’s, topped by a conspicuous 150- meter- high 
cross. In 1958, a few months before its inauguration on the twentieth anniver-
sary of the civil war “victory” (April 1, 1959), there was a nationwide call for 
the bodies of Caídos por Dios y por España (Those fallen for God and Spain), 
including Republicans as long as they were proven Catholics. According to 
the register kept by the Benedictines in charge of the monument, 33,833 bod-
ies entered the crypts, mostly between 1959 and 1971. A total of 12,410 are 
“unknown,” though at the current stage of research it is impossible to trace 
how many of them are Republicans. The Spanish people were unaware of this 
transfer of bodies, and the scale and details of the crypts until the Canales 
case erupted in the media.
The fact that twenty years had passed since the war had finished, with 
many Fallen for God and for Spain consolidated in family or municipal pan-
theons, conditioned this massive body- transfer operation. Resistance in Na-
tionalist quarters to the pressure from the central government to produce 
bodies promoted the semiclandestine, yet official, digging of Republican mass 
graves. The remains of Fascist leader Primo de Rivera were moved from El 
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Escorial to the Valley of the Fallen to preside over the altar at the inauguration 
in 1959. In 1975, a major state funeral took place in the valley when Franco was 
buried behind the altar. With this latest burial, an unmistakably Francoist 
funerary hierarchy was consolidated in the monument. During the transition 
to democracy and the subsequent decades, the valley was beyond dispute and 
remained a major tourist attraction. Until the passing of the Law of Histori-
cal Memory in 2007, every November 20, the date of both Primo de Rivera’s 
and Franco’s death in 1936 and 1975, neofascist political ceremonies took place 
there with official acquiescence. With the most recent wave of exhumations 
starting in 2000, all of this changed, as claims for the recovery, identification 
and dignification of the Republican bodies reached its subterranean crypts, 
threatening for the first time the integrity of the monument.
The Historical Memory Law passed in Parliament in 2007 put an end to 
any political display at the monument but did not include any special pro-
vision to rescue the bodies and only established an outsourcing model for 
other mass graves (Ferrándiz 2013). Relatives of the Republicans buried in 
the valley then filed complaints before the Spanish High Court (Audiencia 
Nacional) and thus were part of a short- lived attempt in 2008 by interna-
tionally known judge Baltasar Garzón to apply International Human Rights 
Law to the crimes of Francoism using the penal concept of forced disappear-
ances. The initiative was derailed by the Spanish Supreme Court. Its ruling 
acquitted Garzón but foreclosed every possibility of prosecuting the crimes of 
Francoism. On the legislative front, a major development took place in 2010 
regarding the scientific study of the crypts. The Socialist vice- president Te-
resa Fernández de la Vega asked the Ministry of Justice to assess the state of 
the crypts and the human remains and to evaluate the feasibility of exhuma-
tions and identifications. Forensic physician José Luis Bedate produced a very 
significant but discouraging report. Bodies had been distributed in twenty- 
eight different burial levels, behind eight chapels. The lateral chapels in the 
central nave had three levels of burials each, while the chapels on both sides 
of the transept had five burial levels each, the most complex of them contain-
ing more than ten thousand bodies. Due to technical limitations and legal 
uncertainties about the status of the cemetery, Bedate could only open one 
hole in each chapel and superficially explore the state of the burials. His team 
took some pictures, though these were not included in the official report. His 
assessment was that exhumations posed a “high technical risk” and that the 
individual identifications were of “extreme complexity” due to the collapse of 
the different stories and the consequent intermingling of bones (Bedate 2011).
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Associations of Republicans buried in the valley, some of which were al-
lowed to be present during the forensic study, were shocked. At this point, 
dna technology had become a more widespread practice in the identification 
of bodies exhumed in mass graves throughout the country, and the official 
forensic report all but shattered the associations’ hopes of legally authorized 
operations to rescue their relatives from the cemetery’s depths. For their part, 
the Benedictine custodians were struggling to keep the ossuary intact and re-
tain full control over it. In the midst of heated public debate, the then abbot, 
Anselmo Álvarez, drafted a double strategy to prove the intractability of the 
crypts: one numerical, the other both physical and symbolic. First, he cast 
doubt on the number of people buried there, suggesting that the total may 
be double the number of those formally registered by his own religious or-
der: a numerical mess. Second, as a sort of mystical counterevidence, sources 
close to him publicly disseminated the idea that many of the bones had actu-
ally dissolved into the bedrock, melting into the very monument for eternity. 
The tens of thousands of skeletal remains had become an integral part of the 
structural foundations of the valley — a physical impossibility. Supporting 
the Benedictines’ evidentiary lockout are the Neo- Francoist associations for 
the defense of the valley, with yet another shot in the barrel: legal complaints 
against tomb profanation in the name of those families that agreed to the re-
burial were any forensic action to take place in the valley.
In 2011, I was appointed by the Socialist government as a member of a 
Commission of Experts to democratize and resignify the valley. My task was 
mostly oriented toward providing solutions for funerary aspects. The main 
proposal, which created a public outcry, was to undo the dictatorship’s funer-
ary hierarchy by removing the bodies of Franco and Primo de Rivera from 
priority burial on both sides of the altar. Furthermore, any attempt at trans-
forming the meaning of the monument demanded that the dictator Fran-
cisco Franco abandon its premises. What was more difficult was to provide 
solutions for the Republicans unexpectedly surfacing in the crypts in the last 
decade. In coordination with memorial associations, we proposed a thorough 
re- evaluation of the ossuaries by bringing in an internationally recognized 
forensic committee, including the International Red Cross. The proposal was 
turned down but, as a trade- off, three forensic physicians, including leading 
expert Francisco Etxeberria, were called to a commission meeting to reassess 
Bedate’s report in the light of the photographs taken during the exploration. 
A senior Ministry of Justice official brought the pictures on a memory stick, 
allowed us to see and discuss them for a few minutes and then left with the 
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memory stick in her pocket. The panorama was certainly grim, and at that 
moment we realized why these pictures had become a state secret and were 
not displayed in the forensic report. Were they to be made public, an outcry 
was certainly guaranteed, even among those families of Franco supporters 
who had allowed the reburial of their relatives in El Valle a few decades ago. 
The Commission of Experts report also reflected the “extreme difficulty” of 
exhumations. Yet, the possibilities of a more thorough forensic assessment, 
and of advanced dna identification techniques, can still offer a minimal hope 
that keeps many relatives fighting, despite the odds.
All of Fausto Canales’s judicial appeals in Spain have been turned down in 
the last decade, as if he were hitting an indestructible impunity wall blocking 
any access to evidence. His claim was also dismissed in the European Court 
of Human Rights in Strasbourg. A claimant in the Querella Argentina since 
2010, he was able legally to testify in 2014 to the Argentinean judge Servini de 
Cubría by videoconference from the Argentinean Consulate in Madrid — after 
being twice blocked by the Spanish government — to no avail so far. Yet on 
March 10, 2016, a judge in El Escorial ordered the exhumation of two Repub-
licans executed during the war in the town of Calatayud (Zaragoza Province), 
opening a new judicial channel for other valley exhumation claims. The State 
Heritage Department, which owns the monument, responded to the judicial 
order imposing conditions unacceptable to the relatives. After their lawyer 
filed a new lawsuit for noncompliance in late July 2016, the case appeared 
before the Supreme Court, where, in turn, it was sent back to the local judge. 
Meanwhile, both the Benedictines and the central right- wing government are 
actively prohibiting any new entry into the crypts, despite the legal mandate. 
All attempts to unbury Franco from the valley and turn him in to his family 
have been systematically blocked, as the monument increasingly armors itself 
against what its supporters — Benedictines, Franco nostalgics, and the very 
political party in power in Spain — consider vengeful assaults from those who 
lost the war and now want to win it by other means.
Conclusion
The Spanish and Argentine cases demonstrate that crimes against human-
ity committed in the framework of military coups and dictatorships were 
concealed for reasons of state security and authoritarian domination, and 
that the complex processes of gathering evidence and managing forensic in-
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vestigations are more often elucidated and driven by family protests, media 
exposure, and the political arena than by courts and tribunals. In one case, 
evidence of crimes appears to be dissolving into the bedrock, and even mini-
mal access is being blocked powerful reactionary forces, to the desperation of 
relatives. In the other, some bodies washed ashore on the beach provide proof 
attesting to a daunting criminal practice and may serve to incriminate perpe-
trators. In both cases, evidence is hard to reach and comes in discontinuous, 
multiple, interlocking, and competing narratives and truth regimes.
The fate of corpses resulting from human rights violations provides an 
extraordinary roadmap to understand the inner workings of repressive ap-
paratuses. That concealment and denial are an integral part in the establish-
ment of regimes of fear goes without saying. Yet, the multiple evidential re-
gimes emerging around such dead bodies after dictatorial control of history, 
memory, and criminal evidence start to diagram the depth of the damage 
that was intended, express the regimes of visibility and invisibility under lying 
structures of terror, and are tragically inscribed by traces of exclusionary na-
tionhood and belonging.
Since the mid- 1980s, with the identification of Mengele’s skull in Brazil 
by Clyde Snow and his forensic team, and the foundation of the Argentine 
Forensic Anthropology Team (eaaf), the exhumation of corpses from epi-
sodes of mass violence and genocide has become a major tool in the search for 
“truth, justice and reparation” of victims in transitional processes around the 
world. The consolidation of increasingly prestigious technologies established 
around wounded bodies implies the emergence of a novel and transforma-
tive necropolitical regime associated with the management of human rights 
violations — part of a broader forensic turn in the understanding of human 
experience and suffering (Anstett and Dreyfus 2015). Mass graves and unburi-
als become a ground zero, where mass assassinations, disappearances, and 
tortures can be deciphered in different degrees of elaboration.
This regime of knowledge and reparation of the violent past is both prom-
ising and contradictory. For one thing, the amount and quality of informa-
tion and evidence that a dead body can provide is enormous, from visible 
fractures to minuscule traces of torture and killing, as in the case of the death 
flights in Argentina. In parallel, a new corporeal epistemology is emerging, 
where, as Klinenberg states, dead bodies become “the site and surface of es-
sential but otherwise obscured social truths” (2002, 121). Also, the forensic 
and archaeological protocols leading the search, unburial, interpretation, and 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 133
identifications of such bodies produce different kinds of evidence: judicial, 
scientific or genetic (Crossland 2013). The increasing availability and con-
stant technical improvement of these new modalities of evidence building are 
deeply transforming the nature of the relationship with the violent past and, 
very importantly, cast a threatening shadow on present and future would- be 
perpetrators, who are forced to develop new and more sophisticated tech-
niques for concealing evidence.
But, as in Spain and Argentina, political, social and cultural contexts are 
diverse, and the limitations are plenty. Despite their prestige as the silver bul-
let of international criminal justice and the fight against impunity — partially 
an aftereffect of the infallible csi effect — the new human rights technolo-
gies of evidence building can also prove very problematic as they create false, 
even imaginary, expectations for victims. This is the case of the Valley of the 
Fallen, where the possibility of dna identification, if almost impossible tech-
nically, keeps alive the flame of hope in relatives but may create long- term 
frustration as evidence melts into the bedrock and gets lost in political, judi-
cial, and religious labyrinths.
Also, as these evidence- based technologies for deciphering the violent past 
become hegemonic and naturalized, they have the potential to displace or 
even contradict alternative forms of historical, political, and emotional con-
nections with both kin and the violent past. Both in Argentina and Spain, sec-
tions of the associative movement are resisting these increasingly hegemonic, 
almost commonsensical, technologies for truth and justice and their associ-
ated evidentiary regimes. In Argentina, because exhumations and identifica-
tions may provide a false closure and short- circuit deeply embedded politi-
cal ideals rooted in claims for the disappeared to return: “vivos los llevaron, 
vivos los queremos” (they took them alive, we want them back alive ). In 
Spain, because the lack of a legal umbrella for the exhumations amounts — for 
some associations — to an erasure of genocide, where media, spectacle, flashy 
forensic evidence, and bogus mourning reign, gravely disturbing the politi-
cal continuity between those assassinated in the civil war and its aftermath 
and contemporary social struggle. Also in this context, the availability of ge-
netic identification is interpreted as fostering a neoliberal individualization 
of memory of what is interpreted as a mass, collective crime. In both cases, 
these resistances coincide in a deep fear that the new empire of technical and 
scientific evidence bulldozes alternative forms of mourning, memory politics, 
and truth making.
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The computer then cranks and heaves and gives an answer, and there is some 
temptation to obey the computer. After all, if you follow the computer you are  
a little less responsible than if you made up your own mind.
— Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind
After Ferguson
Just before noon on August 9, 2014 Officer Darren Wilson responded to a rob-
bery in the Market and Liquor convenience store in Ferguson, Missouri. Wil-
son scoured the rundown streets in search of two “Black males” and quickly 
encountered Michael Brown and Dorian Johnson on Canfield Drive. Minutes 
later, Michael Brown lay dead in the street. Residents and relatives gathered 
at the scene, and several recorded what they saw on their smartphones. Vid-
eos spread quickly and virally through social media, especially one in which 
a narrator declares, “The police killed him, yeah. Say he had his hand up and 
everything; they still shot him” (cnn 2014).1 The spot where Brown died be-
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came the focus of a spontaneous and peaceful gathering. However, Ferguson 
police assembled in force, and violence soon erupted.
A swat team armed with tear gas, rubber bullets, flash grenades, and 
smoke bombs confronted protesters a few days after Brown’s death. The pro-
testers started out decrying the militarization of police and ended up watch-
ing as weaponized law enforcement failed before their eyes. The Missouri 
governor, Jay Nixon, declared a state of emergency, implemented nightly cur-
fews, and eventually called out the National Guard. In November, following 
the decision by the grand jury not to indict Officer Wilson, a state of emer-
gency was again declared in Ferguson. On this occasion, several international 
demonstrations accompanied local protests.
The events in Ferguson are the subject of many thousands of interna-
tional newspaper articles and many more social media posts and exchanges, 
together with investigations and reports, books and films.2 Fundamentally, 
the events centered on the body of a Black youth with two discursive after-
lives. The U.S. Department of Justice issued two reports in March 2015. The 
“Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department” documented how police 
undermined community trust, noting a “pattern of stops without reason-
able suspicion and arrests without probable cause” coupled with a fixation 
on “revenue generation” (doj 2015a, 2). Activists read this as a vindication 
of their claim that a racialized state violence is unjustly targeting Black bod-
ies. However, the second Department of Justice report (doj 2015b) presented 
evidence from the three autopsies conducted on Brown’s body, together with 
eyewitness statements, dna, ballistic and crime- scene analysis. The report 
concluded that there was no prosecutive merit in charging Wilson. Appar-
ently, several eyewitnesses lied: Michael Brown was not shot while attempt-
ing to surrender. Juridical evidence collided with the sociological reality of 
activists in a battle over facts. As if to highlight the impossibility of neutrality, 
activist and journalist, Jonathan Capeheart (2015) changed sides, reflecting on 
the “uncomfortable truth” that this youth was perhaps “someone who would 
otherwise offend our sense of right and wrong.”
At first glance, then, the shooting in Ferguson seems to illuminate an entire 
world of law enforcement in one kinetic moment. Here, however, I propose 
that by focusing on specific encounters we miss broader transformations of 
great importance. Indeed, one of the most significant transformations inter-
nationally is the move toward policing future crimes. Today’s intelligence- led 
and predictive policing efforts are targeting near- future encounters between 
crime and law enforcement such that, the assumption is, some encounters 
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will never occur in the first place. Today in the neighborhoods surrounding 
Ferguson, the St. Louis County Police Department is experimenting with pre-
dictive policing. This is not simply crime mapping or neighborhood profiling; 
rather, it is a particular way of conceptualizing the behavior of human beings 
and their near- future actions.3 Thus, the social- scientific question is: What if 
the robbery in the Ferguson Market and Liquor never happened? This chapter 
addresses this question.
It may be possible to discuss predictive policing by exploring it ethno-
graphically from the perspective of a specific law enforcement institution. 
Here, however, I wish to avoid framing a world of stable cultural institutions 
that resist or accommodate change from the outside (change theorized as an 
unambiguous process of militarization, for example). Instead, I wish to tell a 
broader and more elusive story that takes us from the nineteenth century to 
the present day and from Los Angeles to cities in the UK. It is a story about 
specific efforts to think about human life itself using statistics, software, and 
anthropology.
Anthropological ideas and trained anthropologists are certainly in great 
demand these days. Indeed, several disciplinary leaders have made important 
statements on the ethical and other challenges presented by the anthropo-
logical “moment” in a variety of military and counterinsurgency contexts 
(e.g., Price 2011). However, two points of clarification are worthwhile here. 
First, associations between academic knowledge and application in law en-
forcement are not especially controversial in many branches of anthropology, 
especially those influenced by evolutionary theory (e.g., Durrant and Ward 
2015). Second, discussions about what makes us human, what is universal, and 
how we know the meaning of action are alive in the contemporary. This is 
certainly the case in security contexts where “the human” is a body of knowl-
edge and evidence and a target for intervention. Indeed, French philosopher 
Frédéric Gros (Gros, Castillo, and Garapon 2008), among others, identifies a 
“new philosophical anthropology” in the realm of security. In this chapter, I 
explore the ongoing experiments by anthropologists and others that aim to 
police the future.
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the anthropology of policing, 
which highlights the important role of governmental reasoning. My concern, 
drawing from the work of Michel Foucault, is to show that pioneering statisti-
cians, operating within what one might term apparatuses of security, brought 
together data and visualizations to the point of noting anthropological pat-
terns and phenomena. Thereafter, I explore contemporary predictive policing 
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by focusing on its evidential underpinnings in anthropology, namely, the use 
of evolutionary theories about human behavior, before turning to a specific 
example in the UK. The conclusion I offer is this: ethnographic treatments 
of policing and security institutions must be augmented by multi- sited stud-
ies that track the discourses and practices — bodies as evidence — that move 
along the fault lines of societies. Anthropological concepts are crucial to po-
lice restructuring in the contemporary moment, and here I open a new body 
of evidence for analysis.
Anthropology of Policing as Security
We must situate the unrest in Ferguson, Missouri, alongside numerous inter-
national protests over policing, from the violence in France in 2005 to the UK 
riots in 2011, and from the 2013 Gezi Park revolts in Turkey to recent protests 
by lawyers in Lahore. Of course, one should hardly be surprised to find the 
so- called thin blue line running along global fault lines of race, gender, class 
and inequality, or find that new media forms and video records are disturb-
ing older ways of weighing evidence. It does seem surprising, however, that 
the anthropology of policing remains a small, recent, and somewhat narrow 
field to this day. A cursory review of early anthropological studies that men-
tion policing indicates some of the reasons for this narrowness. It is difficult 
to find many early discussions of police as a distinct societal institution; but 
it is easy to locate discussions of “customary” law or “traditional” justice (e.g., 
Lowie 1912). This suggests that what we now call the anthropology of policing 
is, in fact, the particular intersection between a “modern” but culturally sensi-
tive institutional form and the varieties and alternatives available in people’s 
efforts to maintain and enforce social order.
John Comaroff (2013) also notes the relatively few theoretical touchstones 
used in the anthropology of policing. Of course, several scholars have unset-
tled the Weber- inspired perspective that police embody legitimate state force 
by drawing on fieldwork in contexts where policing is paramilitary, private, 
or even absent (e.g., Goldstein 2016). Other anthropologists probe the spec-
tral law- making and law- preserving violence beyond the state (e.g., Jauregui 
2013). Recently, anthropologists inspired by the work of Michel Foucault are 
attending to governmentality, normalization, surveillance, and resistance. 
However, most of these ethnographic studies are attempts to contextualize 
and understand the everyday encounters between the police and the policed. 
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But what if international transformations now involve efforts to change the 
nature of everyday law enforcement, such that many encounters will be can-
celled out before they even occur? According to Moving toward the Future of 
Policing, an influential rand Corporation report, momentous changes are 
sweeping through law enforcement, and these changes manifest themselves 
in intelligence- led and predictive policing (Treverton, Wollman, and Wilke 
2011). So, how might we discuss the shifting international law enforcement 
landscape without falling for the seductive power of technology or being per-
suaded by what is in part a corporate push for new markets? Indeed, some 
might suggest that predictive policing is really little more than an entrepre-
neurial fad, a species of the contemporary endowed with more significance 
than it deserves by neoliberalism or biopolitics. Here, instead, I situate the rise 
and spread of predictive policing within the broader history of the present.
In his lectures in 1978 at the Collège de France, Michel Foucault recog-
nizes the illusion of permanence staged by modern policing institutions. 
He excavates the broad understanding of order and force that characterized 
seventeenth and early eighteenth- century European uses of “police,” which 
encompassed inequalities, medicine and hygiene, charity, urbanization, and 
circulation, though not necessarily justice.
Generally speaking, what police has to govern, its fundamental object, is 
all the forms of, let’s say, men’s coexistence with each other. It is the fact 
that they live together, reproduce, and that each of them needs a certain 
amount of food and air to live, to subsist; it is the fact that they work along-
side each other at different or similar professions, and also that they exist 
in a space of circulation; to use a word that is anachronistic in relation to 
the speculations of the time, police must take responsibility for all of this 
kind of sociality (socialité). (Foucault 2007, 422)
There is a striking family resemblance here between “police” and the term 
“policy” as it is used today. Indeed, Gregory Feldman reads Foucault as com-
menting on the historical flourishing of “indefinite regulation, of permanent, 
continually renewed, and increasingly detailed regulation . . .  — policy and 
administration in a biopolitical society” (Feldman 2014, 76). But here I wish 
to point to other insights that are of help when exploring contemporary pre-
dictive policing.
Foucault’s analysis of policing history is predicated by discussion of Ire-
land as a colonial laboratory. As is well known, before Sir Robert Peel estab-
lished the world- leading London Metropolitan Police in 1829, experiments 
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had already taken place on John Bull’s other island. Ireland offered “favor-
able” conditions in which to test technologies of rule such as the modern gov-
ernmental statistics as developed by William Petty ([1691] 1970) and others. 
On the back of many years spent surveying and producing extraordinarily 
detailed maps (all while carpetbagging aggressively), Petty’s political arith-
metic unleashed the power of statistics to quantify people’s value or “worth.” 
Indeed, statistics provided the “technical knowledge that describes the real-
ity of the state itself” (Foucault 2007, 354). Following Petty, technical reality 
could be conceived, perceived, and acted upon, and actions could occur with 
reference to how reality might change in the near future.
William Petty’s nascent efforts to produce crime data were later improved 
upon in nineteenth- century France, especially the capacity to visualize such 
data. From the 1820s onward, statisticians represented crimes, suicides, and 
even school instruction levels using choropleth maps. Later, more technically 
precise efforts followed from Adolphe Quetelet’s social physics of the aver-
age man (l’homme moyen) to Henry Mayhew’s statistical and ethnographic 
portraits of British poverty and criminality.4 According to historian Mary 
Poovey (1991), early debates among statisticians show a concern for objectivity 
and reluctance to enter into discussions of causation. Yet, many were struck 
by the power of data qua data to not only count the worth of people but also 
to capture the always- emergent sociality of people. William Cooke Taylor’s 
reflections on French crime data are illustrative in this regard:
There is no better attested, nor more astonishing, record in history, than 
the sudden appearance of a disposition to commit some certain crime in 
a definite manner spreading like a contagious disease, reaching a fearful 
height in defiance of every effort to repress it, and then gradually sinking 
into oblivion. The madness of witch- finding in our country and in New 
England, the crime of poisoning in France when the Chambres Ardentes 
were established, the rick- burning in England within our own memory, 
are familiar examples. Does not this seem to prove that we might reckon 
a certain sympathy or principle of imitation among the leading incentives 
to crime? (Taylor 1835, 213)
Taylor’s protoanthropology may seem to be a long way from software- based 
policing in the neighborhoods surrounding Ferguson, but the distance is 
closed by a simple set of observations. First in colonial laboratories such as 
Ireland and thereafter in the metropolitan heartlands of empire we find the 
coeval development of social data gathering, mapping, and statistical rea-
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soning. This process occurs prior to the emergence of modern policing in-
stitutions and, in fact, provides key conditions for the possibility of those 
institutions. Of course, this is not to suggest a Whig history of our inevitable 
progress toward enlightenment and reason. Rather, my aim is to situate po-
licing within the expansion of governmental statistical reasoning and thus 
note the power of data qua data in the history of efforts to secure popula-
tions. Nineteenth- century scholars recognized that data had emergent quali-
ties and might reveal patters in human behavior, and thus data, statistical 
reasoning, and visualization could establish a near- future milieu in which 
to act. Foucault describes such milieus as being fundamental to apparatuses 
of security that operate by “standing back sufficiently so that one can grasp 
the point at which things are taking place, whether or not they are desirable. 
This means trying to grasp them at the level of their nature . . . grasping them 
at the level of their effective reality. The mechanism of security works on the 
basis of this reality, [responding] to a reality in such a way that this response 
cancels out the reality to which it responds — nullifies it, or limits, checks, or 
regulates it” (Foucault 2007, 46 – 47). Efforts in data gathering, crime map-
ping, and criminological theory certainly expanded throughout the twentieth 
century. However, ongoing experiments in predictive policing, such as in St. 
Louis County, have implications far beyond the modern police institutions 
and crime- busting efforts. Predictive policing is a specific assemblage within 
broader apparatuses of security that targets life itself with anthropology.
The Anthropologist as (Police) Hero
In order to tell the story of contemporary predictive policing, one must at-
tend to the central role of Jeffrey Brantingham, ucla anthropologist and ex-
pert on the environmental adaptations of hunter- gatherers in Northern Tibet. 
Brantingham’s anthropological fieldwork convinced him that the behavioral 
patterns of humans are less elaborate and more predictable than one might 
assume. If hunter- gatherer behaviors are based on established patterns, then 
why not attempt to predict the behavior of an urban forager hunting a Mer-
cedes Benz?
Brantingham explored the la crime data and developed a strong rela-
tionship with the city’s police. He drew together expert collaborators such as 
mathematicians George Mohler and Andrea Bertozzi, and criminologist and 
former rand analyst George Tita. Their work suggested that neighborhoods 
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were at greater risk of crime in the wake of a crime. In nineteenth- century 
terms, they uncovered a principle of sympathy or imitation. But, in quantita-
tive terms, the crime patterns seemed more approachable as earthquakes and 
aftershocks, so they repurposed mathematical earthquake models. The key 
concept deployed was self- excitation: in data, the existence of a crime self- 
excites the possibility of a future crime, which can be represented in time and 
space, in 500 × 500 square- foot digital boxes to be precise. This is not merely 
an effort to use historical data to model the future; this is an experiment in 
emergence (cf. González 2015).
The lapd were quick to begin experimenting with predictive policing, and 
cops soon found themselves patrolling the near future. Early results seemed 
remarkable, and so was the press coverage. Brantingham and his colleagues 
launched PredPol, a cloud- based software company, which made Time Maga-
zine’s list of the fifty top inventions of 2011. Today, numerous international law 
enforcement agencies use PredPol services, and there are a great number of 
other predictive systems in operation. Most, however, share certain assump-
tions about human behavior rooted in evolutionary anthropology.
In order to understand predictive policing, it is useful to consider Brant-
ingham’s evolutionary approach to crime. In a recent and illustrative paper on 
“prey selection” among la’s car thieves, Brantingham (2013) proposes that con-
temporary crime shows similar patterns to age- old foraging behaviors. These 
patterns do not arise from rational choices but, rather, from an evolutionary 
disposition to learn the long- term costs and benefits involved in selecting, en-
countering, and processing or handling prey. In other words, when an array of 
choices is presented, humans make suboptimal choices due to a long evolution-
ary history of necessity.5 If this sounds like an effort to equate human behavior 
with algorithms, then one will not be surprised when Brantingham (2013, 2) 
speaks of “cognitive scripts” that allow one to make decisions on the suitabil-
ity of prey. When all of this reasoning is translated into data on car theft, one 
finds that foragers do seem to make suboptimal choices and respond “primar-
ily to environmental abundance” (10). In short, a Mercedes Benz may be more 
desirable, but it is the Nissan or the Honda that is most likely to vanish from a 
driveway. Car theft, burglary, and other forms of petty crime can be modeled 
using this style of reasoning, and advanced models that consider “self- exciting 
points” can potentially predict gang behavior, or even the casualties of terrorist 
attacks (Brantingham and Short 2011; see also González 2015).
Today, predictive policing is used around the world, but PredPol remains 
most closely associated with U.S. cities, from Memphis to Minneapolis and 
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Miami. The early adopters were the city of Santa Cruz and LA’s Foothill Di-
vision. There, one morning in la, someone switched the computer on, and 
officers were suddenly less responsible for their patrols. Instead, during morn-
ing briefings patrol officers received a map indicating the concentration areas. 
Officers were expected to spend as much time as possible on patrol in their 
box. According to all sound analysis, the crime rate dropped since the rollout 
of predictive policing. For Jeffrey Brantingham, the core issues at stake are 
clear. Speaking at a ucla panel in 2014 on contemporary crime and criminal-
ity, he had this to say:
The challenge that I set out a number of years ago with collaborators in 
mathematics was really to say . . . to the police, “Listen we understand why 
the crime pattern is evolving, and if you use that information you can get 
out ahead of the crime, and do something to prevent it!” So, I’m a strong 
believer in the idea that prevention is much better than waiting for the 
crime to happen, trying to find out who did it, and incarcerating them. We 
know the limits of incarceration. . . .
But, what’s driving the behavior, what’s driving the crime? Here again 
I would say that I have a slightly different perspective. It’s not ethno-
graphic. It’s more thinking about . . . the commonalities that describe all 
burglaries, regardless of whether you’re looking at them in Los Angeles or 
Chicago, or London or Tel Aviv. . . . You would be surprised how similar 
criminals are regardless of where you are looking. . . . A great example of 
this is . . . most offenders commit the crime in the immediate vicinity of 
where they live, where they work or play. . . .
Los Angeles Police Department has been doing what you’d call predic-
tive policing for the past two and a half years. . . . You have a little box, 
a 500 × 500 sq. ft. box that basically says this is where the risk of crime 
today is highest. . . . It’s often not recognized that 80 – 90 percent of the 
crime that police respond to comes from public reporting. The number 
of crimes that police actually discover on their own is very, very small. 
Policing is really a public- police partnership. (Brantingham 2014)
There is certainly much of interest in this statement, but, before unpacking 
the contents, it is worth observing the gulf between Brantingham’s remarks 
and the portraits painted in recent ethnographies of policing.
As noted earlier, the whole world of policing sometimes appears to be 
available in kinetic encounters and critical moments. In Alice Goffman’s 
(2014) controversial study of fugitives in Philadelphia, policing is rendered as 
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structurally violent occupation characterized by constant stop- and- search, 
circling helicopters, and cctv cameras. Although it is a complex work, 
Didier Fassin’s Enforcing Order (2013) opens with similar images drawn from 
his work on policing Parisian banlieux. For Fassin, police stop- and- search 
tactics are mundane but structurally violent in that they target — through 
embodiment and internalization — the bodies of racialized youths, such that 
“the individual is ashamed of the violence to which he has been subjected, 
and feels guilty of a sin that he has not committed” (2013, 8). When racialized 
and marginalized youths encounter police, then, they are confronted by cul-
turally coded and embodied behaviors. Police actions “depend very largely 
on their personal history, the training they have undergone, the supervision 
they receive, the conditions of work imposed on them, the tasks conferred by 
government policies, and the representations of the social world that society 
produces” (Fassin 2013, 24). But what happens, to paraphrase Eric Wolf, if 
we take cognizance of the processes that transcend separate cases, moving 
through and beyond them and transforming them as they proceed? Here we 
are looking at processes that aim to cancel out difficult cases before they arise.
Looking at contemporary policing — especially in the Western world, but 
elsewhere also — Jeffrey Brantingham’s cognitive map of law enforcement is 
rather different from the one that circulates among urban ethnographers. 
When looking at today’s Los Angeles, he sees a city with a reduced serious 
crime rate that is facing decisions about the efficient deployment of law en-
forcement resources. Responding to Brantingham at the ucla panel in 2014, 
criminologist Daniel Fessler exemplified the new intelligence- led approach 
to policing:
There’s substantial debate in criminology as to what has led to the drop 
in crime, but I think that a case can be made that policing practices are in 
part responsible: . . . redeployment of resources, community- based polic-
ing; as you know here in Los Angeles we’ve had a radical shift following 
civil unrest in the way that the lapd tried to connect to communities. 
So one of the reasons that [predictive policing] is so effective is because 
the potential offender is making calculations about probability of getting 
caught, and if you see police officers in your community at about the time 
that you were thinking about offending then that really does deter crime. 
(Fessler 2014)
Doubtless in response, and with events such as Ferguson in mind, commen-
tators will note the “disappearance” of young marginalized and racialized 
POLICING FUTURE CRIMES 147
youths from city streets, those taken into the arms of the criminal justice 
systems across many Western- world countries. But questions might also be 
posed about the displacement of crime from heavily policed neighborhoods 
or the displacement from street crime to more “sophisticated” criminality. 
During 2013 and 2014, I set out to ask these questions of senior police in the 
United States and UK in a series of interviews. Those semiformal interviews 
led to invitations to examine predictive policing systems in operation in sev-
eral cities. I became interested not in PredPol the company but, rather, in 
alternative approaches to intelligence- led community policing, especially in 
law enforcement institutions where those approaches were largely bottom up 
and even suspicious new technology fixes. As one might expect, during the 
past decade law enforcement agencies participated in countless discussions 
about the “power” of so- called Big Data and the insights that algorithmic 
governance will surely deliver. It quickly became apparent that most senior 
police managers and technical analysts understand that Big Data often means 
medium data at best, and algorithms depend entirely on the cultural coding 
that give them their rules. Analysts worked on crime data before the current 
conversation about data analytics. What is of interest to me is the style of rea-
soning, constraints, gaps, and tensions that characterize contemporary police 
efforts to engage with new technology and forms of evidence. Below, I briefly 
discuss research conducted with a police force in a large northern UK city. I 
propose using this case example to tease out ways to study predictive policing 
as a specific technosocial assemblage — and a body of evidence — rather than 
as an empirical example in itself.
Criminal Anthropology in Action
The numbers are there to see, especially for burglary and car theft — it works.  
But . . . it’s weird, like science fiction. I mean, one day you turn on the computer 
and, well, now it’s the computer running things.
 — Interview (informal) with police technician (2013)
It took Dave a while to adjust to there being an anthropologist in his office.6 
He blinked rapidly in what seemed to be an effort to wish me away. That day 
police headquarters was a tense place. The borough was being evaluated as 
part of a national quality initiative. Dave was plainly hoping that the Analy-
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sis Unit he directed would escape the attention of senior officers conducting 
a site visit. He was quite literally attempting to keep his head down when 
his manager entered his office unannounced and introduced me as a visiting 
researcher intending to study crime mapping. Dave’s manager disappeared 
with “Top brass wants you to give him what he needs, ok?” The top brass in 
question was Sir Peter, a senior figure who blessed my short project on alter-
native approaches to predictive policing. At first, I was surprised by the ac-
cess that I had been given, but it soon became clear that there were plenty of 
opportunities for me to bump into the evaluators, and predictive crime map-
ping was the borough’s “stand- out initiative.” Although the technical work of 
the Analysis Unit was regarded as somewhat mysterious by seasoned officers, 
headquarters staff described it as a “miracle factory” — certain types of crime 
had been driven down, by 38 percent in the case of burglaries, and, after all, 
“the numbers don’t lie.”
Well before my first visit, I interviewed several police officers by phone or 
over Skype to become familiar with current operations and policing history. 
I learned about the nineteenth- century slum gangs — mostly Irish migrants — 
 the conflicts between Black British and West Indian youths, football hooli-
ganism, and the drug- related crime wave that swept the city during the 1990s. 
But Dave seemed vague on the historical context in which he worked. He had 
graduated a few years previously from a local university where he specialized 
in criminology and completed advanced training in Geographical Informa-
tion Systems. He joined the borough police force as a civilian employee, sens-
ing in the role of analyst the opportunity to strengthen his research network 
and gain experience as a “practitioner” before hunting for an academic post.7 
Until 2010, the Analysis Unit was dedicated to crime mapping, mostly efforts 
to identify “hot spots” based on historical cases in a borough with a quarter 
of a million residents spread over forty square miles. Dave began working 
with a few seasoned police officers who were seeking to develop their skills, 
together with two young graduates. I felt sure that he would have interesting 
stories about the early days, especially efforts to implement predictive tech-
niques shoulder to shoulder with policemen trained to walk the beat, cultivate 
street- level contacts, and follow hunches. However, he seemed vague about 
those early moments. “So,” I eventually asked, “how exactly does the system 
work, and how does it differ from the American approach?” Dave’s demeanor 
changed. The turned his chair to the two large monitors on his desk with, 
“Watch this!” He pulled up a real- time map of the borough and talked me 
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through the image of city, explaining with great intensity how the different 
neighborhoods yielded data and interacted with one another.
The policing borough has four distinct spaces that dominated its cardinal 
points. To the north, the district abuts a large public housing area, a “sink- hole 
estate” with a very high general crime rate and several gun crime incidents 
each year. Nearly 90 percent of residents in the policing borough identified 
as “white” in official statistics, but over half of the population in the public 
housing area identified as “Black” or “South Asian.” To the east, a large foot-
ball stadium dominates the urban landscape, while to the west an enormous 
shopping mall and retail park extends on both sides of the main road. The 
stadium and shopping mall are areas with few crimes as they are saturated 
with cctvs and have significant private security in place. Private security 
personnel in the mall did not feel free to speak to researchers formally, though 
one individual did grab my elbow and confide, “We keep the crime out by 
not letting certain people in!” (informal conversation 2013). Crime, as Dave 
explained, is generally concentrated to the north, in the center of the bor-
ough, and occasionally in the south of the district. To the south, one finds 
a large area composed of several affluent neighborhoods. These are gated 
communities — “footballers’ wives,” according to Dave. The crime rate is low 
in those neighborhoods, though in recent years police recorded several vio-
lent home invasions. From the analyst’s perspective, these broad spatial fea-
tures can be understood as exercising real- time force that manifests in data — 
and the data is itself emergent.
Starting in 2010, the Analysis Unit began working to normalize historical 
data and make crime reporting more efficient. Relatively quickly, Dave and 
his colleagues were able to produce detailed daily maps that indicated the 
likely locations of future crimes. The maps are provided to patrols during 
morning briefings and indicate risk (referred to as “heat”) by means of col-
ored circles — red indicates high risk. The intensity of the color indicates the 
likelihood of crime in a particular area based on spatiotemporal relationships 
to recent crimes and historical data. The theoretical underpinning for this 
approach is found in this often- cited recommendation by UK criminologists:
In domestic burglary, for example, the danger of a further crime is great-
est at the home of the original victim and spreads out some 400 meters, 
but disappears over six weeks to two months. . . . Instead of mapping past 
events in the conventional way we should map the risk they generate for 
nearby homes, with the map being dynamic to reflect how the risk declines 
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over time. . . . Forecasts can be displayed using a Geographical Informa-
tion System (gis) and overlain on a map of the relevant area, allowing 
patrolling and other resources to be deployed to the areas of highest pre-
dicted risk.
While it is an unhappy comparison, the logic mirrors that used in the 
culling of farm animals in epidemics of foot and mouth disease. Cull-
ing only animals on farms where there is an outbreak ignores the way in 
which disease spreads. (Ross and Pease 2008, 314)
Patrols are given copies of the map — each marked with the Crown copyright 
of the Official Secrets Act, 1911 — that will determine where they should spend 
the majority of their time. And the maps are of course “smart” in that specific 
details of recent crimes and near- future risks appear in dialogue boxes when 
one interfaces with the maps live in the system. Moreover, to assist in this 
process of making the maps “real,” officers’ radios and cars are gps locatable, 
and they are expected to be where the system suggests they be. It is important 
that patrols are not expected to simply cruise about in their designated circles.
Again following Ross and Pease (2008), borough resources are assigned on 
a variation on the so- called Pareto Principle, which holds that a small num-
ber of things are responsible for a large number of outcomes. A few criminals 
commit a large number of crimes, and the spatial distribution of crime will be 
limited by our suboptimal foragers. Moreover, a small number of victims also 
account for the majority of cases of victimization. In other words, we have the 
phenomena of repeat victimization. Thus, the borough’s crime maps repre-
sent future crimes and future victims. The style of reasoning here has led the 
force to “cocoon” neighborhoods, where, say, a burglary occurred. Police pa-
trol the streets visibly; contact with the community intensifies; public service 
workers are encouraged to wear high- visibility clothing; and advice on “target 
hardening” is given to victims, potential victims, and nearby residents.
Over the past several years, extraordinary successes have been attributed 
to the approach taken in this borough. In the United States, cities that have 
experimented with PredPol have shown decreases in some crimes of up to 
25 percent. In this UK borough, burglary is down by 38 percent and car theft 
is down by 29 percent, and all at zero cost. With some justification, a senior 
officer claimed that the results are attributable to organizational change, and 
targeted patrols spurred by new technology implementation: “Future polic-
ing is about effective management, knowing your organization and how to 
implement change across it, across the different skill sets, while ensuring buy-
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 in. It’s about service and evaluating that service, asking the tough questions” 
(interview 2013). With some justification, outside commentators question the 
“displacement” of crime to other boroughs — though there is no substantive 
evidence to support this theory — or to other forms of crime. Car theft does 
seem to be declining internationally as technology changes, and thefts from 
cars are increasing, but the borough seems to counter such displacement by 
targeting the patterns of criminal foragers. However, the most accurate criti-
cal evaluations seem to be implicit in the muted comments of police on patrol. 
I spoke to several officers in this borough and in other cities in the UK and 
United States. During a conversation in 2013, one officer synthesized the on- 
the- ground perspective in one question, “Isn’t this just community policing?” 
(interview 2013).
There is a new body of evidence here, one that exceeds the evidence (vi-
dere) of the sociologically visible and even the relations of cause and effect 
in intelligence- led and predictive policing. We must also attend to evidence 
in more Foucauldian terms, “those évidences on which our knowledges, our 
agreements, our practices, rest,” and thus attend to evidence of events unseen 
(Foucault in Perrot 1980, 44). Contemporary approaches such as predictive 
policing constitute their own milieu and evidential regimes, but they are also 
nested in broader institutional configurations and taken- for- granted ways of 
perceiving and acting in the world. On the one hand, then, as I carried out my 
research, I watched as a law enforcement organization shifted toward predic-
tive policing, a catalyst for changes in reasoning, management, resource allo-
cation, and actual patrols. On the ground, police seemed to be driving down 
crime by “doing nothing,” as one veteran officer put it. Another reflected, 
“These days we get calls about barkin’ dogs. Why don’t you go around to your 
neighbor, knock on the door, and speak to them? Somethin’s up there. And, 
what’s that got to do with us?” (interview 2013). But for all the successes rep-
resented in management charts and reports, crime did not go away, especially 
violent and organized crimes that are not connected with so- called optimal 
foragers. In the gated communities to the south of the borough, residents (at 
least those few I could find to speak to) lived in fear of the rare but terrifying 
home invasions by professional gangs that bring the threat of violence along 
with metal cutters and automatic weapons. Those residents call for tougher 
laws and better armed response. Residents in the poor and racialized north of 
the borough felt that they were under “surveillance.” They feared local drug 
dealers and disliked the heavy- handed police who occasionally screeched into 
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their estate. And, what of the perspective of those police who deal with non-
foragers? The extracts below are from ethnographic notes taken during No-
vember 2013 and show the predictive system in operation from the perspective 
of an elite tactical response unit.
11.13 I’ve just left the chief ’s office and am waited in an anteroom. I’m 
thinking that I’ll never get to see things from the side of patrols 
unless I talk to police in other boroughs and cities. The gis guys 
attributed 79 percent of all burglaries to “optimal foragers.” They 
say that they have driven down burglaries by 61 percent in recent 
months! We all have the same questions. Is it true? Is this about 
changing patrols? Is it sustainable? Are crimes simply being dis-
placed to other districts? What do the patrol guys think? Will I be 
given permission to work with them?
 The chief ’s secretary appears. . . . I’m informed that I will be allo-
cated specific times to interview patrols, but I’m also given permis-
sion to “hang out” with the guys in tactical. . . .
1 5 . 1 3  The tactical unit are “suiting up.” One group will be training while 
the others circle around where the predictive maps indicate the 
risks are greatest. The men and women in tactical quietly go about 
their roles. Their no- nonsense offices and equipment rooms are 
in good order, and their dark uniforms and visible weapons give 
them the appearance of soldiers. The unit commander is curious 
to know exactly what I’m observing. We talk for some time about 
my previous experiences studying counterterrorist operations. He 
doesn’t blink. I mention my lengthy discussions with Dave. “Yeah,” 
he says, “the Analysis, right? Dave . . .” He places the daily predic-
tive heat map on the table, and as if on cue three other officers 
gather around. “Our radios are tagged,” one says, “and they know 
if you’re not in the circle at the correct time.” “I haven’t noticed 
a decrease in crime, to be honest,” volunteered another. “It’s just 
that now you can’t nip home.” We laugh for a moment or two. “But 
I suppose they’re right — I mean the numbers are there,” says the 
unit commander. Everyone stares at the map silently. One officer 
points at a time and heat- sensitive circle. He hesitates before ask-
ing, “What do the colors mean exactly?” Everyone knew what to 
do, but nobody seemed to know what they knew.
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 “So, the maps tell you what to do now? But what was it like before?” 
I asked. “We used to go looking for trouble,” an older officer said. 
“We knew the people and where to look, and what to look for, you 
know, before something kicked off.” “What about now?” I asked. 
“We stay in our little colored circle.” “Maybe it’s working.” “What 
about you?” I asked the unit commander, “If it’s so restrictive, why 
do you still do this job?” “Ah,” he said, “they left us with the good 
bit: we just love kicking down doors!”
But why is a tactical unit thriving alongside software- mediated policing and 
alongside community policing in the form of target hardening, the co- opting 
of local public service workers and the “cocooning” of neighborhoods? If Fou-
cault (2007) is right in suggesting that to police is to take responsibility for 
various forms of sociality (socialité), then one may simply observe that this 
responsibility is unevenly distributed and received. Some are gently cocooned 
against the near future, while darker forces circle around and occasionally 
produce kinetic encounters. It may well be the case that this new criminal 
anthropology is front and center in a redistribution of societal security.
Concluding Remarks
As protests against racialized and violent policing continue around the world, 
many of which cite the shooting of Michael Brown in Missouri, it is all too 
easy to fold contemporary predictive policing initiatives into a preexisting 
image of the world, an image that is confirmed by the very nature of how 
the social sciences study policing. Ethnographers, especially urban ethnog-
raphers, show their hard- to- acquire skills by getting close to hard- to- study 
communities, from marginalized populations to those who police them. 
Indeed, in recent years several ethnographers illuminated the interactions 
between security forces and poor communities, from Didier Fassin’s (2013) 
study of policing in Paris to Alice Goffman’s controversial analysis of struc-
tural violence — policing as “a battering ram knocking [your] door at three 
in the morning’ (2014, 59). But such studies offer only one form of evidence 
(videre), that which can be seen directly. Such evidence can be misleadingly 
vivid and thus distract from broader transformations. This chapter is a call 
attention to another body of evidence shaping policing, one conveyed predic-
tive policing systems.
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As I have shown, predictive systems such as PredPol are not old wine in a 
new bottle, contemporary software licenses for long- standing efforts to profile 
the poor.8 Here I have attended to the new criminal anthropology encoded in 
such systems as indexing broader transformations in how societal security is 
distributed. Of course, the effects of redistribution will be felt unevenly. Just 
as software will not fix institutional racism, even if implemented well tech-
nological solutions may simply result in more stops, more arrests, and more 
racialized youths in prison. And I do not wish to elide the danger that, as one 
research participant put it, one “day you turn on the computer and, well, now 
it’s the computer running things” (interview 2013). There is certainly a danger 
of so- called surveillance creep together with intrusions into privacy and civil 
liberties. However, perhaps the most widely discussed danger arises when one 
considers the range of functions that can be added to polyfunctional predic-
tive systems. Most predictive systems target the spatiotemporal dimensions of 
human behavioral patterns, not the persons themselves. Recently, and mainly 
in the United States, systems have begun to include personal information 
gained from data mining in order to forewarn possible future offenders of the 
consequences of their current actions. According to a New York Times report, 
analysts are now looking at the predictive qualities of social networks that 
include “previous arrests; unemployment; an unstable home life; friends and 
relatives who have been killed, are in prison or have gang ties; and problems 
with drugs or alcohol” (Eligon and Williams 2015).9
Having said this, if the critical social sciences simply engage with new 
policing and security technologies in terms of their possible nefarious uses, 
we will lose the possibility of genuine critique, by which I mean an under-
standing of the core assumptions from which those technologies emerged 
and the possible alternatives available at root. It may be possible that the cur-
rent obsession with policing encounters in urban ethnography is limiting our 
capacity to engage in genuine critique, because we are not attending to the 
transformations that are occurring more broadly.
Even if we distrust technological governance and despise the advocates 
of predictive solutions, we must ask ourselves this: what if the robbery in the 
Ferguson Market and Liquor had never occurred? This essay opened with an 
epigraph from Gregory Bateson, one of the earliest anthropologists to engage 
openly with the positive and negative potential of new technology. Bateson 
saw in social computing the potential hope for humanity, but he worried that 
its style of reasoning would supersede our own and that we would be “a little 
less responsible.” He concluded thus, “If you do what the computer advises, 
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you assert by that move that you support the rules of the game which you fed 
into the computer. You have affirmed the rules of that game. The problem is 
to change the rules” (Bateson 1972, 481 – 82).
Notes
Mark Maguire’s research is supported by the Global Foresight Project in Stock-
holm University, funded by the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, the Swedish Foun-
dation for Humanities and Social Sciences.
1 In extended footage, other residents audibly dispute this version of events.
2 One could easily describe the shooting of Michael Brown as a “critical event” 
that opened the world to evaluation and inaugurated new modalities of action 
that obtain to this day, but this chapter is in part a critique of anthropological 
obsessions with “events” and “encounters” as the really real stuff of ethnographic 
research. The critique here is that what counts as ethnographic evidence may not 
be sufficient for understanding all policing transformations.
3 Several prominent and widely circulated papers on predictive policing have 
served up confusion rather than clarity. Most notably, “Predictive Policing” by 
Sarah Brayne, Alex Rosenblat, and Danah Boyd (2015) confuses crime mapping 
and predictive policing and discusses opportunity theory rather than subopti-
mal foraging theory. Sociocultural anthropologists, in contrast, have been quick 
to appreciate the significance of these experiments in the context of shifts in 
global policing and governance. Roberto González criticizes predictive polic-
ing as academic entrepreneurialism lending “dubious” theories to potentially 
oppressive systems that are only a short step from counterinsurgency (e.g., 
González 2015). This is a useful critique, but this chapter discusses the rise and 
spread of predictive policing in ways that show its flexibility and adaptability 
as a mode of engaging with intractable problems of crime in the contemporary 
moment. Much will be learned by attending to actually existing efforts to police 
future crimes before deploying a hermeneutics of suspicion or disposing of them 
under the rubric of faddish “Big Data” solutions.
4 Here one should underscore the fact that governmental innovations in knowl-
edge and rule occurred in contexts of empire and moved back and forth along 
the route ways carved by colonization. Michel Foucault (2003) recognized this 
as the “boomerang effect” of colonial governance.
5 (Sub- )Optimal Foraging Theory has been criticized on a number of grounds — 
aside from the potential downsides of applying unmodified a behavioral ecol-
ogy to human beings — with many critics pointing to one rather obvious issue: 
for all its neatness and suitability for modeling, foraging theory does not admit 
to falsification. Specific predictions may be more or less accurate, but it is dif-
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ficult to test the underlying assumptions, the “rules of the game,” so to speak 
(see Johnson 2014).
6 All names hereafter are pseudonyms.
7 Today, police officers face fast- changing and complex threats not from the per-
spective of coherent institutions but, rather, as the front line of service provi-
sion assemblages. Technologies such as public video- surveillance are often out-
sourced, and even the back office is now potentially differentiated. For example, 
in 2012 the private security company g4S was contracted to build and staff many 
functions within a police station by the Lincolnshire Police Authority. The Police 
Authority claimed that the move would result in “the leanest police force in Brit-
ain,” capable of delivering “services” at an even lower “cost per head of popula-
tion” (see Plimmer and Warrell 2012, 4; see also Treverton, Wollman, and Wilke 
2011, 34).
8 If one were tempted to propose that the entire process is simply a glossy version 
of “profiling” poor neighborhoods, then one would entirely miss the evidence 
being represented. In short, criminals such as car thieves will respond to envi-
ronmental abundance; the real- time crime maps show where crimes will occur, 
not where criminals reside, for now at least.
9 Indeed, one might situate such approaches alongside broader efforts to look for 
risky personality types using neurological evidence, the “new diagram” in crimi-
nal justice identified by Nikolas Rose (2010) as “risky brains.”
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SEVEN
“Intelligence” and “Evidence”
Sovereign Authority and the Differences  
That Words Make
Gregory Feldman
A man arrived on a Thursday evening by plane with a young 
woman and checked into a pension close to the city’s downtown 
core.1 An hour later, they exited the pension, walked through the 
historic district, and returned. The team set up surveillance again 
by 8 am on Monday morning, but neither of the couple left the pen-
sion until 7 pm. The team divided into two shifts lest the monotony 
of sitting in a car and a café across the street wear down their con-
centration. Brian, a member of the team, also enlisted the support 
of the family owners of the pension, who also managed the estab-
lishment. Throughout the week, they would always call if either 
of the two individuals passed through the lobby. This happened 
rarely before 7 pm. This situation made it difficult to gather some 
information about the man’s activities before they left. Since they 
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stayed in a pension, rather than an apartment, the team surmised 
that they would not stay in the country for too long, especially if the 
man’s base of operations was in Denmark. He did not appear to be 
meeting anyone and, so, the value of whatever information might 
be found in the pension room increased considerably.
Therefore, the team had to make a decision: either they request 
a judge’s warrant authorizing them to search the room, or they sim-
ply search it without a warrant. The former option could not even 
be seriously considered given the tight frame they faced compared 
to the length of time it takes a judge to issue a warrant. They chose 
the latter option. David and Max approached the pension owners 
and asked for them to let them into the room. The owners obliged 
without hesitation, and even with some amount of giddiness and 
excitement. The young adult son even bragged that this was the 
second time a police team had requested his help in this regard.
In the small room, Max videorecorded with his smartphone 
items on an end table and in a handbag that included a credit 
card. He then flipped through a wallet. David carefully searched a 
suitcase that contained an iPad, but he left it alone. Max flipped 
through a daily planner, but saw nothing of interest. David then 
found an official letter from his government’s immigration service 
and showed it to Max, who videorecorded it as well. Max then 
found an old cell phone that had been left on. He videorecorded all 
of the contact information in the incoming/outgoing calls menu. 
He was not able to access the phone’s contact list. The manager and 
a cleaning lady assisted David and Max in whatever small way 
they could: they pointed to a bathroom, they helped put things back 
in their original place, they nodded in different directions to make 
sure David and Max checked everything possible. The work was 
done in fifteen minutes. All four double- checked to ensure every-
thing was put back exactly where it was left. They casually exited 
the room and made their way down to the staircase to the lobby, 
chatting the whole time as if they were old friends. After we left, 
David explains that the manager was “happy to help. People help 
us all the time. People’s lives are boring. He’ll be able to brag to his 
girlfriend. They teach us about this stuff in the training courses.”
Brian had been following the man and woman during the il-
legal search. His job was to phone David and Max if they were to 
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start walking back in the direction of the pension. When we all 
reconvene in the car across the street, Brian addresses my question 
about how the state prosecutor, who is responsible for the case, 
can possibly find useful information that they had just obtained 
illegally. He explains that they give useful information to the pros-
ecutor, who does not always need to know how it was obtained and 
who does not always bother to ask. Crucial consequences hang on 
the two categories of information they obtain. “Evidence” is any in-
formation that is admissible in a court trial of an indicted suspect. 
In differs from “intelligence,” which is information that police use 
to advance an investigation. Intelligence is not admissible in court 
for two reasons. First, it is often too vague to help make a case for 
or against a defendant. Second, more germane to this chapter, the 
methods by which it is obtained do not qualify it to be admitted in 
court. The legal protection of evidence is designed to protect defen-
dants from cases fabricated against them. It also protects peoples’ 
privacy and abusive police practices that can occur when police 
are looking for evidence. Thus, while most intelligence is gathered 
legally, some of it can only be acquired through quasi- legal means 
at best or illegal means at worst.
This chapter is part of a larger four- year project that studies an 
undercover police investigative team. The project examines three 
particular aspects of their work. First, it addresses the modes and 
conditions in which the team makes ethical judgments while con-
ducting their street work. Many of those judgments take place in 
the “gray zone,” or that space in the margins of the law and beyond. 
Second, it compares the form of sovereign action they undertake 
in that gray zone against the form of action taken in the context 
of traditional nation- state sovereignty. Third, it examines the in-
terface between transnational criminal networks and the security 
state to better conceptualize the way in which state sovereignty is 
effected in the contemporary moment.
This chapter examines the technical conditions of the team’s undercover in-
vestigative work to identify the circumstances in which they can enter the gray 
zone. The point of this exercise is to describe the spaces in a wider security 
apparatus in which its officials — undercover investigators in this case — can 
and do deviate from policy and legal mandates. Such deviations do not de-
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pend upon the random whims of police officers themselves. Even the roguest 
of cops need an opening or an opportunity in which they can disregard law. 
Yet, we must be careful not to sensationalize the fact because the law depends 
upon the gray zone, even if the most horrendous of violations also transpire 
in the same place. This chapter, then, outlines the bureaucratic context in 
which an undercover police investigative team works. It then explains the 
means through which the team enters the gray zone. This means is the team’s 
control over the narrative of the street side of an investigation, which features 
almost no oversight from higher authorities. Primarily, it is their freedom to 
classify retrieved information as either “intelligence” or “evidence” that pro-
tects team members in the gray zone. Ironically, the judicial system itself also 
protects the team in that space should a gumptious lawyer push too hard on 
the question of how the team obtained their information.
The understanding of the gray zone used in this chapter draws on Giorgio 
Agamben’s (1998) work on the basis of sovereign power. He argues that the 
sovereign is the entity that can suspend law, thus creating a “state of excep-
tion” in which it can act with impunity against those individuals whom the 
law no longer protects. Those individuals become homo sacer, whose vul-
nerability conceivably knows no ends. Lacking legal protection, homo sacer 
cannot politically assert himself and so can only be acted upon or neglected. 
Homo sacer is not even worthy of a ritual sacrifice because nothing about 
him is worth offering to a higher principle or deity. Therefore his murder 
comes with no penalty for the murderer because the loss of his life has no 
effect on the order that the principle or deity upholds. This chapter will ad-
dress how the team enters the gray zone in the course of its own work and 
assumes sovereign authority over those tied to their investigations, if only in 
limited circumstances. As a side note, much research examines how great 
atrocities occur in the gray zone as actors endowed with sovereign authority 
abuse homo sacer. However, this is not an inevitable outcome, and elsewhere 
I have discussed how the particular situation in which the team works mini-
mizes the likelihood of abuse of their sovereign authority (Feldman 2016).
An Immigration Service as a Blueprint and as a Process
The country in which the team works features a wide range of police forces, 
each with different mandates and competencies. These national- level forces 
are located under a variety of government ministries. The investigative team 
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itself is housed in the Ministry of the Interior’s immigration service, which 
is further subdivided into departments such as border control, document 
control, administrative analysis, and criminal investigations among others. 
The Criminal Investigations Department focuses on transnational organized 
crimes that carry at least eight- year sentences for the convicted. This depart-
ment is subdivided into five separate groups, four of which focus on crimi-
nal rings originating in specific geographic regions of the world. These four 
groups work at headquarters, mostly at desktop computers. They conduct re-
cord searches and data analyses and have instant access to eu databases such 
as the Schengen Information System (sis), Visa Information System (vis), and 
eurodac (the biometric fingerprint database for asylum applicants), which 
store information on all travelers who enter national/eu spaces. They also 
have access, by request or by warrant, to a number of national databases in-
volving phone records, banking records, and vital statistics. A chief leads each 
of those groups and by extension will manage the case investigation on a daily 
basis for a state prosecutor. As the fifth group in the Criminal Investigation 
Department, the investigative team is not defined by geographic specialty, but 
rather by all the street- level investigative work such as surveillance, searches, 
and arrests. They perform these tasks at the request of the deskbound in-
vestigative groups. Sometimes responsibilities bleed across the lines between 
the team and the other groups. The latter will occasionally do surveillance 
themselves. The team does some data analysis itself, particularly the creation 
of cluster diagrams mapping social connections based on information down-
loaded from suspects’ mobile phones.
A distinguishing feature between the team and the deskbound investiga-
tive groups is the indifference that the team holds toward their own official 
ranks. Their ranks, along with all other employees in the immigration ser-
vice, are based on the year they that they completed their rookie training. 
Those in the same year ascend through the same pay grades. Those in rela-
tively higher positions will be held responsible for problems that emerge in 
an investigation, but they will also be favored for any new opportunities that 
arise such as trips to other European cities to attend conferences and work-
shops in other eu cities. However, Frank has cultivated the team to work in a 
much more egalitarian manner. He explains, “My group, instead of the oth-
ers, has no hierarchy. That means I don’t interfere. There is a formal hierar-
chy, yes, but we don’t care about that. If Max understands the Chinese case 
best, then it is best that he calls the shots on that one. I won’t interfere.” David 
jumped in immediately: “He listens to our ideas and opinions. He’ll tell us if 
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it is stupid or good. He’ll let us go for it if it is good.” His praise of Frank was 
hardly an empty platitude. David is the farthest thing from an ass- kisser I 
have ever met who still managed to keep his job.
Standard cases officially begin in a state prosecutor’s office. The prosecutor 
coordinates an investigation with the chief of a deskbound investigative group 
and with a judge. The chief will manage the case on a daily basis by assigning 
people to conduct record checks, liaising with other governmental offices for 
information, and communicating with the team about the necessary street 
work. The judge ensures the legality of the investigation and must approve 
(and periodically reapprove) such measures as home searches, wiretapping, 
and deep- cover operations. The team conducts these types of operations, but, 
when following procedure, they ask the prosecutor to obtain a warrant from 
a judge. If the prosecutor relies on evidence brought in from another mem-
ber state, such a judge would decide if the methods of its retrieval meet their 
own national legal standards. The need for this decision occurs fairly often, as 
organized crime moves across national borders within the union. If only one 
country is conducting the investigation, then cooperation among member 
states is usually done informally. Investigators regularly contact counterparts 
in other member states, often via email, for any helpful information that they 
might have on an investigation. In some cases, they may even ask those coun-
terparts to conduct surveillance for them in their own countries. To be sure, 
investigators generally value informal cooperation. They share a unique sense 
of camaraderie in which they wish their counterparts in other member states 
to see the quality of their work. The relations across national lines tend to be 
much more collegial than adversarial. However, different police forces within 
member states compete against each other to accumulate contacts and co-
operative arrangements with counterparts in other eu countries. They even 
conceal those contacts to protect their advantage over rival groups inside the 
department and beyond and beyond the immigration service itself. Intra- eu 
cooperation carries a high political premium in the senior levels of admin-
istration. Some investigations are conducted jointly between member states 
requiring them to calibrate their legal standards in advance of opening the 
joint investigation. The eu agency eurojust facilitates this process so that 
evidence and investigative procedures in one participating country can be 
admissible in the court of another. The europol might also be involved as 
a clearinghouse of criminal records, legal information, and contact informa-
tion for investigative personnel so that member states may better coordinate 
transnational investigation.
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Of course, the overall process flowing across groups, units, agencies, and 
ministries faces plenty of obstacles, to say nothing of high officials placing 
politically sensitive cases on hold. Put differently, an organizational blueprint 
and an actual process conducted by situated actors do not squarely map onto 
each other. Conflicts, ambiguities over responsibilities, political interests, and 
personal interests cloud what might otherwise be a smoothly functioning in-
vestigation. For example, the team is occasionally asked, by implication, to 
do favors for the odd senior official and parliamentarian. Personal favors for 
information might be passed along discretely to Frank from higher- ranked 
officials, often those who owe their positions to top figures in their political 
parties. (As government appoints the senior strata of the ministries, obliga-
tions are owed to those who got them appointed to those positions.) Some-
times these requests pertain entirely to personal concerns, such as develop-
ing a profile on a daughter’s new lover. Other times they pertain to political 
infighting, or internal cases in which it is hard to determine if the motivation 
is political or legal. Moreover, it always remains unclear as to what Frank 
himself understands about the request and how much he shares it to the team. 
Nevertheless, the team will do the job. I asked John if he felt awkward about 
these situations. He replied: “No, we know the rules of the game. We need 
equilibrium of the system. For example, we need them to support us when 
we go to in the gray zone. We might buy software that is illegal to use, but 
we need them to approve the purchase by identifying it as another cost. ‘We 
scratch their backs and they scratch ours.’ These requests are rare, only a 
couple of times per year.” But, as Max reckons, “They last forever. They are 
golden. They are like stocks. Today they are worth y for an mp, but if he be-
comes a minister, then they are worth x. If he leaves parliament, then they are 
worth zero.” The team, however, reaps little benefit beyond less bureaucratic 
hassle and more protection when they operate in the gray zone. Max adds, 
“We don’t get that much, really. It is like nuclear deterrence. We would never 
use this information on our own. We wouldn’t be offensive with it. Then, we 
would really lose. Ultimately, we just want to work and keep our lifestyle. We 
are low- ranking and low- paid. We just want to work without being troubled 
by politics.”
As another example, tensions arise between the team and the other inves-
tigative groups in the Criminal Investigation Department. Part of the ten-
sion amounts to envy. The team enjoys certain freedoms that the deskbound 
investigators lack. They can set their own hours according to the needs of the 
street investigation. If they know that they do not need to start a surveillance 
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until 1 pm, then they will not arrive at headquarters until noon. They must be 
prepared, however, to work that surveillance until their targets have returned 
home, which can be well after 11 pm. They keep street props in the office, such 
as a skateboard and a soccer ball, which are fun to play with during down-
time. They also can dress according to the needs of the surveillance. Usually, 
this means informal attire, which contrasts with the professional dress code 
of the other investigative groups. The allure of operating clandestinely on the 
street makes for more interesting experiences than what is found in an of-
fice. The team enjoys tackling the challenges they encounter on the street as 
a form of self- expression. The topic always leads to lively conversation. Brian 
notes that “we can be our individual selves. This is different from other units. 
That’s an asset for us but it would be a liability in other units. This is needed 
for the job.” In addition to the deskbound investigators, the team regularly 
contrast these experiences of being to those of officers who stamp passports 
for the immigration service’s Border Control Department. This task signifies 
to them the most monotonous and degrading type of work that can be as-
signed to someone in their profession. In the summer months, they are often 
seconded to border control to help process the heavy loads of tourists circulat-
ing through the city’s airport. David commented,
There’s gotta be some point to what you’re doing. If I stamp thirty pass-
ports, there are no consequences whether I do it or not. The job itself was 
just the most mind- numbing thing to do. At first, you try to be positive 
and do the best you can. Then, you try to do as little as you can. Have you 
seen the guys working all their lives at an egg processing plant? The eggs 
keep coming past them on a conveyer belt and they say, “good egg, good 
egg, good egg, good egg . . . rotten egg . . . good egg, good egg, good egg.”
I caught an African man with a passport that wasn’t his own. The guy 
had a French passport, but he goes to the non- eu passport control line. 
The only similarity he had with the picture was that he was Black. The 
guy in the picture had a slightly swollen and droopy eyelid. You could 
see that the man with the passport poked himself in his eyelid to match 
the picture, but he poked himself in the wrong eye! I sent him to biomet-
rics for a comparative analysis. He failed and was sent back. That was the 
most exciting part of the month.
Another source of tension is the deskbound investigators’ accusations that the 
team relentlessly pushes its own agenda. Frank is not shy about championing 
the team’s successes up the chain of command while strategically highlight-
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ing those investigators’ mistakes. To stress their incompetence, he once rhe-
torically asked them if they needed him to “wipe their asses with baby lotion.” 
They filed an official complaint of harassment in retaliation with the minis-
try’s legal office. Yet, simple arrogance does not fully explain Frank’s tone and 
persistence. Rather, shifts in the ministry’s bureaucratic terrain and changes 
in senior personnel come with promises of starting the organization anew 
and finding ways to cut down on costs. Frank’s promotion of his team aims 
at protecting them from any possible restructuring, most of which is only 
intended to give new senior figures an air of action. These potential changes 
not only threaten the team’s thrill of working together, but also the quality of 
evidence procured for investigations.
For example, several senior officials would be quite comfortable having 
each of the desk investigative groups conduct their own street work. The 
team abhors this idea and not only because it puts their own role at risk. 
(They would likely not be laid off in an organizational restructuring, but they 
could be reassigned to positions that they would find much more boring and 
isolating.) In their opinion, the other groups are incompetent on the street. 
They underestimate the skill it takes and the personal disposition that one 
must have to appear inconspicuous during surveillance operations. They 
have neither the team ethos that street work requires nor the knowledge of 
the city’s contours and how people move through it. They do not thrive on 
the uncertainty that appearing in public space brings. Conduct on the street 
where one must consciously act “normal” takes a considerable amount of self- 
confidence. David reasons that “they [desk investigators] would go out and 
think, ‘I must act normal.’ This is the beginning of a job gone bad. You really 
just need to be comfortable in your own skin when you are somewhere that 
you don’t normally hang out.” From the team’s standpoint, street- level inves-
tigation could not differ more from the analytic tasks conducted in the office.
In a telltale example, one deskbound investigative group jeopardized the 
larger investigation and potentially placed the team in danger. As Brian not 
so delicately puts it: “When they do their own street work, they fuck it up and 
the target knows that he has been under surveillance. Then they ask us to do 
it, but don’t tell us that the target already knows. This is dangerous. They [the 
targets] can trap us in an operation and ambush us. [This trick had recently 
happened to uniformed police in the city.] We need to know if the targets 
knows he is being followed. They should tell us. They are supposed to have 
us do it.” The particular target in question, a Nigerian national suspecting 
of participating in a trafficking ring, knew how to conduct his own counter-
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surveillance maneuvers. Moreover, he was alerted to the fact that the police 
had been following him because of the sloppy street tactics of the deskbound 
investigators. They had decided to do their own surveillance because the team 
had been too busy with other assignments, but never mentioned to the team 
that they had done so and that the target had spotted them. Had the team 
been made aware, they would then have designed their own surveillance op-
eration differently, Brian continues:
The neighborhood this guy lives in is a rough neighborhood, all Black im-
migrants. He goes to the café when we see him. [Brian, Frank, and David 
were already in the café.] Then, he goes out and starts to pretend to go to a 
car to see if he could provoke us to move. We didn’t move. He then walked 
across an open field so that he could expose us in an open space. That way 
he could confirm that we were the same people in café [i.e., by dragging 
the team along to an open space, the target could then spot them in two 
different places, on the safe assumption that the only likely reason to see 
them in those two different places was the fact they were following him].
The guy goes into a car with someone else, and they drive to see his 
lawyer in another part of town. The lawyer gets into the car with them, 
and they start making funny moves in the car like turning around in odd 
locations, changing speeds randomly to see if anyone in a different car 
does the same thing to keep up with them. They go to a café, and we park 
near it. The lawyer comes out and knocks on our window and shows his 
card. He says, “I want your id. I am these guys’ lawyer. I want your id, 
and I will call the police. I said, “I am not giving you my id. You can call 
the police. From the back seat, David yells out, “I don’t believe you’re a 
lawyer. You wouldn’t dress like that! You look like you sell cars!” [David’s 
strategy was to act in such a way that no police officer would in a situation 
like this one.]
The lawyer still called the police and motioned his clients to come over to 
where he was standing by the car. Brian got out, and the clients identified 
him to their lawyer. The lawyer asked why they were following them, to which 
Brian replied that he will wait for the police before he talks. Ultimately, Brian 
had to lie to the police when they arrived to extricate Frank, David, and him-
self from the situation.
I then lean into the car and tell Frank to start the engine and go. I stayed 
behind and told the lawyer that there are a lot of crooks in the world. The 
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police came, and I talked to them in private. I told them that our target is 
a woman who met these guys in a café and that we followed them as some 
of her contacts to learn a bit more about them. Then I left, and the police 
explained everything to the lawyer. . . . Now, imagine if those guys were 
selling drugs and they thought that we were also sellers moving into their 
territory. That would be very dangerous.
In fairness to the desk investigators, the Criminal Investigations depart-
ment is overworked and understaffed. Cases take longer to close than anyone 
desires, and for every case a state prosecutor can actually investigate, many 
more criminal acts occur without notice. The dual pressures of time and fi-
nancial constraints prompt the desk investigators to do their own surveil-
lances, which also lead them to making basic mistakes in the operation.
Control of the Narrative as the Stepping Stone  
into the Gray Zone
Yet, mere bureaucratic overlaps, infighting within departments, and rivalries 
across policy terrain do little to illuminate the mode of action when sover-
eign agents forego legal restrictions or policy mandates. These issues alone 
shed no light on the gray zone. At most, they highlight opportunities for the 
ambitious to pursue their personal agendas, but the advancement of compet-
ing interests is not the question in this analysis. The questions here are how 
the investigative team enters the gray zone and how they conduct themselves 
while there. There is no singular path to the gray zone. Much depends on the 
political climate, the historical moment, and the state agent’s position in the 
formal bureaucracy.
The contrast with overseas intelligence work best spotlights the delicate 
threshold into the gray zone. Operating in foreign countries, spies are not 
beholden to those countries’ laws at all. Spies are not limited by legal consid-
erations, but rather political ones. If spies get caught, then their fate rests in 
the hands of diplomatic negotiations. Their safe return home is a matter of 
bargaining between their own government and the government upon whom 
they spied. In contrast, undercover investigation is subject to legal restraint. 
Lawyers can examine investigative procedures before a judge. If summoned 
as witnesses in court, they will spend hours reviewing their surveillance 
reports so that they can answer a lawyer’s questions in cross- examination. 
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Hence, even though the investigative team works under far less oversight than 
the desk investigators, lawyers, senior officials, and occasionally parliamen-
tarians will still want to know, as David so characteristically puts it, “what 
the fuck we are doing?”
For these reasons, the team cannot enter the gray zone through fiat, hold-
ing a cavalier attitude either toward the law or the possible political fallout if 
things awry. Vincent explained, “It’s like basketball, the ball is already over 
the line. If the player has his feet just inside the line, then he can reach over 
and try to bring the back to the court. You still have to respect the rules.” 
Again, in contrast to the deskbound investigators, John explained that “in 
their work, they can get proof through the legal way. The person working in 
surveillance has to be very careful because everything will be written. This 
is different because we are on the street.” The graceful and artful transgres-
sion into the gray zone occurs through their control of the storyline of what 
happened on the street during an investigation. They alone supply that nar-
rative as no one else can corroborate events, signifying David Graeber’s (2015, 
80) point that bureaucratic structures of domination allow for those in posi-
tions of authority to provide the explanation of what happened. However, that 
control also gives them cover when they act on their own ethical judgments 
outside of legal and policy constraints.
Two examples are particularly relevant to understanding how the team 
shifts over from scripted legal and policy terrain to the nebulous gray zone. 
Illustrating the first example, Max invoked a metaphor while we sat at a side-
walk café watching a door across the street from which a suspect would even-
tually exit.
This is a white cup. Everyone can see that this is a white cup. But a judge 
will not see that it is a white cup if the evidence that it is a white cup is not 
obtained the right way. He will ask, “Where are the warrants?” Everybody 
knows what it is, but if you don’t follow the rules, then it is not part of the 
investigation. It frustrates me a lot. We have to give rights to everyone for 
justice, but what about doing justice. If we don’t do it by the book, then 
there are disciplinary actions. A lawyer will always find a flaw. They will 
interrupt justice.
To preclude this potential problem with the judge, the team makes a crucial 
distinction between “evidence” and “intelligence,” giving the team the power 
over the script and the necessary protection for entering the gray zone. Intel-
ligence is any information used to investigate suspected criminal activity. It 
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does not appear in court. Evidence is information directly tying a suspect to 
a crime that must appear in court. The team would never present intelligence 
in court lest the methods of retrieval be exposed: “If you don’t follow the 
rules, then it is not [officially] part of the investigation.” Evidence, of course, 
will appear in a surveillance report, while intelligence is never recorded in 
any official document, testifying to the fact that documents are not passive 
instruments of clear bureaucratic procedures. Rather, they are strategically 
crafted so that policy makers instrumentalize them for their own purposes 
(Hull 2012, 252). In this vein, the team will find a legal way to present intelli-
gence as evidence. For example, the team needed to know if a Chinese owner 
of business suites in a downtown building was running a brothel. However, 
paying for sex with a prostitute managed by a pimp is illegal, and so no team 
member could patronize the establishment to obtain direct evidence. Yet, 
they could not determine if it served as a brothel without going inside (and 
furthermore Chinese brothels in the city only cater to Chinese clients). They 
provided a Chinese informant with €150 to solicit the establishment’s services 
and to ultimately confirm it as a brothel. This information will be used only 
as “intelligence” because of the team’s illegal involvement in its procurement, 
that is, soliciting sex from someone controlled by a pimp. With this intelli-
gence, however, they can justify the time and money for an operation to le-
gally obtain evidence: most likely including the sounds of people having sex; 
condoms found in the trash cans outside the building; and confessions from 
people patronizing its services when the bust occurs. If a judge, prompted by a 
defense attorney, were to ask how intelligence was obtained — that is, how they 
knew the actual use of those suites ahead of the bust — then the team would 
argue that they cannot reveal their sources lest it jeopardize their informant’s 
safety. No judge would push further, thus tacitly approving the team’s right to 
invoke a state of exception.
Frank described the second example as he stood in the door frame of the 
team’s office at headquarters. Between drags on his cigarette, he explained, 
“For us, we always seek the truth. For us, the truth is the right thing, even if 
we have to lie.” The lie to which he refers is not a falsehood, but rather an in-
ference for which there is no direct evidence. They maintain that they know 
the truth based on experience rather than direct observation, which could 
never be obtained under any imaginable scenario. As a hypothetical example, 
if the issue in court is whether one suspect retrieved a bag left in a closet by 
another suspect, then it would normally stand to reason that if the latter was 
seen entering the closet with the bag and exiting it without the bag and the 
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former entered the closet without the bag but exited with it, then the latter left 
it for the former even if the team never witnessed a direct exchange. Hence, 
the “truth” is not a specific object that the investigators must “see.” Rather, the 
truth is that which a judge recognizes as sufficiently compelling reasoning, 
based upon some amount of sensory evidence, to reach a conviction. Thus, 
“lying” only means to obscure how information was obtained. Other forms 
of manipulation also occur. If warrants are needed to tap phones or enter 
houses, then they have learned how to present the argument to the prosecutor, 
who will then have a greater chance of obtaining the warrant from the judge. 
They could stress such urgencies as an underage prostitute in danger or sus-
picions that human trafficking is occurring. These situations are more likely 
to prompt a quick and favorable reply from a judge given the political impor-
tance of eu states being seen as committed to combatting these problems.
Indeed, the team has plenty of opportunity to blatantly lie and baldly fabri-
cate reports. Brian rhetorically asked, “Do you know how easy it is for cops to 
frame people? We could do it very easily if we want to.” A primary reason that 
they do not, and this can be argued without naiveté, is a sense of justice. Brian 
continued: “The underlying thing in our work is justice. Sometimes our work 
is dirty. But we don’t harm anyone we don’t need to. There is an honor among 
what we do: don’t forge surveillance reports. Can you imagine how easy it 
would be to put someone in jail? Still, think if we were caught. The image of 
the unit would be tarnished. We would lose credibility. The judges would not 
trust us.” Honor, as well as justice, are at play here. I replied to Brian, “Is honor 
important in other jobs like taxi driving or financial analysis?” He answered, 
“No, honor only matters when there is credibility on the line.”
Conclusion
We should well know that truth is not a matter of some independent and ob-
jective reality against which the messy, subjectivity of human affairs should 
be compared. Truth, then, functions as a tacit agreement on the rules that 
enable what can and cannot be said. The structure of that agreement sus-
tains and is sustained by the power arrangement of national security- cum- 
state sovereignty. The work of Michel Foucault (1990) well conceptualizes the 
practices through which power and knowledge become inseparable and con-
stitutive of social order.2 This much of the dynamics of modern power is well 
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understood. The present case study, however, provides a subtle illustration of 
how situated actors work these rules in ways that can yield two different ef-
fects. The first effect is a mere reproduction of the current form of state sov-
ereignty. The creativity that state security actors deploy in the course of their 
work does not inherently suggest a break from traditional forms of sovereign 
power. Neoliberal society, in particular, well appropriates the creativity and 
agency of its experts and technocrats (see Rose 1993). The second effect is to 
temporarily create a new form of sovereignty, if only operating within highly 
circumscribed space of action. While cases of well- documented abuse abound 
in the gray zone, abuse itself is not a foregone conclusion even if it is sadly all 
too common. Therefore, honor may seem like a naively optimistic way to end 
the chapter, but it is worth taking Brian’s comments at face value. Although 
not the focus of this chapter, honorable action can be pursued by the team 
because the channel through which they can enter the gray zone is clear, but 
rather narrow. The intelligence/evidence distinction does not grant the team 
license to rewrite the law wholesale or simply abandon legal restraint. If they 
pushed too hard in the gray zone, then some sort of pushback would ensue 
and expose their illicit deeds. The thin distinction between the two key words 
of “evidence” and “intelligence” comes replete with significant opportunities 
and foreclosures within the power- knowledge grid of state sovereignty. While 
the latter are known well enough, the former remain quite mysterious to us, 
and so the opportunities may go untapped.
Notes
I would like to thank the members of the investigative team for their openness 
and accommodation. An Insight Grant from Canada’s Social Science and Hu-
manities Research Council funded this research.
1 The team works in the immigration and border service in an interior ministry 
of a southern, maritime eu member state. Their cases exclusively investigate 
transnational networks involved in burglary, prostitution, human smuggling, 
and human trafficking. They have granted me extensive ethnographic access on 
the condition that I do not identify the name of their country.
2 As the point specifically pertains to migration and security, see Didier Bigo 
(2006) and Gregory Feldman (2012).
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The constitution of a national security state transformed the United States 
into a new kind of secret society after World War II, one in which state power 
rests to an unprecedented degree precisely on the ability of officials to man-
age the public- secret divide through the mobilization of threat. This secrecy/
threat matrix marks all state secrets as equivalents of the atomic secret, mak-
ing revelation a matter not just of politics but of the life or death of the nation- 
state. The Cold War arms race — founded on the minute- to- minute possibility 
of nuclear war — installed the secrecy/threat matrix as a conceptual infra-
structure, enabling a new species of politics in the United States. Instead of 
enabling a system in which knowledge is power, the national security state’s 
system of compartmentalized secrecy produces a world in which knowledge 
is increasingly rendered suspect. This is a profound shift in how secrecy func-
tions socially. In such a nation- state, secrecy becomes an increasingly patho-
logical administrative form, one that prevents confidence in knowledge, and 
where no one — citizen, solder, or official — is untainted by secrecy’s distorting 
effects. As we shall see, the security state is increasingly structured not by the 
value of knowledge or by the power of withholding knowledge, but rather by 
the theatrical performance of secrecy as a means to power.
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Instituting Secrecy
With the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and the National Security Act of 1947, 
the United States effectively removed huge areas of governmental affairs from 
citizens’ purview. These acts formally installed a new security state within 
the United States, constituting a rather fundamental change in the nature of 
American democracy. The Atomic Energy Act created the first kind of infor-
mation — nuclear weapons data — that did not need to be formally classified: it 
was “born” that way. The National Security Act then created a wide range of 
new governmental institutions — most prominently, the Central Intelligence 
Agency (cia), the first of what would become seventeen intelligence agencies 
in the United States — that by charter would not be publicly accountable to 
citizens. Created in peacetime, the new laws and agencies marked the estab-
lishment of a permanent wartime economy as well as a fundamental commit-
ment to state secrecy in the United States. Rationalized as an effort to protect 
military secrets about the atomic bomb in an uncertain world and to prevent 
a “nuclear Pearl Harbor” (see Dower 2010, 27), these acts inaugurated a split 
between national security and state security in the United States, with citizens 
implicitly recognized as a potential barrier to state security policies. After 1945 
the U.S. security state apparatus increasingly used nuclear fear as an affective 
means of reconstituting the line between the foreign and the domestic, and 
to mobilize citizens as Cold Warriors.
Although the concept of a state secret was not invented during the Man-
hattan Project, the state structures that were established to build the atomic 
bomb have subsequently evolved into an unprecedented and massive infra-
structure in the United States — so massive, in fact, that its sheer scale is diffi-
cult to assess (see Burr, Blanton, and Schwartz 1998; and also Masco 2002 and 
2006). Today there may well be more knowledge that is classified than is not, 
more knowledge that is produced and locked up in the military- industrial 
state than is offered by all nonmilitary academic literatures. Peter Galison has 
calculated the scale of secret versus public knowledge in the United States and 
offers this assessment (2004, 231):
There are 500,000 college professors in the United States — including both 
two- and four- year institutions. Of course there are others — inventors, 
industrial scientists, computer programmers — responsible for generat-
ing and conveying knowledge, especially technical knowledge. But to fix 
ideas, four million people hold [security] clearances in the United States, 
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plus some vast reservoir who did in the past but no longer do. Bottom 
line? Whether one figures by acquisition rate, by holding size, or by con-
tributors, the classified universe is, as best I can estimate, on the order of 
five to ten times larger than the open literature that finds its way into our 
libraries.
The classified archive is many times larger than the open library. Produced in 
the name of citizens who have no access to this knowledge except as employ-
ees of the security state, the classified universe is not simply a means of pro-
tecting the nation- state from the spread of dangerous military information; 
official secrecy is a social technology, a means of internally regulating and 
militarizing American society. The organizing principle for this system of 
secrecy is the atomic bomb, which is positioned within the universe of classi-
fication as the ideal type of state secret. Indeed, the system of secrecy that de-
veloped after World War II was premised on the idea that everything marked 
as classified had the potential to produce catastrophic results if made public. 
An important part of the cultural work accomplished by the state’s recitation 
of nuclear danger in the first decades of the Cold War was to establish this 
linkage between the classified and the apocalyptic — merging a bureaucratic 
system for managing the military- industrial economy with images of immi-
nent destruction of the nation- state at the slightest slippage or revelation. By 
discursively positioning every classified file as potentially an “atomic secret,” 
the state transformed a provisional system of wartime secrecy into a fully 
nationalized system of perception management and control.
In essence, a new social contract was formed in the first decade of the 
Cold War, enabled and structured by the affective power of atomic weapons 
(Masco 2014). Simultaneously the ultimate weapon and the ultimate vulner-
ability, nuclear weapons presented a new set of contradictory resources and 
challenges to the state. For example, although declaring that the United States 
possesses “the greatest military potential of any single nation in the world,” 
National Security Council Directive 68 (nsc 1993, 50) — the top- secret pol-
icy document that articulated the Cold War policy of Soviet containment in 
1950 — is nonetheless ultimately a text about U.S. nuclear vulnerability. The 
directive depicts the Soviet Union as an existential enemy in anticipation of 
its future nuclear potential and argues not only for a fourfold military buildup 
but also for a mobilization of all institutions of American society to fight a 
long Cold War. This reengineering of American society for a new kind of 
warfare required a widespread recalibration of everyday life, including politi-
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cal, economic, and military institutions as well as the urban landscape and 
ideas about the future (see Galison 2001; Masco 2008). The early Cold War 
military planners — Major General Walter E. Todd, commanding general of 
the Western Air Defense Force for the United Kingdom; Lieutenant General 
Willard S. Paul, an expert on economic mobilization in the U.S. Office of 
Defense Mobilization; and Val Peterson, head of the Federal Civil Defense 
Administration — all called in the same Scientific Monthly article (titled “Na-
tional Defense against Atomic Attack”), for the construction of a “perfect 
air defense” involving the full accoutrements of now iconic “closed world” 
military technologies (see Edwards 1996), a dispersion of industrial sites away 
from urban centers, a relocation of housing stock to the periphery of cities, a 
constant war- gaming of potential Soviet attack scenarios along with domes-
tic civil defense exercises, a massive program to stockpile critical materials to 
feed and care for the entire national population, new building standards for 
all construction designed to resist the effects of a nuclear blast’s effects, and 
a significant military expansion of the U.S. capability to fight a nuclear war. 
Todd, Paul, and Peterson concluded (1955, 246):
Mobilization is no longer to be undertaken upon declaration of war or 
after war starts. Either we stay ready at all times to absorb and survive the 
worst blow an enemy can strike, or we do not. If we do not, there probably 
will be no chance to mobilize afterward. If we do, there is a good chance 
that the blow will never be attempted, for we will have substituted many 
targets for a few. The enemy will no longer be able to destroy effectively 
the capacity to operate and, thus, to break the national spirit by a massive 
attack on major metropolitan areas.
We stay ready at all times. The immediate goal of the countercommunist state 
was to reengineer American society around and through the atomic bomb. 
Not only was nuclear fear integrated into military planning, but it also trans-
formed the very nature of the nation- state.1 Indeed, all the projects proposed 
by Todd, Paul, and Peterson were actually pursued, fusing the Cold War mili-
tary project with a new kind of domestic military economic strategy. But what 
was the actual nature of the nuclear threat? In 1950, the Soviet Union had no 
more than 5 nuclear devices, while the United States had more than 350; by 
1961, these arsenals had grown substantially: the Soviet Union had amassed 
more than 2,400 weapons, while the United States had more than 24,000 war-
heads and bombs (Norris and Kristensen 2006). Few Americans at the time, 
or today, understand that the United States maintained at least a ten- to- one 
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nuclear advantage throughout the first decades of the Cold War, the period 
of the most intense nuclear paranoia in the United States. So how do we rec-
oncile the clear nuclear advantage the United States maintained through the 
early decades of the Cold War with the domestic nuclear discourse of absolute 
vulnerability and imminent surprise nuclear attack?
Nuclear fear was the central concept within a larger project of emotional 
management campaign project designed and conducted by both the Truman 
and Eisenhower administrations to mobilize citizens for a new kind of war 
(see Oakes 1994). By concentrating public attention on specific images of nu-
clear threat and by classifying all other aspects of the nuclear economy, the 
early Cold War state sought to calibrate the image of crisis to enable the Cold 
War project. The primary goal of what was publicly called “civil defense” 
in the first decades of the nuclear age was not to protect citizens from the 
exploding bomb but rather to psychologically reprogram them as Cold War-
riors. The calculated campaign of images — produced by the nuclear test pro-
gram and delivered under the rubric of domestic civil defense — was an effort 
to access the emotions of U.S. citizens and thereby transform an emerging 
nuclear threat into a means of consolidating the power and importance of 
the security state. As a top- secret report to President Dwight Eisenhower put 
it in 1956 (Panel on the Human Effects 1956, 5), “Just as the Industrial Revolu-
tion of the early nineteenth century, with its far- reaching effects on war and 
peace, required vast social and psychological adjustments, so the present pe-
riod faces extremely complex social and psychological changes.” Vast social 
and psychological adjustments are needed.
Calling for a new state project to install “psychological defenses” in citi-
zens, and challenging each individual to engage in an “emotional adaptation” 
to the thought and reality of nuclear warfare, the report concludes (Panel 
on the Human Effects 1956, 11; see also Vandercook 1986): “The keystone of 
the program is knowledge — not merely information made available but in-
formation, both frightening and hopeful, so successfully conveyed as to be-
come useful knowledge translated into plans, procedures, and the capability 
for constructive action. . . . In order to prepare the people, we believe that it 
will be necessary to involve them, and to involve them at deeper levels than 
mere factual information.” A deeper level than facts. Involving citizens meant 
teaching them about the effects of nuclear explosions — providing specific im-
ages of the bomb and censoring all others — while publicizing the emerging 
Soviet nuclear threat. Civil Defense was an explicit program to teach citi-
zens to fear the bomb, fuse that fear with anticommunism, and modulate its 
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intensity so that a potentially terrified public did not become unwilling to 
support the larger Cold War program. The ultimate goal of civil defense was 
the creation of a citizen who was permanently mobilized as a Cold Warrior, 
restructured internally for constant readiness and psychologically hardened 
by nuclear fear. One of the most powerful attributes of the atomic bomb, in 
other words, is that it offered new access to the emotional life of the nation, 
producing a new kind of public constituted and militarized through a highly 
tailored vision of totalizing threat.
But if publicizing a specific concept and image of nuclear danger was the 
key to mobilizing citizens — to establishing an everyday life infused with the 
minute- to- minute possibility of nuclear war — the corollary project was an 
expanding use of state secrecy to manage the production of threat and con-
trol its public image. In the early Cold War period, the atomic bomb was 
the ultimate key to achieving global “superpower” status, as well as to in-
stalling a concept of danger that was the exclusive domain of the security 
state. For the nuclear state, this secrecy/threat matrix became a concentrated 
means of managing domestic populations as well as pursuing the broader 
geopolitics of communist containment. Secrecy was not just about protect-
ing technological secrets in a global competition with the Soviet Union; it 
was also a means of converting American society into a countercommunist 
state at the level of institutions, economies, politics, and emotions. The War 
on Terror is a contemporary effort to reproduce the success of this early Cold 
War project in population management, affective governance, and military- 
industrial expansion, while at the same time expanding existential danger 
itself through the phantasmatic figure of the “terrorist with a wmd” (Masco 
2014). The Obama administration ultimately committed also to a “modern-
ization” of the U.S. nuclear complex, planning a set of new warheads, bomb-
ers, and missiles to be developed through mid- century at a foreseeable cost 
of at least one trillion dollars, thus extending the U.S. commitment to mili-
tary nuclear power through the twenty- first century (Wolfsthal, Lewis, and 
Quint 2014).
The Counterterror State
Since 2001, secrecy has become a core tool in transforming the United States 
from a countercommunist to a counterterrorist state, and its official use is an 
ever- expanding practice. In a variety of Executive Orders and formal direc-
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tives in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks, the Bush administration 
required each federal agency of government to increase its control of informa-
tion.2 According to government audits, there were nine million formal clas-
sification decisions in 2001 but over sixteen million by 2004, a trajectory that 
continues well into the Obama administration. Moreover, the rate at which 
records that are over twenty- five years old were declassified fell by over 75 per-
cent in the same period. Thus, the official past as well as the official present 
have become newly politicized as well as highly censored domains.3 The cost 
of simply managing secret information in the United States grew to be over 
$7.2 billion a year, involving in one year alone over four thousand classifica-
tion authorities and over 351,150 new classifications decisions.4 However, these 
figures only deal only with explicit classification or declassification decisions, 
the making of which is a formal regulatory process. An expansive “Sensitive 
but Unclassified (sbu)” category of information is a potentially larger and 
more influential category of knowledge. Information that is sbu is not offi-
cially classified; it is information simply removed from public circulation and 
treated as if it were classified.
Officially justified as a means of protecting information about “critical in-
frastructures” following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington 
in 2001, the sbu designation and its expanding use have radically changed the 
way information is handled within federal agencies. The Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 charged federal employees to “identify and safeguard homeland 
security information that is sensitive but unclassified.”5 However, the act de-
fined none of its terms, leaving it up to each federal agency to draw the lines 
between public access and critical infrastructure protections. Concurrently, 
the Department of Justice advised all government agencies to limit the scope 
of Freedom of Information Acts (foia) requests wherever possible — forcing 
litigation and thus contradicting the law’s intent — and while also pursuing an 
unprecedented application of the Espionage Act of 1917 to targeting whistle- 
blowers within the government. These processes only accelerated during the 
Obama administration, including prosecutions of reporters writing about 
counterterror policies (Elsea 2013). In support of these new restrictions, the 
counterterror state has also embraced advocated a “mosaic theory” of infor-
mation threat. This theory assumes that disparate items of information (par-
ticularly those that appear innocuous and of no obvious use to an adversary) 
can nonetheless be assembled to create a whole that is more powerful than 
the sum of its parts. According to this theory, any piece of information is 
potentially a national security threat, as it is the creative linking together bits 
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of knowledge that are imagined to be dangerous. The extensive surveillance 
programs run by the National Security Agency after 2001 — involving digital 
surveillance, archiving telecommunications across platforms, and data min-
ing on a newly comprehensive global scale — also rely on this concept. David 
Pozen has consequently argued that an aggressive use of the mosaic theory of 
information synergy produces claims that are “unfalsifiable,” leading inevita-
bly to overclassification and threat proliferation (2005, 679).
The result of these new laws, practices, and interpretive strategies is obvi-
ous: information that flowed relatively freely a few years ago — for example, 
environmental impact studies of government projects — now fall into this sbu 
category and are often not available to citizens. A generalized state security 
concept trumps all other concerns (in this case, environmental protection) 
via the sbu approach. The images of prisoner abuse from Abu Ghraib prison 
fell within the sbu category and were released only after being leaked to 60 
Minutes, the New Yorker, and Salon.com and via litigation by the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union.6 But less provocative information about govern-
ment contracts, policy debates and initiatives, and anything that might have 
patentable potential — also falls within the sbu category. Thus, the overall 
strategy of the counterterrorist state has been to replace a presumption of 
transparency in nonmilitary matters with wide- ranging restrictions that em-
phasize noncirculation rather than, or in addition to, formal classification (see 
Roberts 2006, 36 – 41). It is via the sbu category that much of American society 
is being implicitly militarized — as keeping basic governmental information 
from citizens is increasingly normalized, equated with antiterrorism, and ac-
cepted as an administrative practice.
The most important aspect of the sbu category of information is that it 
has never been defined by federal law; it is a strategically vague concept that 
is used differently by each federal agency. The U.S. Government Account-
ability Office (2006) found fifty- six different definitions of sbu in use and 
could document few provisions to identify which (and how many) officials 
within an agency are authorized to designate information as sbu. The sbu 
designation is thus a largely unregulated category of information within the 
federal government. The first articulation of sbu as a category came from 
John Poindexter, while working as Ronald Reagan’s national security advi-
sor, before he gained notoriety for his role in the Iran- Contra scandal. At the 
start of the War on Terror, he also served as head of the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency until public revelation of his proposed Total Infor-
mation Awareness data- mining project (devoted to capturing all digital com-
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munication) forced him to step down in 2002. In 1986, Poindexter defined sbu 
information this way (quoted in Knezo 2003, 20):
Sensitive, but unclassified information is information the disclosure, loss, 
misuse, alteration or destruction of which of which could adversely affect 
national security or other Federal Government interests. National Security 
interests are those unclassified matters that relate to the national defense 
or the foreign relations of the U.S. government. Other government inter-
ests are those related, but not limited to the wide range of government or 
government- derived economic, human, financial, industrial, agricultural, 
technological and law enforcement information, as well as privacy or con-
fidentiality of personal or commercial proprietary information provided 
to the U.S. government by its citizens.
National security or “other” interests. The “related but not limited to” con-
cept here expands the sbu category to include most of governmental work: 
today, perhaps as much as 75 percent of nonclassified government informa-
tion could be designated as sbu. When fully deployed, the sbu category ef-
fectively expands national security to include any kind of information whose 
release might be inconvenient to the execution of state policy. When com-
bined with the mosaic theory of information risk, there is literally no aspect 
of governmental work that could not be conceptualized as an essential part 
of U.S. national security and thus seen as a threat if made public. Increas-
ingly, anticipatory defense trumps democratic process across governmental 
activities.
Indeed, the sbu category was aggressively mobilized by federal agencies as 
an antiterrorism provision in October 2001, as a means of protecting critical 
infrastructures (also a strategically vague term) from terrorist attack (Knezo 
2003, 25). From the perspective of the counterterror state, the value of sbu as 
a category is not only its ambiguity — as literally anything in the government 
can be separated from the public sphere, according to its logics — but also be-
cause there is no formal review process that citizens can use to challenge the 
designation of information as sbu. There is no federal agency charged with 
regulating the use of sbu or hearing appeals. It is therefore up to each federal 
agency, branch, office, and official to decide where to draw the line between 
public accountability and security, which allows near- infinite flexibility in 
standards and logics. If having basic information about governmental prac-
tices can be constituted as a threat, then sbu functions to blur the distinction 
between the citizen and the enemy. It also allows any kind of federal informa-
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tion to be marked for noncirculation, creating an expansive new category of 
withheld information located between the explicitly classified and the public.
Following the declassification campaigns of the immediate post – Cold 
War era, and the enormous democratization of access to information access 
enabled by the Internet in the 1990s, the early twenty- first century has thus 
witnessed a fundamental shift in the idea and mechanisms of openness and 
transparency in the United States. Indeed, a central part of the conversion of 
the United States from a countercommunist to a counterterror state has been 
an information strategy of increased classification and noncirculation, and 
also of censoring of the existing public record. The U.S. National Archives 
have become an explicit front line in the counterterror project, as historical 
records relating to presidential authority, war authorizations, intelligence on 
wmd issues, and other military matters going back to the start of the Cold 
War have been removed, and designated as either designated as sbu or reclas-
sified (isoo 2006).7 At least one million pages of previously declassified ma-
terials have been pulled from the National Archives since October 2001 (see 
Bass and Herschaft 2007). Thus, the historical formation, as well as the cur-
rent projects, of the security state haves been subject to expanding forms of 
censorship. Official fear of the terrorist, and of the wmd, has enabled a formal 
reconstitution of the security state as secret entity generating a wide range of 
covert actions within the United States and around the world. Secrecy in all 
its forms is a political tool, with the art of redaction an additional method for 
withholding information while complying with federal law (see figure 8.1).
Agreeing with every major official study of state secrecy in the past thirty 
years, William Arkin (2005, 12) argues that this level of secrecy is not only ex-
cessive but also profoundly damaging to a democracy, because it confuses the 
domestic politics of secrecy with efforts to protect military operations. Arkin 
notes, for example, that U.S. military activities operations that are easily rec-
ognized as such in the Middle East (from special operations to drone strikes) 
are nonetheless classified by the United States government, a state of affairs 
that serves only to keep U.S. citizens — not foreign nationals, military lead-
ers, or adversaries — in the dark (see also Sagan and Suri 2003, 150). Chalmers 
Johnson (2000), takes this insight a step further, by pointing out that the cia 
term “blowback” addresses not only the retaliatory consequences produced 
by U.S. covert actions at home and abroad, but also the damaging crucial do-
mestic effects of secrecy. Since U.S. covert operation actions are by definition 
unknown to U.S. citizens, then actions taken around the world in response to 
them are literally unintelligible to U.S. citizens. Secrecy works here in a dou-
8.1  “Endgame,” redacted page from a cia report on interrogation techniques  
(U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 2004).
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bled fashion to enable state actions that might not be supported if they were 
subjected to public debate while at the same time denying citizens a means 
of understanding the long- term political effects of U.S. global activities. In 
a counterterror state, blowback has several additional perverse effects: since 
U.S. citizens have no insight into U.S. covert actions around the world, retal-
iatory acts appear to the American public as without context and thus irra-
tional. And given that the premise of the War on Terror is that a “terrorist” is 
an irrational and inherently violent being who is dedicated to destroying the 
United States, blowback empowers yet another level of American misrecogni-
tion and fantasy: namely, that the United States is only a global military actor 
when provoked by irrationally violent attacks. As Joseba Zulaika (2009) has 
shown in great detail, terror produces terror, becoming a self- propagating 
circuit of fantasy, preemptive violence, and retaliation.
A similar observation was made by Daniel Moynihan (1998) in his post – 
Cold War review of official secrecy: he noted that the Cold War decision to 
keep the Venona intercepts of encrypted Soviet diplomatic communications 
classified to protect sources and methods in the 1950s actually worked pri-
marily to keep U.S. citizens in the dark about the true scale of Soviet espio-
nage in the United States, since the Soviets soon knew their code had been 
broken. Moynihan suggests that releasing the files before 1995 might have pre-
vented or reduced the profound political divide in American society over the 
nature of Soviet infiltration — as the Venona intercepts documented that there 
were, in fact, Soviet spies in the United States but nowhere near the numbers 
imagined by Senator Joseph McCarthy (see also Shils 1996, 13). Thus, secrecy 
produces political fetishes that can fundamentally distort a democratic public 
sphere. For example, the cia’s increasing use of drones for targeted killings 
in Pakistan and Afghanistan has been the subject of widespread reporting 
(by nongovernmental agencies and mass media) and even confirmed by both 
President Obama and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, yet the cia asserts 
in foia litigation that “the use (or non- use) of drones” is a “classified fact” and 
therefore not subject to any declassification claim.8
Jodi Dean (2002) argues that it is public recognition of state secrecy that 
enables a democracy to manage the split between what political life is sup-
posed to be and what it is believed to be, between its ideal type and its lived 
experience. She argues that recognition of state secrecy — and the accompa-
nying conspiratorial subtext to everyday life that it engenders — functions to-
day to block political participation and curtail the possibility of truly demo-
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cratic endeavors. Specifically, collective assumptions about the secret state 
(its capacities, interests, omnipotence) installs an ever- ready alibi for failed or 
stalled politics within the public sphere, allowing the fantasy of democracy 
to coexist within its distorted reality. In Dean’s view, citizens now work more 
passionately to locate and reveal the secret than to enact structural change 
through direct political action. The democratic state form, which formally 
claims to be both transparent and accountable, has been reduced, via the 
logic of the secret, to a fight over the terms of the visible and nonvisible rather 
than social progress. For Dean, engaging the secret therefore becomes an act 
of misrecognition for citizens, who assume that revealing the hidden is the 
means of organizing democratic politics rather than mobilizing for collective 
action and is the way to organize democratic politics. She suggests that the 
evocation of the secret and the call to reveal it have therefore become sur-
rogates for real politics in the United States — together constituting a fetish 
form that prevents the kind of collective mobilizations that enabled the social 
justice movements of past eras. Dean suggests, in short, that a belief in the 
secret constitutes the possibility of a democratic public — for if only citizens 
knew the state’s secrets, they could correct the obvious failings of the current 
political system and create a more perfect society — but it also installs a pub-
lic for which agency is therefore also endlessly deferred in the act of chasing 
greater transparency. But if an informed, democratically energized citizenry 
is the first victim of the elaborate system of secrecy in the United States, policy 
makers also suffer.
There is a remarkable moment in Daniel Ellsberg’s autobiography in which 
he describes a conversation with Henry Kissinger, who was then on the verge 
of becoming Secretary of State. Ellsberg, the rand analyst who eventually 
leaked the top- secret U.S. history of the Vietnam War known as the Pentagon 
Papers to the New York Times and the Washington Post (see Prados and Porter 
2004), attempts to prepare Kissinger for the psychological effects of having 
access to above top- secret information. He informs Kissinger that, over the 
coming years, he will feel, in the following order: exhilarated (at the access), 
foolish (for what he once thought he knew), contempt (for those who do not 
have access), and increasing skepticism (about the quality of classified infor-
mation). In the end, Ellsberg tells Kissinger (Ellsberg 2003, 237 – 38):
It will become hard for you to learn from anybody who doesn’t have these 
clearances. Because you’ll be thinking as you listen to them “What would 
this man be telling me if he knew what I know? Would he be giving me the 
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same advice, or would it totally change his predictions and recommenda-
tions?” And that mental exercise is so torturous that after a while you give it 
up and just stop listening. I’ve seen this with my superiors, my colleagues . . . 
and with myself. . . . You will deal with a person who doesn’t have those 
clearances only from the point of view of what you want him to believe 
and what impression you want him to go away with, since you’ll have to lie 
carefully to him about what you know. In effect, you will have to manipu-
late him. You’ll give up trying to assess what he has to say. The danger is, 
you’ll become something like a moron. You’ll become incapable of learn-
ing from most people in the world, no matter how much experience they 
may have in their particular areas that may be much greater than yours.
You become something like a moron. Ellsberg reveals here a rarely commented 
on aspect of compartmentalized secrecy: it relies not only on withholding in-
formation but also on lying. Individuals must lie in order to protect their own 
classification level in everyday interactions throughout the system, and thus, 
they distort their social relations to protect the system of secrecy. Knowledge 
itself thus becomes doubly corrupted: first, because of the effect of compart-
mentalization on perceptions of expert knowledge as described by Ellsberg, 
and second, because perception control becomes as important as informa-
tion management. Deception via classification becomes the internal structure 
of the security state, which over time works not to underscore the value of 
information — often the assumed goal effect of a system of compartmental-
ized classification — but rather to corrode the very terms of knowledge and 
expertise, making individual motivations and judgments also suspect.
The role of deception is crucial in the transformation of a democratic state 
into a security state, as the public good becomes absorbed into that of a secu-
rity apparatus that by definition seeks to extend its power and reproducibility. 
This logic is made visible by even a cursory look into the state secrets privilege 
in the United States — the tool whereby the security state blocks a legal pro-
ceeding to protect “national security interests.”
The states secret privilege was formally established in 1953 in the Supreme 
Court case United States v. Reynolds.9 After an Air Force b- 29 aircraft crashed 
near Marion, Georgia, in 1948, family members of the dead and injured sued 
the government for negligence, and sought declassification of the accident 
report to support their claim. The families won in lower courts, but lost on 
federal appeal in the Supreme Court. The air force argued that the b- 29 mis-
sion involved research on “secret electronic equipment” and that to release 
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any information about the crash would damage national security. This case 
set the precedent for a “state secrets” privilege in the United States, which has 
become a now standard federal tool for nullifying legal challenges on national 
security grounds. The family members, however, continued to push for re-
lease of the accident report via the Freedom of Information Act, receiving sev-
eral copies during the 1990s that were heavily redacted. Then, in 2000, they 
found an uncensored copy of the once- classified, and by then highly litigated, 
accident report on the Internet. It had been inadvertently released by the air 
force as part of a larger declassification of fifty- year- old records. The report 
made no mention of the “secret electronic equipment” that was the basis for 
the initial Supreme Court state secrets ruling, but it did document negligence 
in the maintenance of the aircraft and the training of the crew. Thus, the air 
force appears to have classified the report in 1948 not for national security 
reasons but rather to avoid liability for the accident. The families sued again 
to have the 1953 ruling overturned as fraud, and the Justice Department suc-
cessfully deployed the mosaic theory of secrecy to stop the legal proceedings: 
in essence, federal lawyers argued that it is impossible to understand today 
what seemingly innocuous bits of information might collectively have had 
national security implications in 1948, regardless of the initial Air Force argu-
ments (Fisher 2006, 203). It is crucial to recognize here that the foundational 
legal case for the state secrets privilege in the United States is grounded in 
deception rather than a principled theory of national security — illustrating 
how secrecy functions not only to protect information but to create new re-
alities and new forms of bureaucratic agency and protection. Since 2001, the 
state secrets privilege has been evoked to nullify judicial hearings in an ex-
ceptional number of high- profile cases, including the extraordinary rendi-
tion of a German citizen by the cia, retaliatory suits against whistle- blowers 
within the Federal Bureau of Investigation (fbi) and the air force, domestic 
data- mining operations in the United States, multiple cases involving the sur-
veillance of U.S. citizens without a legal warrant, and accusations of targeted 
killing of foreign nationals and Americans abroad (Chesney 2007; Garvey 
and Liu 2011). The states secrets privilege is a central tool of the counter-
terrorist state in managing threat perception as well as legal standing. It re-
veals the extraordinary power of the secrecy/threat matrix, which promises 
catastrophic consequences for a revelation of the secret while simultaneously 
classifying the considerations, evidence, and precedents supporting such an 
assessment.
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The Affects of Secrecy
The modern state form is, in many respects, founded on the assumption of 
secrecy. Michel Foucault (1995; 2003) has shown that the modern state main-
tains the right not only to keep secrets but also to subject its citizens to in-
creasingly minute forms of surveillance. The eighteenth- century logic of the 
panopticon is of a sovereign who sees without being seen, a formulation built 
literally into the architectural infrastructure of the prison and ultimately the 
mind of the prisoner. A similar logic is today replicated across U.S. digital 
surveillance activities on an unprecedented scale — creating a counterterror 
state that attempts to be completely hidden while rendering citizens com-
pletely transparent. Similarly, the modern project of population management 
involves a fine mesh of institutions devoted to measuring individuals and 
creating statistical portraits of citizens across a wide range of subjects, from 
health, to education, to the economy. Foucault charts a steady progression in 
the forms of knowledge, as well as the psychosocial intimacy of these state 
projects, from the overthrow of monarchal authority to the early twentieth- 
century nation- state, as the tools of surveillance and technologies of popula-
tion management steadily increase in both power and resolution. Thus, there 
has always been a profound separation between citizens and the state, and the 
practice of democratic politics has always been highly mediated by practices 
of secrecy. Yet, the kind of state produced in the aftermath of World War II 
in the United States — a nuclear- armed, global superpower — takes a core 
principle of the nation- state form, the use of secrecy in the name of collec-
tive security, and expands it into a totalizing structure that links all aspects 
of the state in a radical global counterformation. In this post – World War II 
system, secrecy becomes not just a technology of state power, a means of or-
chestrating policy and protecting state interests through the withholding of 
information, but also the basis for an entirely new kind of power: the ability 
to create new realities.
Specifically, in the nuclear age the idea of the secret knowledge becomes 
deployable on its own. Evoking the secret thus also becomes a means of 
claiming greater knowledge, expertise, and understanding than, in fact, is 
possible. How else do we explain the fantastic collective failure of the U.S. 
intelligence agencies to be attuned to the internal collapse of the Soviet Union 
in the late 1980s, even after generating nearly constant threat assessments of 
Soviet activities for four decades? How do we explain the constant tension 
within U.S. security culture over dissent in the United States and the fre-
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quent placing of nonviolent social activists into the category of the enemy? 
Secrecy has been enormously productive in terms of building and protect-
ing a military- industrial economy, but it has also created new perceptions 
of state power that affect government officials as well as citizens. The link-
age between the secret and the apocalyptic in the nuclear security state has 
transformed the citizen- state relationship both conceptually and in practice. 
The secrecy/threat matrix is, in this regard, ultimately a project of percep-
tion management, one that functions to create, protect, and project the idea 
of a “superpowered state.” Thus, the atomic bomb inaugurates a new kind 
of social contract in the United States, one that separates national security 
as a public discourse from state security as an institutional practice. It ulti-
mately grounds the power of the state in the perceived ability to destroy or 
be destroyed, rather than in the strength of its democratic institutions (see, 
for example, Armstrong 2002).
The wmd as a technological form has always promised apocalyptic conse-
quences if used in combat, but the idea of the “wmd,” its phantasmatic figu-
ration, has been equally powerful in U.S. security culture. By defending all 
state secrets as the equivalent of the atomic secret, the U.S. security state has 
increasingly consolidated and defined its power via threat designation and 
inflation. The counterterror state’s efforts to expand official secrecy along-
side its amplification of the wmd as the single greatest threat to the United 
States (see U.S. White House 2002) reveals one long- term effect of the Cold 
War secrecy/threat matrix: an official desire to close off citizens’ access to 
the state altogether, in the name of protecting the public. Official secrecy can 
now effectively restrict even the most banal forms of government information 
under the sbu category and mosaic theory concepts. These practices over-
turn the market logics of the information age, in which information made 
free was seen as a social good. The consequences of this information strategy 
are widespread in the United States, not only for systems of accountability 
but also for the sciences — in which self- censorship is increasingly sought for 
those working in fields of study that might have infrastructural, or military, 
or patent applications. Thus, the broader effect of these policies is to define 
the public sphere not as an inherent aspect of democratic order but as a fun-
damental risk to that very order, identifying rights that citizens should will-
ingly surrender for their personal safety. The extensive data collection of the 
National Security Agency after 2001, for example, has rendered every detail 
of American citizens’ digital lives a potential security concern in the name of 
counterterror. Indeed, what does it mean when the free flow of information 
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is the exception rather than the rule in a global superpower that is also a self- 
proclaimed democracy?
Finally, and importantly, the secret society that is the state is ultimately 
headless, an effect of both the systematic distortion in the believability of 
knowledge as it moves up the levels of a compartmentalized infrastructure 
and the demands on individuals to protect perceptions. Thus the secret is 
transformed over time in such a system: indeed, the “idea” of secret knowl-
edge itself becomes deployable, corrupting public understandings of what is 
possible and what is not, and giving those with executive authority the abil-
ity to seem more knowing then they actually are. Instead of limiting agency 
via protected knowledge, the secrecy/threat matrix empowers a new kind of 
agency, unrestrained by facts. In the lead- up to the invasion of Iraq in March 
2003, the Bush administration systematically deployed the idea that there 
were wmds in Iraq as well as an imminent threat to the United States, to en-
able war. Vice President Dick Cheney, for example, stated in a speech to the 
Veterans of Foreign Wars National Convention on August 26, 2002, that there 
was absolute certainty about the Iraqi threat (Cheney 2002): “Simply stated, 
there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruc-
tion. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against 
our allies, and against us. And there is no doubt that his aggressive regional 
ambitions will lead him into future confrontations with his neighbors — 
confrontations that will involve both the weapons he has today, and the ones 
he will continue to develop with his oil wealth.” There is no doubt. Here is the 
secrecy/threat matrix in action, for Cheney implies that the intelligence com-
munity has documented with perfect clarity not only the technical terms of 
the Iraqi biological, chemical, and nuclear programs but also the intent of the 
regime to use them “against our friends, against our allies, and against us.” 
This is not a deployment of actual knowledge, as the lack of any evidence of 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraqi after the invasion demonstrates, but it 
is a political deployment of a claim to secret knowledge.10
Secretary of State Colin Powell, in his historic presentation to the United 
Nations in February 2003, was even more exacting in his deployment of the 
secrecy/threat matrix.11 He portrayed an Iraqi biological weapons program 
that was so advanced, it was already capable of threatening the continental 
United States. Claiming to have sources within the Iraqi government, he pre-
sented cartoon diagrams of mobile weapons labs (see figure 8.2) and satellite 
imagery of “wmd” production facilities (see figure 8.3). Powell stated conclu-
sively (2003):
8.2  Iraqi mobile bioweapons laboratories, from Secretary of State Colin Powell’s 
presentation to the United Nations, February 2003 (Powell 2003).
8.3  Iraqi wmd sites, from Secretary of State Colin Powell’s presentation to the 
United Nations, February 2003 (Powell 2003).
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We know that Iraq has at least seven of these mobile, biological agent fac-
tories. The truck- mounted ones have at least two or three trucks each. 
That means that the mobile production facilities are very few — perhaps 18 
trucks that we know of. There may be more. But perhaps 18 that we know 
of. Just imagine trying to find 18 trucks among the thousands and thou-
sands of trucks that travel the roads of Iraq every single day.”
We know. This depiction of mobile “biological agent factories” effectively trans-
forms every truck in Iraq into a potential wmd laboratory, illustrating the 
phantasmatic power of the concept of the wmd when used by officials deploy-
ing secret knowledge.
But the nature of the threat becomes increasingly specific in Powell’s pre-
sentation, its very recitation of detail suggesting that even more exacting 
knowledge existed in the classified domain:
We know from Iraq’s past admissions that it has successfully weaponized 
not only anthrax, but also other biological agents, including botulinum 
toxin, aflatoxin, and ricin. But Iraq’s research efforts did not stop there. 
Saddam Hussein has investigated dozens of biological agents causing dis-
eases such as gas- gangrene, plague, typhus, tetanus, cholera, camelpox, and 
hemorrhagic fever. And he also has the wherewithal to develop smallpox.
We know. Powell claims that Iraq has the capability not only to weaponize bi-
ological weapons but also to deliver them via state- of- the- art technologies — 
 including unmanned aerial vehicles or drones:
The Iraqi regime has also developed ways to disperse lethal biological 
agents widely, indiscriminately into the water supply, into the air. For ex-
ample, Iraq had a program to modify aerial fuel tanks for Mirage jets. This 
video of an Iraqi test flight obtained by unscom [a United Nations Special 
Commission] some years ago shows an Iraqi f- 1 Mirage jet aircraft. Note 
the spray coming from beneath the Mirage. That is 2,000 liters of simu-
lated anthrax that a jet is spraying. In 1995, an Iraqi military officer, Muja-
hid Salleh Abdul Latif, told inspectors that Iraq intended the spray tanks 
to be mounted onto a mig- 21 that had been converted into an unmanned 
aerial vehicle, or uav. uavs outfitted with spray tanks constitute an ideal 
method for launching a terrorist attack using biological weapons.
That is simulated anthrax. Iraqi jets as well as drones are presented here as a 
means of threatening not only Middle Eastern states but also the home ter-
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ritories of the United States and United Kingdom, a fantastic claim given the 
distances involved. After this expansive portrait of Iraqi military capabilities, 
Powell concludes that the weapons inspectors have failed to find the “wmds” 
and that the threat from these weapons is immediate: “There can be no doubt 
that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly 
produce more, many more. And he has the ability to dispense these lethal 
poisons and diseases in ways that can cause massive death and destruction.” 
There can be no doubt. Powell’s cartoons and fuzzy pictures of industrial sites 
appear today, years after the invasion, not simply as a fabrication of knowl-
edge but rather as a tactical deployment of the idea of secret information, for 
his presentation was loaded with the promise that more detailed and exacting 
information existed, but that it could not be made public without putting U.S. 
interests at risk. Indeed, Powell began his presentation to the United Nations 
Security Council Assembly by stating: “I cannot tell you everything that we 
know, but what I can share with you, when combined with what all of us have 
learned over the years, is deeply troubling.”
This deployment of “secret” knowledge relied on the mechanisms and 
techniques of government that were initially established after World War II 
to protect information about the atomic bomb — which linked existential 
threat and covert knowledge production in a new way. The campaign to in-
vade Iraq also drew on culturally established forms of nuclear fear developed 
in the United States during the Cold War and cultivated for generations. We 
see here one result of a multigenerational system of state secrecy: a funda-
mental corruption in the terms of knowledge, where the idea of knowledge 
(imagined, projected, fantasized) replaces actual content as a means of en-
gaging the world. The “will to believe” (in Iraqi wmds and links between Sad-
dam Hussein and al Qaeda) by the Bush administration remains a stagger-
ing achievement of the counterterror state, but it was only enabled as official 
policy by the structural effects of compartmentalized secrecy, which worked 
to limit debate, discount all alternative sources of information, and discredit 
and politicize any course of action short of war. It was not a lack of good in-
telligence that led to the invasion of Iraq in 2003; rather, it was the long- term 
corrosive effects of a compartmentalized and politicized worldview on the 
very possibility of governance. The secrecy/threat matrix is a core tool in the 
War on Terror, but it has also been revealed to be a highly overdetermined 
form, one that functions to fundamentally distort both expertise and knowl-
edge.12 And in a counterterror state where knowledge itself is rendered either 
suspect or irrelevant, only fear, desire, and ideology remain as the basis for 
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action in a world constituted as full of emergent and proliferating existential 
dangers.
Notes
This chapter is excerpted and revised from an article first published in Public 
Culture (22:3) and later appearing in expanded form in The Theater of Opera-
tions: National Security Affect from the Cold War to the War on Terror (2014).
1 Indeed, the cultural, institutional, and environmental effects of the bomb have 
been installed very deeply in American society precisely because they are to 
a large degree constitutive of it after 1945 (Masco 2006; Masco 2014). See also 
Schwartz (1998), Wills (2010), and Priest and Arkin (2011).
2 President Bush signed Executive Order 13292 in 2003 — which permitted classi-
fication of “scientific, technological, or economic matter related to the national 
security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism” (Bush 2003). 
For reviews of secrecy policy in the Bush administration, see Knezo 2003 and the 
detailed report prepared by Representative Henry Waxman (U.S. House 2004).
3 See OpenTheGovernment.org (2005a; 2005b) for a detailed assessment of the 
first George W. Bush administration’s record on secrecy.
4 See U.S. Information Security Oversight Office (isoo 2004a; 2004b). For an as-
sessment of the Obama administration’s record on secrecy of openness, see Af-
tergood (2013).
5 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub.L. 107- 296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002), sec. 896.
6 American Civil Liberties Union et al. v. Department of Defense et al., U.S. District 
Court for Southern District of New York, 04 Civ. 4151 (akh), 2005. See also Hersh 
(2004), Benjamin (2006), and Roberts (2006, 51 – 54).
7 For a detailed discussion and analysis of the reclassification program in the Na-
tional Archives and Records Administration, see Aid (2006).
8 See alcu v. cia, No. 11- 5320, 2013 wl 1003688 (DC Cir. 2013), Document #1377008, 
June 4, 2012, 6.
9 345 U.S. 1 (1953). For a detailed history of the case, as well as an analysis of the 
state secrets privilege in the United States, see Fisher (2006).
10 Cheney has long argued that a president should not be fully informed about 
covert actions, to enable plausible deniability in public statements. As vice presi-
dent, he found various ways of restricting briefing information (including reduc-
ing the daily national intelligence estimate to a single page) for President Bush 
(Suskind 2006, 173 – 75; see also Gellman 2008).
11 For a transcript of his presentation to the United Nations, as well as images from 
his slide presentation, see Colin Powell (2003). For a detailed assessment of the 
biological weapons claims in Powell’s presentation, see Kathleen Vogal (2008).
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12 The categories “for official use only” and “sensitive but unclassified” have recently 
been replace by the term “controlled unclassified information,” an official effort to 
reduce the number of information management markings in the federal govern-
ment that does not change the core logic of the sbu designation (Obama 2010).
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NINE
What Do You Want?
Evidence and Fantasy in the War on Terror
Joseba Zulaika
My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid 
sources. These are not assertions. What we’re giving you are facts and con-
clusions based on solid intelligence” — thus began Secretary of State Collin 
Powell his February 5, 2003, debriefing at the United Nations Security Coun-
cil, with the tapestry reproduction of Picasso’s Guernica behind him covered 
up with a blue curtain (Powell 2003). He was about to provide evidence of 
Saddam Hussein’s possession of weapons of mass destruction before going 
to war with Iraq. At the outset Powell established the axiomatic nexus that 
should concern everyone; he had come, he said, “to share with you what the 
United States knows about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction as well as Iraq’s 
involvement in terrorism.” Then he immersed himself in enlisting a plethora 
of facts for what was, he insisted emphatically, irrefutable evidence. The in-
formation came from a variety of sources from various countries, including 
testimonies from various people, taped conversations among Iraqi officials 
“
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detailing their deceptive practices, maps and photos showing the hiding of 
chemicals from inspectors in dozens of sites. A teaspoon of anthrax was all 
that it took to create panic in Washington the week after 9/11, Powell stated 
matter- of- factly while raising with his right hand a vial of simulated anthrax; 
Hussein was in possession of twenty- five thousand liters of anthrax, plus a 
stockpile of several hundreds of tons of chemical agents. Hussein’s nuclear 
program included the development of ballistic missiles and drones. Previ-
ously, in his January 2003 State of the Union speech, President George W. 
Bush had left little doubt as to Husseiń s nuclear ambitions: “The British gov-
ernment has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quanti-
ties of uranium from Africa.” Powell’s conclusion as to Hussein’s possession 
of wmds was definitive and undisputable. And there was more: “I cannot tell 
you everything that we know,” Powell added.
But possession of wmds by Hussein was not in itself the worst. “Our con-
cern is not just about these illicit weapons,” Powell went on to the heart of 
the matter. “It’s the way that these illicit weapons can be connected to terror-
ists and terrorist organizations that have no compunction about using such 
devices against innocent people around the world.” He linked Hussein to 
various terrorist organizations, including the “decades long experience with 
respect to ties between Iraq and Al Qaida,” an organization that “continues to 
have a deep interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction.” The conclu-
sion was unavoidable: “Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of 
mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option. Not in a 
post – September 11th world.”
The Real, the Bluff, and the Passion for Evidence
It was an impressive performance by the secretary of state while commanding 
the world’s attention. Powell had deployed to the fullest the “secrecy/threat 
matrix” at the core of the counterterror state (Masco 2014, 144). Soon the 
United States invaded Iraq; the expectations for finding the concealed weap-
ons of mass destruction were high. Anyone reading a liberal newspaper such 
as the New York Times could only have an unmistakable sense that Hussein 
possessed or was about to possess a frightening arsenal of weapons of mass 
destructions. The paper was so convinced that a front page piece by Judith 
Miller was entitled “U.S. Experts Find Radioactive Material in Iraq.”1
Except that there were no weapons of mass destruction to be found in 
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Iraq. The long list of facts brought by Powell, as well as all the media’s feeding 
into the imminent expectations of finding such weapons, amounted to no 
evidence whatsoever. The false narrative had all been based on fantasy. But 
by then the United States had committed itself to an “asymmetric warfare” 
in which for years it would spend in each single hour in Iraq the equivalent 
of the total of al Qaeda financial resources (Singer 2009, 271). If the invest-
ment in nuclear weapons since 1940 is estimated in $5.8 trillion (Masco 2006, 
336), the tag for the War on Terror, according to Brown University’s Watson 
Institute, is $4.4 trillion.
The facts enlisted by Powell at the United Nations (the aluminum tubes, 
the vial of anthrax, testimonies by defectors, and so on) were real facts even 
if their value as evidence of wmds was soon demolished. How was this “evi-
dence” assembled and believed? One component that the intelligence services 
did not know at the time, and which was made known years later to the public 
on July 2, 2009, was that, based on cia’s interviews with him, evidence had 
in fact been planted by Hussein himself to keep his regional enemies at bay. 
Thus, a critical “evidence” was that Hussein actually had been bluffing. Such a 
hall of mirrors between real and pretended intentions is central to the murky 
semantic space created between terrorism and counterterrorism. The inabil-
ity to sort out real threat from bluff makes those espousing counterterrorism 
vulnerable to be fooled into a catastrophic course of events.
The logical status of Powell’s assertions about Hussein’s future acts is rem-
iniscent for the anthropologist of the one displayed by the Azande oracular 
revelations: “Oracular revelations are not treated as hypothesis and, since 
their sense derives from the way they are treated in their context, they there-
fore are not hypotheses. They are not a matter of intellectual interest but the 
main way in which Azande decide how they should act. We might say that the 
revelation has the logical status of an unfulfilled hypothetical” (Winch 1977, 
88). Nor does Powell consider his projections about Hussein’s future course 
of action hypotheticals but as about- to- happen unfulfilled certainties. In fact, 
a mantra constantly heard about nuclear terrorism is based on ruling out 
hypotheticals — “it is not if but when.” Only actual events can be perceived by 
the senses, yet fantasy or magical thinking provides the explanation for future 
events. Since knowledge of the future evil of witchcraft or terrorism is hard to 
come by, one needs arcane and secret means for obtaining it.
Powell’s evidence at the United Nations, and others we will examine 
below, in all their historic gravity, should be placed at the nexus of history 
and fiction. A model for such nexus can be found in Terry Castle’s discussion 
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of the famous ghost story An Adventure (1911), written by Charlotte Moberly 
and Eleanor Jourdain, two well- educated and proper women who recounted 
in great detail how they, while visiting Versailles as tourists, saw a lady who 
was none other than Marie Antoinette. She observes the following about the 
intense interest aroused by the book: “The prime symptom of Adventure- 
mania was a passion for invoking ‘evidence’ ” (Castle 1991, 30). It is enough 
of a problem to explain how someone might see a ghost, but the issue gets 
multiplied when two see the same delusion, which leads Castle to investigate 
the nature of collective hallucinations and invoke Sigmund Freud’s lament 
that we still possess “no explanation of the nature of suggestion” (quoted in 
Castle 1991, 12) and of ideological transference in general. Such “passion for 
invoking evidence,” when there was none, is also evident in Powell’s testimony 
and raises issues of how the “contagious folly” of a nonexistent threat could 
be shared by so many. Hence the deployment of the modern notion of fantasy 
becomes relevant to grasp counterterrorist culture and the risks it may entail 
to global security. In the opposition between dream and reality, fantasy is on 
the side of reality; in the way psychoanalysts understand it, fantasy is what 
gives consistency to what we call reality.
Sociologists and anthropologists have long studied the crucial role of the 
Durkheimian “collective representations”: ideas, beliefs, values, and emotions 
elaborated and held collectively by a society. Historians likewise are used to 
speak “of the realm of imaginary representations, a realm that also has a 
history, fed not by ‘facts’ alone but also by ‘interpretations’ ” (Vidal- Naquet 
1991, 328). But while “representation” is the subjective mode of actual realities, 
imagination per se, in its inconstancy of form, may represent nothing and 
be just fantasy. This chapter’s approach to terrorism — that most factual and 
traumatically realistic discourse in the current political discourse — examines 
the phenomenon as a case of collective representation and views its evidence 
as filtered through the framework of fantasy.
What Do You Want to Hear? Guantánamo Evidence
“Is the story true?,” the torturer asks the Guantánamo inmate Mohamedou 
Ould Slahi about the confession extracted from him after months of torture. 
“I don’t care as long as you are pleased. So if you want to buy, I am selling,” 
Slahi replies (Slahi 2015, 292).2
Slahi is one of the hundreds of people who were taken to Guantánamo with 
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no record of wrongdoing. A native of Mauritania and with an engineering 
degree from the University of Duisburg in Germany, Slahi proved to be 
one of the many instances of misplaced identity in which a supposedly big 
fish, after years of harrowing torture, provided no valuable information, his 
case ultimately dropped for lack of evidence. Lt. Col. Stuart Couch refused 
to prosecute him because his incriminating statements had been obtained 
through torture. Judge James Robertson granted Slahi habeas corpus and 
ordered his release in April 2010.3 The Department of Justice appealed the 
decision, and Slahi was kept in custody until October 17, 2016. In 2005 Slahi 
wrote a Dantesque document, Guantánamo Diary, the narration of his years 
of torture in the hands of the United States.
After a lawsuit filed by the Associated Press for his transcripts and the 
pressure of his attorneys, Slahi’s memoir was declassified by the U.S. gov-
ernment and finally published with many redactions in 2015. If the histo-
rian Carlo Ginzburg “learned to read witchcraft trials as texts, which pro-
vided direct evidence of the inquisitors and lay judges behind them, as well 
as some indirect and usually distorted evidence on the defendants” (1991, 321), 
similarly Slahi’s diary provides extraordinary proof of what type of evidence 
counterterrorist knowledge and policy is based upon, but most important 
evidence of the level of fantasy and delirium of the torturers themselves.
Central to Slahi’s experience is, in his own expression, the “endless catch- 22” 
in which he is unbearably caught (214).4 His interrogators want information, 
which he does not possess. Frequently he is unable to open his mouth because 
of the swollen lips; he finds himself bleeding from his mouth, ankles, wrists, 
nose; at times the superior orders the torturer to stop because, Slahi said, the 
superior “was afraid of the paperwork that would result in case of my death” 
(214). At one point a team takes him into a high- speed boat through the sea to 
simulate some kind of execution. He will have to be willing to tell them what 
they want to hear, but he will have to build a narrative that becomes credible. 
Slahi is most lucid in showing how difficult such task is: “Had I done what 
they accused me of, I would have relieved myself on day one. But the prob-
lem is that you cannot just admit to something you haven’t done; you need to 
deliver the details, which you can’t when you hadn’t done anything. It’s not 
just, ‘Yes, I did!’ No, it doesn’t work that way: you have to make up a complete 
story that makes sense to the dumbest dummies. One of the hardest things 
to do is to tell an untruthful story and maintain it, and that is exactly where I 
was stuck” (232). It has to be a plausible lie that makes sense, and this requires 
an entire narrative, for “fantasy is the primordial form of narrative, which 
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serves to occult some original deadlock” (Žižek 1997, 11). In order to placate 
the torturers, he has to dress his lie in a story that must look plausible, other-
wise the catch- 22 gets transferred to the torturers themselves, who will end up 
realizing in anger that he is “lying” when he is confessing and is “telling the 
truth” when he admits to his making up the evidence. Believing Slahi’s tale 
was made more difficult because by then the interrogators knew that most of 
the Guantánamo inmates had no terrorist past.
The torturers were not getting the collaboration they wanted from Slahi, 
and at one point he was transferred to a special torture unit. This is how 
Slahi is providing his evidence: “I was literally in terror. For the next seventy 
days I wouldn’t know the sweetness of sleeping: interrogation 24 hours a day, 
three and sometimes four shifts a day. I rarely got a day off. I don’t remember 
sleeping one night quietly. ‘If you start to cooperate you’ll have some sleep 
and hot meals.’ xxxx used to tell me repeatedly” (218). The interrogators al-
lege that another top terrorist confessed that he had been recruited by Slahi 
for the September attack. After the seventy days and nights of torture, Slahi 
is taken to a “far faraway secret place” (267) to continue the interrogation — a 
place where no sleep was allowed and where “all the guards were masked with 
Halloween- like masks, and so were the Medics” (271). The guards keep their 
names secret from the inmates. All Slahi wants is to die. He starts to halluci-
nate and hear voices day and night. Slahi’s “confession” will finally take place, 
and the torturers will be “happy” that they got the “evidence” they looked for.
“Confessions are like the beads of a necklace: if the first head bead falls, 
the rest follow” (275), Slahi notes in reference to the fact that an admission of 
culpability is the easy thing; what follows, establishing an entire detailed nar-
rative that will satisfy the imagination of the torturer and incriminate people 
you don’t know, is the hard part: “I had no crimes to confess to, and that is 
exactly where I got stuck with my interrogators. . . . But through my conversa-
tions with the fbi and the DoD, I had a good idea as to what wild theories the 
government had over me” (275). Slahi has to admit that “obviously there is no 
way out with you guys.” The torturer replies: “I’m telling you how!” Slahi gives 
in: “Now, thanks to the unbearable pain I was suffering, I had nothing to lose, 
and I allowed myself to say anything to satisfy my assailants. Session followed 
session since I called xxxx” (278). The interrogators are “very happy” (). 
Slahi notes: “I answered all the questions he asked me with incriminating 
answers. I tried my best to make myself look as bad as I could, which is ex-
actly the way you can make your interrogator happy. I made my mind up to 
spend the rest of my life in jail. You see most people can put up with being 
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imprisoned unjustly, but nobody can bear agony day in and day out for the 
rest of his life” (278).
The false information could all be easily checked out and disproved, but 
ignorance of facts becomes a condition for the fantasy narrative. The tortur-
ers imposed an actual taboo about admitting ignorance: “Whenever I thought 
about the words, ‘I don’t know,’ I got nauseous, because I remembered the 
words of xxxx, ‘All you have to say is, ‘I don’t know, I don’t remember, and 
we’ll fuck you!’ Or xxxx: ‘We don’t want to hear your denials anymore!’ And 
so I erased these words from my dictionary” (280). He is asked to write his 
answers, which deserve congratulatory comments: “You’re very generous in 
your written answers; you even wrote a whole bunch about xxxx, who you 
really don’t know,” xxxx accurately said, forgetting that he forbade me to 
use the words ‘I don’t know’ ” (280). There is no negative in the unconscious, 
Freud famously wrote. The difference between a factual narrative and a fan-
tasy narrative is that there is no negative limit; everything is possible in the 
realm of fantasy. Demanding information, while forbidding the statement “I 
don’t know,” is the de facto ordering of a fantasy narrative.
The interrogators are happy with Slahi’s cooperation. But they want the 
whole truth, and such guarantee presents real problems of certification. “I 
think you have provided 85 percent of what you know, but I’m sure you’ve 
gonna provide the rest” (289). He is told his story about Canada doesn’t make 
sense:
“So what would make sense?” I asked.
“You know exactly what makes sense,” he said sardonically.
“You’re right, I was wrong about Canada. What I did exactly was . . .”
“I want you to write down what you’ve just said. It made perfect sense 
and I understood, but I want it on paper.”
“My pleasure, Sir!” I said. (290)
Slahi writes down exactly what they have voiced to him for years now. 
“I came to Canada with a plan to blow up the cn Tower in Toronto. . . .” 
(290) [a tower he had never heard about before Guantánamo]. The inter-
rogator is happy:
“This statement makes perfect sense.”
“If you’re ready to buy, I am selling,” I said. (291)
But in the end Slahi’s catch- 22 gets transferred to the torturers themselves: 
how can they know that the confessed evidence is anything but the blowback 
of their own fantasy? If the interrogators really wants to know the facts, it 
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should be relatively easy to prove that the fabricated narrative is false in many 
facts of substance and detail. Thus the process will require a further stage in 
which they will have to keep torturing Slahi to see if they can sort out when 
the man is lying and when not. “If we discover that you lied to us, you’ve 
gonna feel our wrath” (288), they tell him. After he gives false testimony 
against a Canadian, the torturer comes back to him: “I talked today with the 
Canadians and they told me they don’t believe your story about xxxx being 
involved in drug smuggling into the U.S.” (282) [Two years later he is relieved 
to learn that the man incriminated by him was in fact released].
Slahi is the incarnation of the famous Lacanian “Che vuoi?” (What Do 
You Want?). He provides them the tale they want to hear. But not everyone 
is happy with buying the confession extracted under torture; one of the tor-
turers “doubted the truthfulness of the story” (291). He is asked whether the 
story he is telling is true: “if you want to buy, I am selling.” The torturers find 
this disconcerting: “But we have to check with the other agencies, and if the 
story is incorrect, they’re gonna find out.” At this point, since he has already 
“sold” them whatever information they wanted, and knowing his fate has 
been sealed, Slahi is even willing to sell them the truth: “ ‘If you want the 
truth, this story didn’t happen,’ I said sadly” (292). This provokes the fury of 
the torturers: “xxxx came back harassing me and threatening me with all 
kinds of suffering and agony.” Not only do the torturers have to believe the 
story they are hearing from Slahi; he himself has to pretend to believe it or else 
“the radically intersubjective character of fantasy” (Žižek 1997, 8) gets lost. 
Slahi and his tormentors had to come to some kind of agreement by which, 
while he plays the role of “the- one- who- knows,” the torturers have to be “the- 
ones- who- believe” his stories.
As if to reassure themselves they didn’t hear “the truth,” Slahi is ordered 
to write more about his Canadian plot. After all, “You know, nobody really 
knows what we’re doing here. Only a few people in the government know 
about it. . . . The President reads the files of some detainees. He reads your 
case” (318). The torturers want to believe that the confession reflecting their 
own fantasy will become a true narrative that can hold up for everyone, 
including the president. As to Slahi, in his answers to his torturers — Che 
vuoi? — making up the tales was not the hardest part; it was having to believe 
them himself in order not to ruin the intersubjective nature of the fantasy 
narrative.
Confronted with their doubts, at one point the torturers take the strategy 
of hypothesizing:
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“Let’s talk hypothetically. You understand hypothetical?” xxxx said.
“Yes, I do.”
“Let’s assume you’ve done what you confessed to.”
“But I haven’t.”
“Just let’s assume.”
“Okay.” I said. . . .
“Between you and xxxx, who was in charge?”
[Slahi adopts the frame of “let’s assume this is true” and makes up a 
reply.] “’It depends: in the mosque I was in charge, and outside he was in 
charge,” I answered. The question assumed that Hanachi and I are mem-
bers of a gang, but I didn’t even know Mr. xxxx, let alone conspire with 
him as part of a corps that never existed. But anyway I could not tell 
something like that to xxxx. I had to tell him something that made me 
look bad.
“Have or haven’t you conspired with those individuals as you 
admitted?”
[Slahi shifts to the frame “this is true.”] “You want the truth?”
“Yes!”
“No, I haven’t,” I said. (294 – 95)
The torturers are enraged to be caught up in the schizophrenic mirror of 
made- up truth/lie Slahi offers them in reflection of their own fantasy. The 
torturers “tried to play all kinds of tricks on me. . . . They drove me into the in-
famous catch- 22: If I lie to them, ‘You’ll feel our wrath.’ And if I tell the truth, 
it will make me look good, which would make them believe I am withholding 
information because in their eyes i am a criminal and I wasn’t yet able to 
change that opinion” (295). Now that after years of torture he has agreed to tell 
them what they wanted to hear, they’d like their fantasy to be true. The search 
for truth reaches its surreal climax when they subject him to a lie detector test. 
Slahi’s lie is what the torturers wanted in order to confirm the truth of their 
own fantasy; Slahi’s truth (his total innocence) was the ultimate blow to the 
torturer’s fantasy framework. Could it be that a lie detector might get them 
out of their own catch- 22 by proving beyond doubt that in fact Slahi did take 
part in all the terrorist plots he confessed to, that his confession is after all 
true, that he himself believes his own confession? The answers Slahi provided 
are erased in the book.
The interaction between Slahi and his torturers conforms to the seman-
tic situation studied by Gregory Bateson in his seminal essay “A Theory of 
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Play and Fantasy.” His argument is that a paradoxical frame similar to Epi-
menides’s paradox (the Cretan who said “All Cretans lie” — if he was telling 
the truth he was lying, and vice versa) obtains in play and fantasy, situations 
that he diagrams as ruled by the premise “All statements within this frame are 
untrue” (Bateson 1973). The self- contradictory nature of the premise forces 
that if a statement is true, then it must be false, and if it false, then it must be 
true, which was Slahi’s predicament. Tyranny could be defined as a situation 
in which the tyrant is allowed to “play” with the laws while imposing his own 
fantasy over the objective facts.
The catch- 22 in which Slahi is caught extends to his emotions; he suffers 
the Stockholm Syndrome regarding his own torturers. As one of them leaves 
Guantánamo, Slahi finds himself crying in the cell “as if I’d lost xxxx, and 
not someone whose job was to hurt me and extract information in an end- 
justifies- the- means way. I both hated and felt sorry for myself for what was 
happening to me” (320). Such emotional attachment surprised the interroga-
tors, who made sure to remind him, despite his emotions, that he is a “crimi-
nal” after all (320). Among the many redactions in each page of Guantánamo 
Diary, there is one that surprised its editor Larry Siems: the deletion by the 
army of the word “tears” in Slahi’s statement, tears provoked by the mention 
of his family (229). But deleting “tears” makes perfect sense, for such emo-
tional expression humanizes Slahi in stark dissonance with the treatment 
they gave him as an animal. Slahi was repeatedly told: “Looks like a dog, 
walks like a dog, smells like a dog, barks like a dog, must be a dog” to which 
he adds the comment: “I know I am not a dog, but yet I must be one” (276). 
In a replica of Pier Paolo Pasolini’s Saló, the photos of tortured people at 
Abu Ghraib showed them on a leash and making them walk like dogs. And 
once you have turned the prisoner into a terrorist beast, not only are you free 
to torture him indefinitely but also, why not, practice bestiality with him, a 
caged and defenseless animal, while others watch the session from a moni-
toring room. Slahi narrates how two female officers take off their blouses and 
force him “to take part in a sexual threesome in the most degrading man-
ner” (230), something that is “hurtful” to his sex. Once Slahi had been turned 
fully into an animal to be hunted, tortured, fucked, and executed, put a tear 
in his face and such evidence breaks the entire fantasy narrative based on his 
bestiality. The censor of the Diary is willing to allow the reader know that 
they abused the dog physically and sexually, but never that Slahi could feel 
pity and shed a tear. William Blake wrote: “A tear is an intellectual thing”; 
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counterterrorism could be defined as the prohibition of the statement “A tear 
is a terrorist thing.”
In the end, as Morris D. Davis, a retired air force colonel and the chief 
prosecutor of the military commissions at Guantánamo from September 
2005 to October 2007, put it in a piece entitled “Guantánamo’s Charade of 
Justice,” it is not just al Qaeda leaders but the American legal system that 
is on trial, his conclusion being that “Guantánamo has come to symbolize 
torture and indefinite detention, and its court system has been discredited” 
by the evidence of a “litany of failure” (Davis 2015). Eleven years passed by 
since Slahi wrote his Diary and six years since Judge Robertson ordered his 
release in April 2010. And yet Slahi was still in Guantánamo, still guilty of his 
torturers’ deliriums, until October of 2016. Slahi’s case shows the true body 
of evidence — the ultimate indictment of the counterterror state’s framework 
of delusional fantasy. As John le Carré put it with rigorous precision, “A vi-
sion of hell, beyond Orwell, beyond Kafka: perpetual torture prescribed by 
the mad doctors of Washington.”5
Guantánamo as Counterterrorism’s Fundamental Fantasy
Secretary Powell’s chief of staff and the man who helped Powell prepare his 
speech at the United Nations, Col. Lawrence Wilkerson, wrote in a sworn 
statement that, by the end of August 2002 President Bush, Vice President 
Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and others knew that of the 
initial 742 inmates, “the vast majority of Guantánamo detainees were inno-
cent . . . [and] that there was a lack of any useable evidence for the great ma-
jority of them” (Wilkerson 2010). A study by Seton Hall University Law pro-
fessors profiling 517 Guantanamo inmates found that 8 percent of them were 
characterized as al Qaeda fighters and “that U.S. forces ‘purchased’ 95 per-
cent of those in Guantánamo from Afghan warlords and others who turned 
in alleged al Qaeda and Taliban for a bounty” (Wright and Dixon 2008, 133).
How can we grasp the stark fact that the U.S. counterterrorist security 
state willingly subjected hundreds of innocent prisoners it knew were inno-
cent to the harshest of tortures for a period of years while providing a charade 
of military justice? President Obama promised to close it as soon as he took 
office but was unable to do so in eight years as president. Why the neces-
sity of Guantánamo? A key answer is: Guantánamo offered the fundamental 
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fantasy necessary to provide consistency to the U.S counterterrorist culture 
and security state. It was proof that “the worst of the worst” were being kept 
under control and punished. The general public, impervious to news that by 
and large the inmates had been apprehended for bounty and were innocent, 
overwhelmingly approved of it and continues to do so. Dismantling Guantá-
namo as a tyrannical farce would imply that counterterrorism was left bereft 
of its enemy’s core fetish.
The obscenity of innocent inmates knowingly kept in Guantánamo while 
interrogators put on a show of searching for “evidence” of terrorism can be 
illustrated with another equally Dantesque Guantánamo diary, Murat Kur-
naz’s Five Years of My Life (2007). Born in Bremen, Germany, Kurnaz married 
a Muslim woman from Turkey and decided to go for two months to the Ma-
sura Center in Lahore, Pakistan, to learn what he needed to be a good Muslim 
husband. As he was to return to Germany on December 1, 2001, he was ar-
rested in Peshawar, Pakistan. He was taken first to Kandahar and then Guan-
tánamo. Like most prisoners in Guantánamo, he had been sold for a bounty 
of three thousand dollars. Kurnaz writes of grisly images of inmates with legs 
and fingers amputated as well as people killed in Kandahar and Guantánamo 
as the result of torture; he describes in harrowing detail how close he came to 
death on several occasions. The hope for him was that he would find an inter-
rogator who would listen to his evidence; in the end it should have been quite 
easy to check the facts of his life in Germany and verify he had conducted an 
ordinary life and was by no means a terrorist.
The stark fact was that, in the words of his attorney, “the U.S. government 
knew of his innocence as early as 2002 (just six months into his detention), 
even as it continued, cynically, to argue that Murat was an ‘enemy combat-
ant’ ” (Azmy 2007, 240). For five years of interrogation the United States would 
pretend to be either in search or in possession of “evidence” to subject him to 
the most extreme, life- threatening forms of torture. Survival at all costs was 
Kurnaz’s goal, and for this he held on to his faith and to the hope that some-
one would check the bare facts of his life. One day he comes to the realization 
that “they had known everything about me from the very beginning. They 
weren’t interested in the fact that I had never been to Afghanistan and was 
innocent. I didn’t stand a chance” (Kurnaz 2007, 144).6
But the pretense of the search for evidence has to continue in order to 
make sense of the torture, and the questions become more and more absurd: 
the color of his shoes in Bremen, what brand of shirt he preferred, confirma-
tion of his birth certificate, the correct spelling of his name. German inter-
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rogators, who must have known of his innocence, arrive in Guantánamo in 
search of “evidence they could use to accuse me of some crime” (173). The in-
terrogators accuse him of lying; “you know everything about me,” he protests. 
“We have our own evidence,” they reply (175).
In September 2004, after almost three years of living literally in a cage 
of six feet by seven, and two years after U.S. officials knew he was innocent, 
Kurnaz was taken to a tribunal that is going to determine whether he is an 
enemy combatant. Two weeks later the judge read his ruling that he was a 
dangerous enemy combatant on the grounds that he belonged to al Qaeda, the 
evidence being his friendship with a friend from Bremen, Selçuk Bilgin, who 
allegedly became a suicide bomber; a second charge was that he belonged to 
Jama’at al- Tablighi because he had lived with that group (the Tablighi are an 
avowedly pacifist and apolitical group). As if the absurdity of blaming Kur-
naz for his former friendship with a suicide bomber whose attack took place 
eighteen months after he was in Guantánamo was not enough, the reality was 
that Selçuk Bilgin lived in Bremen and had not immolated himself. A phone 
call would have been enough to check these facts. But that would imply the 
military tribunal had to give up their fantasy narrative that the man they had 
tortured to the extreme for years could be anything but a terrorist.
Later in 2005 and 2006 the Administrative Review Board would take an-
other look at his case and conclude that “the defendant was captured in Tora 
Bora in Afghanistan where he was leading a group of Taliban guerrillas. He 
is considered an enemy combatant and will be kept in Guantánamo.” When 
he replied that they had known for five years that he was arrested in Paki-
stan, not Afghanistan, the head of the tribunal stood his ground: “That’s what 
we’ve concluded from the evidence” (217).
In January 2005 Judge Joyce Green ruled that the Guantánamo detain-
ees were entitled to due process rights and could challenge their detention. 
She mentioned in particular Kurnaz’s case, her conclusion being that his de-
tention was unlawful (Azmy 2007, 248). But the government appealed Judge 
Green’s decision, which was later upheld by the Supreme Court. In the mean-
time Kurnaz’s attorney, Baher Azmy, found himself in the position of having 
to go to Germany in March 2005 to shame the government into negotiating 
his release by publicizing his Guantánamo torture. Kurnaz, who though he 
was born and lived all his life in Germany was not technically a German citi-
zen, would find out not only that the Americans had been willing to release 
him in 2002 when they decided he was innocent, but also that “the German 
government apparently didn’t want to let me reenter the country, and claimed 
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that my residency permit had expired” (234). It would take another fifteen 
months before the new Chancellor Angela Merkel would plead with President 
Bush and obtain his release.
Kurnaz’s innocence was a known fact that the U.S. officials and interroga-
tors had to render into an unknown in order to continue with their search for 
evidence in their show of justice. The ultimate evidence was that to give con-
sistency to their counterterrorist reality they had to stick to their fantasy re-
garding Guantánamo and the terroristic and beastly nature of their inmates. 
President George Bush released 532 detainees; Obama released 161, and of 
the 61 remaining in August of 2016, 20 were cleared for transfer if there were 
countries willing to take them. The prospect of closing Guantánamo created 
an alarm among the Republicans in the House, who in September passed a 
bill with 244 votes in support of representative Jackie Walorski’s view that 
“Americans are safer with these dangerous detainees securely locked up.”7 
The very prison that became internationally an emblem of American lawless-
ness and brutality, its orange jumpsuits adopted by the Islamic State while 
depicting the execution of Westerners, is also the emblem that is needed to 
sustain the fundamental fantasy of safety from terrorism.
Like Sheer Fantasy”: Intentionality as Evidence
Terrorism is by now the most routine of news. Take the recurrent thwarted 
terrorist plot opening up the afternoon cable newscast. We have been in-
formed about dozens of terrorism plots foiled in the United States and else-
where since 9/11.8 No one can take lightly these frightening news; and yet, are 
these arrests evidence that reveal the existence of actual terrorism plots? Take 
the Washington Metro bombing plot, the New York subway plot, the plot to 
blow the Sears Tower, the one to bomb a Portland Christmas tree lighting: 
what they all have in common with dozens more across the nation is that 
they were in fact organized and led by the fbi — they were sting operations. 
What the frightened viewer doesn’t know is that in fact there was no real 
risk in the alleged plot, that it was essentially an elaborate ploy by the fbi to 
catch some al Qaeda sympathizer. Having examined all the high- profile ter-
rorism plots of the decade from 2001 to 2011, Trevor Aaronson found that, 
“of the 508 defendants, 243 had been targeted through an fbi informant, 158 
had been caught in an fbi terrorism sting, and 49 had encountered an agent 
provocateur” (Aaronson 2013, 15). With the exception of three cases, most of 
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them were small- time criminals, people who made some false statement (72 
cases) or were prosecuted for immigration violations (121 cases). The Human 
Rights Watch report of 2014 observed that there was no single terrorist attack 
linked to Islamic organizations between 2001 and 2013, yet there were dozens 
of manufactured terrorist plots that resulted in hundreds of people going to 
jail. The report quotes the former fbi agent Michael Germano: “When the fbi 
undercover agent or informant is the only purported link to a real terrorist 
group, supplies the motive, designs the plot and provides all the weapons, one 
has to question whether they are combating terrorism or creating it” (Gessen 
2015, 245 – 46). The report goes on to say that “the fbi may have created terror-
ists out of law- abiding individuals” and that the informants and agents “often 
chose targets who were particularly vulnerable — whether because of mental 
disability, or because they were indigent and needed money that the govern-
ment offered them” (246). Leaders of Islamic organizations have denounced 
the fact that informers infiltrated in their mosques “have helped promote 
plots” (Vitello and Semple 2009). These informers are usually experienced 
criminals, such as Shaded Hussain, “an accused murderer and con artist who 
in less than ten years has become one of the Bureau’s most valuable terrorism 
informants” (Aaronson 2011, 223).
What body of evidence does the journalist present to support the scary 
news about foiled terrorist plots? He simply repeats the statements offered 
by the counterterror officials, unconcerned they are “creating crimes to solve 
crimes so they can claim a victory in the war on terror” (Aaronson 2011, 33). 
The news of the foiled plot, given as an unquestionable document that pro-
vides direct proof of terrorism, becomes the ultimate evidence of the ubiqui-
tous terrorism threat. Aaronson shows in abundant detail the media’s lapdog 
approach since 9/11 in covering terrorism cases in the United States; they op-
erate “in an information vacuum, as most, if not all, of the initial information 
comes from the police or prosecutors,” thus providing “the government with 
a public suspension of disbelief” (Aaronson 2011, 71); it will take weeks and 
months before they can interview the defendants and get a more nuanced 
view, but by then the story is old and no longer makes the front pages. The 
public will not find out that, case after case, “the only terrorist involved . . . 
was an imaginary one on the fbi payroll” (Aaronson 2011, 73). But, having 
abdicated any definition of terrorism to the counterterrorist state, the media 
goes along with the theater of sting operations rather than cast a critical eye 
as to who the real terrorists are (as opposed to the people on the margins en-
trapped by the fbi). Thus, “in sting after sting, from Miami to Seattle, the fbi 
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and its informants have provided the means for America’s would- be terrorists 
to carry out an attack, creating what a federal judge has called a ‘fantasy terror 
operation’ ” (Aaronson 2013, 234).
As several fbi and Justice Department agents admitted, “chasing terrorists 
is like chasing ghosts — you’ll only see them if you’re willing to let your eyes 
play tricks on you” (Aaronson 2013, 207). Which brings us back to the his-
toric ghost story An Adventure with which we began and which aroused such 
public interest during the first decades of the twentieth century; “a passion 
for invoking ‘evidence,’ ” we were told, was “the prime symptom of Adventure- 
mania” (Castle 1991, 30). Such passion for evidence, when there was none, was 
also the hallmark of Powell’s testimony at the un. The “contagious folly” of a 
shared vision of Marie Antoinette, or the fear of terrorist “ghosts” by such a 
wide public, required that we deploy the notion of fantasy. Arthur Cum-
mings, an ardent supporter of sting operations as a former assistant director 
of the fbi’s National Security Branch, put it best when he argued that one 
needed to understand that “the fbi’s true enemies weren’t so much Al Qaeda 
and Islamic terrorism but rather the idea of Al Qaeda and Islamic terrorism.” 
His emphatic assertion that “we’re at war with an idea” (Aaronson 2013, 226) 
should be stated as “we’re at war with a fantasy” — a fantasy of a fetish Terror 
that overpowers both terrorists and counterterrorists.
Sting operations are about the intentionality of potential terrorists for car-
rying out future acts. What type of evidence is this — about events that have 
not yet taken place? As law professor Mark Kelman put it, “answering ques-
tions about the ‘probability’ of a future event poses even more than typically 
difficult epistemological problems compared, for instance, to questions about 
whether a particular event in the past occurred” (1991, 171). It is not that there 
is lack of evidence that terrorism has a past and present replete with heinous 
violence. And yet, what seems most terrifying and defining of contemporary 
terrorism is what is yet to come — most critically, as prophesized by so many 
commentators, the specter of “it is not if but when” of nuclear terrorism.
Time is the defining axis that differentiates fantasy from historic reality. 
In the waiting for terror defined by the imminence of a threat, what could 
happen is actually the case now as collective representation and fear. What 
takes place in real time is a small part of terrorism; its future anticipation, its 
fantasy, is as a critical component of the counterterrorism culture. One could 
argue that the distortion of temporality implicit in such waiting and fearing 
of terror can become self- fulfilling (Zulaika 2009), that is, a false definition 
of reality provokes a behavior that later makes it true; in its perverse logic the 
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course of events becomes “proof” of the correctness of the prophecy (Merton 
1968, 477).
Nothing has been more consequential in the War on Terror than the Bush 
administration’s doctrine of preemption that led the United States to the 
war in Iraq. By definition, “the logic of pre- emption entails action before the 
event, and relies upon an imaginary of extreme threats, which justify other-
wise unthinkable actions” (Stampnitzky 2013, 168). Sting operations illustrate 
counterterrorism’s need to act before the crimes have been committed — its 
primary evidence is concerned with having clues about non- events that might 
reside in the intentionality of potential terrorists. Preemption continues to 
justify the imposition of a State of Exception on American politics, including 
the continuing existence of Guantánamo. The judges naturally partake of 
this same ideology of preemption against the ghosts of terrorism, and thus in 
case after case “these men, some broke, others with mental problems, couldn’t 
have committed even small- time offenses on their own, and yet the fbi and 
Justice Department have convinced courts and the public that they are terror-
ists, even though it was government informants and agents who provided the 
plans and weapons that allowed them to become terrorists in the first place” 
(Aaronson 2013, 235).
There is one sting operation that deserves particular attention because it 
preceded the first attack on the Twin Towers in February 1993. It took place 
against the group associated with the blind Sheik Omar Abdul- Rahman. The 
key figure to the operation was the informer Emad Salem, who received in 
compensation two million dollars. With Salem’s testimony, the Sheik was 
condemned to life in prison. What type of evidence did Salem have? Salem 
“began his testimony by admitting that he had lied to just about everybody 
he ever met,” the New York Times reported; that he was “always ready with 
another believe- or- not exploit”; and that his testimony sounded “like sheer 
fantasy” (MacFarquhar 1995, a9). An editorial added that the indictment of 
the Sheik “only required to prove the intention to wage a terror campaign” 
and concluded that “only the sketchiest connections [were] established be-
tween Sheik Omar Abdul- Rahman and the alleged mastermind of that crime, 
Ramzi Ahmed Yousef.”9 And yet it was evidence enough for counterterrorism 
to condemn the man, considered by many Muslims their supreme spiritual 
leader and legal authority, to life in prison. Two of those Muslims closest to 
him were Osama bin Laden and Ayman al- Zawahiri.
How is it that a mercenary’s “like sheer fantasy” testimony became key evi-
dence to condemn Sheik Rahman to life in prison? The answer rests in good 
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part in Kelman’s observation that, “Questions of how we claim to know the 
things that we know and whose claims to knowledge are treated as authorita-
tive are inescapable in reaching legal judgments” (1991, 169). Sheik Rahman’s 
moral and judicial authority couldn’t have been higher for the Muslims (some 
commentators have compared him with the status a pope has for the Catho-
lics); the cia had used his high authority and his services for years when they 
brought him to the United States to help recruit jihadists against the former 
Soviets. But obviously the claims that mattered in his trial were those of the 
informer Salem. The fact is that “we believe that the defendant we favor has 
produced differentially convincing evidence to bolster a claim” (Kelman 1991, 
170). Blind and frail, Sheik Rahman is a learned and holy man for his commu-
nity, but in the United States he is Muslim — in the eyes of the counterterror 
state law, his moral authority was no match with the mercenary Salem, who 
admitted “that he had lied to just about everybody he ever met.” In a culture 
in which the figure of the Terrorist embodies absolute Evil, it was enough to 
associate the blind Sheik with such a tabooed figure to condemn him. In the 
framework of “like sheer fantasy” assumed by his counterterrorist handlers, 
Salem’s fabrications were solid evidence.
Drones from Area 51
The drone program is the latest development in counterterrorism, “the only 
game in town” in the words of ex- cia director Leon Panetta. Drones are the 
tragic proof that even under President Obama, terrorism continued to be the 
fundamental fantasy of U.S. policy. Obama was critical of the rhetorics of the 
War on Terror as candidate, but once in power he basically continued his pre-
decessor’s policies, vastly expanding drone warfare. Ten thousand feet above 
in the sky, and seventy- five hundred miles away at Creech Air Force Base, the 
drones are a further step in the sensorial distancing from the targeted enemy. 
The enemy is no longer a real body but a mere image in the computer screen. 
The belief is that the flying robots will soon be “in the position to take the 
initiative against the enemy on a battlefield” and that “the pressure to let ro-
bots take the shot will be very hard to resist” (Caryl 2011, 58). The scenario is 
a Nintendo- like war in which subject- less machines, praised for “their ability 
to see and think” (Caryl 2011, 58), and while mimicking all sorts of animals, 
will on their own identify and eliminate the terrorists. The drones can do all 
the warring operations, they can program a target and follow it for days while 
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flying on their own, and they can make irrelevant the human participation. 
Such nonhuman component appears to be in fact the most marvelous aspect 
of the drones: the unmanned machines have no desires of their own, are not 
subjectively responsible for their killings, cannot commit war crimes or kill 
themselves.
The new robotic military industry has developed in close association with 
science fiction. The drones are operated to a large extent from Creech Air 
Force Base in the Nevada dessert, forty- five miles north of Las Vegas, known 
by the soldiers as “the home of the hunters.” It is close to other secretive and 
restricted places in the Nevada Test and Training Range such as Area 51, also 
known as Dreamland and Paradise Ranch. Given the secrecy around the fa-
cility, whose very existence was denied for decades, Area 51, while develop-
ing and testing new weapon systems, became also the site of intense fantasy, 
famed for all sorts of unidentified flying objects and conspiracies. Area 51 
has been the setting for more than sixty movies, tv shows, and video games 
(Singer 2009, 138). There is a Science Fiction Channel with a tv series about 
Eureka, the town set up by the Pentagon for scientists to work and live in. In 
short, Area 51 conflated during the Cold War the development of the latest 
weapon systems with the fantasy supplement of extraterrestrial sightings and 
conspiracy theories.
If the atomic bomb tested mostly in Nevada’s desert became “the national 
fetish” (Masco 2006, 17) during the Cold War, the counterterror state has wea-
ponized drones in the same test site with a similar fetishistic goal. The con-
spiracy epicenter is no longer populated with extraterrestrial aliens; they have 
been replaced with the terrorist aliens also seemingly belonging to an entirely 
strange world. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism estimates that drones 
have killed between six and eight thousand people. This is the Real of the 
drone effects. But, given that there is complete ignorance as to who the vast 
majority of these victims are, fantasy plays a key role in determining who they 
are and justifying why they should be killed. The estimates as to how many 
of them are combatants and how many civilians are starkly different depend-
ing on which sources you pay attention to. Cian Westmoreland, in a talk he 
gave at the University of Las Vegas Law School in March of 2016, claimed 
that as a drone technician he had directly participated in the killings of 359 
innocent civilians just in the year 2009. In August 2011 the counter terrorism 
chief John Brennan stated that not a single noncombatant had been killed in 
a year of strikes; the Conflict Monitoring Center, a private organization that 
collects Pakistani and foreign news reports, estimated on their web page that 
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of the 609 killed in 2011, only four were al Qaeda leaders. According to the 
Drone Papers, in 2012 over a period of four months drones killed 155 people 
in the tribal areas of Afghanistan: nineteen were people they intended to kill; 
the rest were missed targets (Scahill 2016, 53). The stark contrast in numbers 
results ultimately from how you define “terrorist.” Potentially everyone is a 
terrorist if he/she conforms to the “signature strike” of a certain life pattern 
in a given territory observed from a drone ten thousand feet above. As an 
example, most adult males traditionally carry guns in Pakistan or Yemen, 
a “pattern of life” that makes them all potential targets. But guns might not 
be necessary as the ultimate evidence, for, as a cia officer told Jane Mayer 
of the New Yorker, “no tall man with a beard is safe anywhere in Southwest 
Asia” (Ahmad 2011). This results in a method that “in effect counts military- 
age males in a strike zone as combatants, unless there is explicit intelligence 
posthumously proving them innocent” (Becker and Shane 2012). You must be 
a “terrorist” if you are in a zone where there are terrorists and if you conform 
to my fantasy framework by which you look like one.
The strategic fantasy about the unilateral combat conducted with drones is 
the belief in warfare without any risk for our side. From Achilles to Siegfried 
to Hercules to Ajax, “The great myths of invulnerability are almost all ac-
counts of failure” (Chamayou 2015, 73). The ultimate instance of such intoler-
ance to risk was Vice President Cheney’s famous 1 percent theory: if Saddam 
Hussein had a 1 percent chance of obtaining weapons of mass destruction, the 
United States had to act to prevent it (Suskind 2006). Ruling out chance from 
a terrorist scenario, a type of warfare in which deception is the sine qua non 
at all levels, is like ruling luck from poker: only a traumatized player would 
adopt such a self- defeating inflexibility.
In the opinion of many legal scholars (e.g., Cohn 2015), drones have re-
moved all boundaries between legitimate combat and assassination. If we fol-
low Michael Walzer and Grégoire Chamayou (Chamayou 2015, 13) in recall-
ing the history of ethics of warfare — that you cannot kill if you are not ready 
to die — the drone, by ruling out real combat, “destroys the very possibility 
of any clear differentiation between combatants and noncombatants” (147). 
This is at the heart of the hotly debated issue of whether the victims are over-
whelmingly combatants or civilians. If you completely ignore who the people 
you are killing are, as is the case in most instances, the need to claim a fantasy- 
based “evidence” that they are actually terrorists becomes imperative — the 
fantasy sustains the belief whether you are engaged in assassination or not.
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What Does the Terrorist Want?
Che vuoi? What do you want? What is bothering you? In psychoanalytic the-
ory, “fantasy is an answer to this ‘Che vuoi?’; it is an attempt to fill out the 
gap of the question with an answer. In the case of anti- Semitism the answer 
to ‘What does the Jew want?’ is a fantasy of ‘Jewish conspiracy’: a mysterious 
power of Jews to manipulate events, to pull the strings behind the scenes” 
(Žižek 1989, 128). In the case of suspect Muslim migrants in a rich European 
country, the answer to “What do Muslims want?” is the fantasy of a terrorist 
plot, the fear that they are going to take over Western culture. This provokes 
reactions such as the one in Switzerland — a referendum to deny them per-
mission to build two minarets. Or the more recent one of France’s prohibi-
tion of the burkini or full swimsuit because, as Prime Minister Manuel Valls 
put it, it symbolizes Islam’s “enslavement of women.” In Slavoj Žižek’s words, 
“The crucial point that must be made here on a theoretical level is that fantasy 
functions as a construction, as an imaginary scenario filling out the void, the 
opening of the desire of the Other: by giving us a definitive answer to the ques-
tion ‘What does the Other want?,’ it enables us to evade the unbearable dead-
lock in which the Other wants something from us, but we are at the same time 
incapable of translating this desire of the Other into a positive interpellation, 
into a mandate with which to identify” (Žižek 1989, 128). It is not only that the 
torturer answers to Slahi’s “What do you want?” with his own construction 
of a fantasy narrative; it is also that the coordinates of the counterterrorists’ 
desires are not simply satisfied but constituted by the fantasy- scene: “through 
fantasy, we learn ‘how to desire’ ” (Žižek 1989, 132). Something becomes the 
object of our desire “by entering the framework of fantasy, by being included 
in a fantasy- scene which gives consistency to the subject’s desire” (Žižek 1989, 
133). The tabooed figure of the Terrorist is an individual in possession of that 
unknown quality that is “in it more than it,” an X that provokes for both fol-
lowers and opponents intense fear and desire.
The U.S. defense budget has almost doubled since the Cold War when it 
emerged as the only superpower; it currently surpasses the budgets of most 
other countries combined. Such staggering military reality can hardly be un-
derstood unless we grasp as its indispensable supplement the figure of the 
Terrorist. The point is not to deny the existence of violence in many countries 
or that there are people who fit a standard definition of actual or potential ter-
rorists; it is rather the imminent expectation of the terrorist with the wmds (a 
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possibility that security experts such as Robert Mueller [2006] have ruled out 
as extremely improbable). Such configuration of a worldwide terrorist threat 
operates much in the way that collective representations have worked in the 
past at the confluence of history and fiction.
The drone war has been described as “sheer fantasy, if not literally science 
fiction” (Sluka 2011, 72). Michael Ignatieff wrote that virtual war “as a surgi-
cal scalpel and not a bloodstained sword” is a seductive illusion, adding: “We 
need to stay away from such fables of self- righteous invulnerability” (2000, 
214 – 15). These “fables,” turned into the current hegemonic culture, require 
a valid theory of fantasy, one that does not render it into the “not- real,” but 
considers that fantasy “constitutes a dimension of the real” (Butler 1990, 108). 
Reality is masked by fantasy and “the two become compellingly conflated” 
(Butler 1990, 107). But fantasy, in its semantic excess, can also interrogate and 
contest the claims of the real. Fantasy’s own power of fragmentations implies 
that the mastery the subject claims over it is already undone and that the very 
identity of the subject of fantasy is put into question by the multiple identifica-
tions available to the fantasy setting.
Journalists Dana Priest and William M. Arkin (2011) have described a new 
counterterrorism industry of thousands of government organizations and 
private companies with the mission of studying and catching subjects whom 
they have never met and whose primary cultural or subjective contexts they 
utterly ignore. The basic working premise for this staggering security indus-
try with over a million private contractors and public officials with top- secret 
clearances would seem to be never to let us be in touch with a terrorist body 
or project ourselves into a terrorist subject; never to let us mess up our fantasy 
relationship with the tabooed Terrorist by actually having a really meaningful 
contact with the feared/desired Monster.
Whether it is Hussein’s bluffing or the fbi’s counterterrorist sting opera-
tions, deception and the planting of false evidence are crucial to terrorist 
warfare. In such a game the problem facing the counterterrorist is what type 
of evidence to accept as valid. This is reminiscent of classical detective fiction, 
a genre in which misinformation and lack of evidence are central to the plot. 
The detective is aware of his ignorance and knows that there is more to the ev-
idence than meets the eye, that there is a gap between the evidence and what 
it hides. “There is a gap, a distance, between the evidence and that which the 
evidence establishes, which means that there is something that is not visible 
in the evidence: the principle by which the trail attaches itself to the crimi-
nal” (Copjec 1994, 176). In detective fiction, the detective’s skill for spotting 
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unsuspected evidence emerges typically in opposition to the figure that serves 
as his foil — the proverbially dumb policeman. Both the police and the detec-
tive are looking for evidence, but the detective knows that the evidence per se 
cannot account for the way it reveals itself. Both are in search of “evidence,” 
yet it is the Colombo- esque detective, irritating in his rumpled and appar-
ently absentminded manners, who shrewdly resolves the case by binging the 
decisive evidence, while making a fool of the policeman. What was wrong 
with the policeman’s approach is that he ignores the criminal’s subjectivity 
in its complex interaction of cultural premises and unconscious desire. In his 
search for “objectivity,” the policeman will take seriously every piece of evi-
dence, including those deliberately planted by the criminal to fool him. The 
detective’s knack, on the contrary, is his ability to read literally the murderer’s 
desire in the traces he left hidden or in the very evidence that is not there.
If “after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki [the Cold War] was 
fought incessantly at the level of imagination” (Masco 2014, 16), this is not 
less true of the current War on Terror. But if the framework of fantasy is a 
necessary supplement to the counterterror culture, such reliance may turn 
out to be its Achilles heel as well. Masco’s work provides a groundbreaking 
analysis of the cultural and imaginary continuities between the Cold War 
and the War on Terror — the recognition that the ‘new’ counterterror state in 
2001 was actually a repetition, modeled in language and tone on the launch of 
the national security state in 1947” (2014, 5). From the beginning, the security 
state exploited nuclear fear to create a docile citizenship. “A key innovation 
of the counterterrorist state,” Masco adds, “is . . . [the] commitment to using 
the imaginary to locate danger” (2014, 11). Another way to state the transition 
is that the War on Terror rejects deterrence to embrace preemption. The shift 
entails a change in the imaginary from the symbolic fiction of world hege-
mony based on nuclear power (fantasy as stabilizing dream) to the spectral 
reality of a world disorder under the ubiquitous menace of terrorism (fantasy 
as unconquerable chaos). In deterrence the security state is engaged in secur-
ing defense systems never to be used — the threat is based on ritual display and 
symbolic meaning, including the dream that atomic weapons would make 
war obsolete. In preemption one has to endlessly fantasize future acts of war 
based on current nonevents. In deterrence the state uses collective fantasy to 
produce evidence — of an already existing state of terror, whereas in preemp-
tion the public is fed fantasy to sustain the evidence — for what does not yet 
exist but is to come. Careful analysis as to how “overblown” the threat posed 
by terrorists is will not diminish the assumption that they are in possession of 
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an apocalyptic power — something that can only be explained by their access-
ing the general public’s framework of fantasy. Nothing seems more critical for 
exorcising the media and the public from the terrors of the current post-9/11 
security state than to unveil the evidentiary role of fantasy in underpinning it.
The psychoanalytic cure for the traumatized subject consists in awaken-
ing the subject from the spell of fantasy: “The final moment of the analysis 
is defined as ‘going through the fantasy’: not its symbolic interpretation but 
the experience of the fact that the fantasy- object, by its fascinating presence, 
is merely filling out a lack, a void in the Other. There is nothing ‘behind’ the 
fantasy; the fantasy is a construction whose function is to hide this void, this 
‘nothing’ — that is, the lack in the Other” (Žižek 1989, 133). Counterterrorist 
culture, we have argued in this chapter, in all its traumatic fear and trembling, 
is also dependent on a fantasy construction that serves as supplement to the 
real of violence. “Traversing the fantasy” regarding terrorism doesn’t mean 
confronting the reality as it is; it implies accepting the inconsistencies inher-
ent to the figure of the Terrorist itself. How to gain a distance from this spec-
tral framework, how to unhook enjoyment from the pursuit of the hunted 
terrorist — that becomes the critical issue.
Notes
1 New York Times, May 4, 2003.
2 Parenthetical citations to Slahi’s account refer to this edition throughout.
3 During this period the U.S. government lost thirty- four out of forty- six habeas 
corpus cases.
4 Slahi had been first arrested and interrogated in January 2000 as he returned 
to his home country Mauritania from Canada, where he felt watched by the 
U.S. intelligence services. Two months after 9/11, Slahi turned himself in to the 
Mauritanian authorities for questioning; he was arrested and rendered for eight 
months to a “black site” in Jordan, then taken to the infamous Bagram Base, and 
from there to Guantánamo in August 2002.
5 Back cover copy of Kurnaz’s book.
6 Parenthetical citations to Kurnaz’s book refer to this edition throughout.
7 “The Latest Bad Idea for Guantánamo,” New York Times, Editorial, September 
20, 2016.
8 According to Heritage Foundation, sixty plots have been foiled in the United 
States (see Zuckerman, Bucci, and Carafano 2013.) The home secretary for Great 
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Britain claimed on November 2014 that British security services had foiled forty 
terror plots since the London attacks of 2005 (Topping 2014).
9 New York Times, March 19, 1995, a14.
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Mark Maguire and Ursula Rao
Bodies as Evidence emerged over several years from a series of informal con-
versations and formal workshops. The editors and contributors, working in 
ethnographic field sites from India to the United Kingdom and Argentina 
to the United States of America, noted that many contemporary matters of 
great consequence are now recognized and discussed as matters of evidence. 
On the one hand, calls for evidence- based policies and practices seem to be 
heard everywhere; on the other hand, previously taken- for- granted eviden-
tial relations are being tested and teased apart. Of course, as we stated in the 
introduction to this volume, the history of philosophy has witnessed the rise 
and fall of numerous evidential regimes, but discussions of evidence are by no 
means confined to epistemology or scientific discourse. Rather, most profes-
sions recognize and gather evidence in particular ways and operate their own 
systems of “veridiction.” Indeed, it is possible to argue that deep transforma-
tions in professions, disciplines, and institutional divisions of labor are part 
of the contemporary problematization of evidence. For example, anthropolo-
gist Helen Lambert (2009) describes the rise of “evidence- based medicine” 
alongside the increasing prominence of similar discussions in the domains 
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of welfare, housing, and public policy. In short, our discussions based on eth-
nographic knowledge of diverse field sites suggested to us that much could 
be said about the contemporary by engaging directly with contested bodies 
of evidence.
Bodies as Evidence also emerged from the recognition that discussions of 
evidence in anthropology have thus far been limited. Lambert’s (2009) excel-
lent discussion of evidence- based medicine turns to focus on ethnography, 
questioning the lack of “evidence” in, of, and from the discipline’s favored 
method. Her work is illustrative of recent writing that takes anthropological 
evidence as its primary focus (e.g., Csordas 1994; Hastrup 2004; Engelke 2009; 
Chua, High, and Lau 2009; cf. Cull 1854). These anthropologists insist upon 
the relational qualities of evidence — in Thomas Csordas’s (1994, 475) elegant 
formulation, “Evidence has to be of or for something.” However, this position 
clearly presents a two- sided challenge. First, ethnographic understandings of 
evidence must be sufficiently open to account for the numerous evidential re-
gimes found in the world. Anthropology, as Mary Douglas once put it, is clas-
sically about our “provincial logic” encountering “native thought.” Thus, “two 
different sets of hypotheses about the nature of reality and how it is divided 
up are exposed, each carrying the ring of self- evident truth so clearly that its 
fundamental assumptions are implicit and considered to need no justifica-
tion” (1972, 27). Second, however — and this is the inspiration behind several 
recent writings on evidence in anthropology — ethnographic engagements 
with relational evidence- making, causation, and doxastic attitudes are still 
expected to be “evidence based” in the contemporary moment. Regardless of 
the varieties of so- called native thought, a certain provincial logic seems to be 
prevailing.
Bodies as Evidence is not a series of essays on anthropological methods; it 
is, rather, a response to the contemporary focus on evidence, the tremendous 
weight placed upon evidence today, and the simultaneous erosion of trusted 
sources of evidence. In this volume, then, the editors and contributors have 
focused on evidence in security contexts, one of the contemporary domains 
in which relations of cause and effect, truth and falsehood, doxastic and af-
fective attitudes and reason all seem to be coming apart and reforming. Al-
though security is often regarded as a natural requirement of human life, 
the semantically vacuous term is better understood as denoting processes 
that naturalize themselves differently depending on cultural factors and the 
particular historical moment. In other words, “security” and “insecurity” are 
names for processes that are highly variable. For instance, in The Spirit of 
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Laws Montesquieu proposes that security and justice are foundational to lib-
erty, but he concedes that “there are cases in which a veil should be drawn for 
a while over liberty, as it was customary to cover the statues of the gods” (1914, 
102). In this analysis, however, one does not govern primarily through secu-
rity; one does not permanently govern in the darkness behind a veil. Note, 
then, the historical discontinuity between Montesquieu’s philosophy and the 
post- 9/11 “securitarian” reason of U.S. vice president Dick Cheney:
We do, indeed, though have obviously the world’s finest military. . . . We 
also have to work sort of the dark side, if you will. We’re going to spend 
time in the shadows in the intelligence world. A lot of what needs to be 
done here will have to be done quietly, without any discussions, using 
sources and methods that are available to our intelligence agencies if we’re 
going to be successful. That’s the world these folks operate in. And so 
it’s going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal, basically, to 
achieve our objective. (Cheney 2001)
The contrast here is between the eighteenth- century reason of the state (rai-
son d’état) and the contemporary reason of the counterterrorist apparatus.
Today’s “security” thus seems to name a permanent process of following a 
potentially dark path to an unreachable future free from terror, deprivation, 
and injustice. To begin to study the processes and pathways of such security 
measures, one must attend to discontinuity with the past, to ruptures in the 
relations of evidence with the world, and to the production of doxastic and 
affective attitudes, moral and ethical relations, and even reason. In short, nei-
ther security nor evidence offers us unbroken lines that stretch back into the 
past. Michel Foucault points directly to the modern rupture in evidence that 
uncoupled the “truth” of morality and ethics from scientific rationality:
Descartes . . . said, “To accede to truth, it suffices that I be any subject 
which can see what is evident.” Evidence is substituted for ascetics at the 
point where the relationship to the self intersects the relationship to oth-
ers and the world. The relationship to the self no longer needs to be ascetic 
to get into relation to the truth. It suffices that the relationship to the self 
reveals to me the obvious truth of what I see for me to apprehend that truth 
definitively. Thus, I can be immoral and know the truth. I believe that 
this is an idea which, more or less explicitly, was rejected by all previous 
culture. Before Descartes, one could not be impure, immoral, and know 
the truth. With Descartes, direct evidence is enough. After Descartes we 
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have a non- ascetic subject of knowledge. This change makes possible the 
institutionalization of modern science. (Foucault 1983, 252)
While some anthropologists have sought to provincialize Foucault’s approach 
to relations of truth, knowledge, and power (e.g., Tambiah 1990), others rec-
ognize that the orientations available in his work pointed to problematiza-
tions worthy of sustained anthropological attention (e.g., Rabinow 1996, 161). 
Indeed, it is noteworthy that Foucault emphasized the highly specific and 
mundane forms of knowledge that accompanied the birth of modern institu-
tions such as the asylum, the clinic, and the prison—forms of knowledge that 
would later assume the mantle of scientific rationality. “The birth of the sci-
ences of man,” he tells us, “is found in . . . ignoble archives, where the modern 
play of coercion over bodies, gestures and behaviours had its beginnings” 
(Foucault 1995, 191). Today, the always unstable and unfinished walls dividing 
key societal institutions such as the military, the police, the prison, and the 
factory have crumbled; disciplines have blurred; and divisions of labor have 
broken down and reformed.
Security discourses and practices now traverse many societal domains. 
Disciplining is achieved not only in mainstreamed institutions but through 
the micromanagement of populations in contexts of welfare, urban gover-
nance, policing, and the war against terror. The discussion of Ieva Jusionyte, 
Daniel M. Goldstein, and Carolina Alonso- Bejarano on the penetration of the 
national boarder into the inner space of the nation- state makes painfully ob-
vious the multiple threatening presences of portals in the lives of migrants. To 
survive, draw benefits, and be granted citizens’ rights, people must regularly 
evidence their compliance with multiple rules. Nikolas Rose (1996) argued 
that government in advanced liberal democracies downloads onto citizens 
the responsibility of caring for themselves and their lives. Security regimens 
ensure that citizens comply. They also create shadow worlds, the characters of 
which have been at the center of several chapters in this volume. Hypervisibil-
ity of those aspects thrown up by indicators hide the human experience of liv-
ing in an age of (in)securitization. They create instead the worlds of “illegal” 
migrants rendered increasingly insecure, worlds where, despite the fantastical 
promises of forensic knowledge, some dead bodies are identified and others 
remain Other. Then there’s the illusion of “evidence” from the tortured body. 
Thus, while contemporary security regimes often claim scientific rationality, 
they remain rooted in ignoble and provincial forms of knowledge production.
Security clearly has a problem: bodies as evidence, or the desire for and fas-
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cination with technologies that promise to provide evidence- based and thus 
neutral knowledge by tracking, understanding, and tracing the human body. 
But, as the contributions to this volume show, while technoscience prom-
ises neutral knowledge about human bodies it generally delivers only partial 
knowledge about social categories and persons. In short, (in)securitization 
produces and reproduces the poor, the migrant, the victim, the criminal, or 
the terrorist enemy. Indeed, in The Quest for Certainty (1930, 51), John Dewey 
proposes that modern scientific rationality has failed to acknowledge or di-
gest an ancient philosophical problem, namely, “that certainty, security, can 
be found only in the fixed and unchanging.” But security has also become a 
matter of regulating the “changing course of events” (1930, 96) and even the 
risk- filled future. Security now labels regulatory efforts to specify, fix, lock 
into place, verify, and make certain a world that often refuses to cooperate. 
Thus, in the gaps, interstices, and shadows of security- modernity one finds 
tricksters, fakes, and frauds; occult economies; and the malevolent operations 
of terrorist enemies. Like the counterfeit modernities that Jean and John Co-
maroff (e.g., 2006) address, security exposes a double conceit at the core of 
modernity, namely, that bodies, signifiers, and identities can be fixed and that 
security discourses and practices have somehow acquired a magical formula 
that will enable that fixing to occur. One can give numerous examples to il-
lustrate, but perhaps the most obvious example comes yet again from U.S. 
counterterrorism. Since 2001, the U.S. government has invested hundreds of 
millions in technologies that can search the human body for signs of “mal-
intent” or the intent to cause harm. The theory of malintent substantiates 
technoscientific efforts to read the body, from eye movement to fleeting facial 
expressions. In other words, theory decides what counts as evidence. But sci-
entific rigor has to take a back seat, because the theory is classified in order to 
maintain security (see Maguire and Fussey 2016).
But how do we anthropologically investigate the production of knowledge, 
and evidence, in the realm of security? In this volume we have emphasized 
conceptual work on body- knowledge, as well as the mimesis and magic that 
can be found tangled within the roots of the great contemporary drive to 
secure individual identities, bodies, boundaries, and borderless conflicts. It 
is clear to us that security and insecurity are interfused in the sense that fear 
is both a target and outcome of security discourses and practices. As Jean 
Comaroff put it during one of the workshops that inspired this volume, late 
modernity is stalked by “the perfectly ordinary person who turns out to be 
someone, something, dangerously different from whom they say they are — by 
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the spectre of the counterfeit citizen, the imposter immigrant, the bogus asy-
lum seeker, the inscrutable terrorist” (Comaroff 2013). Our efforts herein have 
shown the play of truth and falsehood, seen and unseen, the elevated claims 
and “ignoble archives” (Foucault 1995, 191). We have not, however, succumbed 
to the temptation to see power as always coercive or alterity as an always- 
available source of alternatives. Rather, through its diverse contributions, this 
volume shows us the enormous and active production of knowledge and evi-
dence in the realm of security, bodies of evidence that are never as coherent 
as they present themselves, forms of knowledge that are forever shadowed by 
insecurity and doubt, for both the observer and the observed.
This volume began with contributions on the topic of biometric security. 
Today’s registration efforts ongoing in India are part of the largest biometric 
capture project in human history. But such efforts have a particular history, 
one rooted, according to Michael Taussig, in the use of fingerprints to prevent 
people from impersonating others in order to collect pensions and other ben-
efits. Biometrics became signatures and fetishes, used to make people legible 
and to scare them with the power of mysterious signs. This was, in essence, 
the “modernizing sorcery [of] colonial bureaucracy” (1993, 222). But modern 
biometric systems emerged in multiple locations, from the Hooghly River 
in India to metropolitan heartlands of empire, and drew new lines connect-
ing colonial administrations to policing institutions and scientific racists to 
social reformers. Simply stated, biometrics was not and is not a series of tar-
geted interventions to solve problems of identification. Rather, what we are 
investigating here is a coalition between practical problems and solutions and 
much broader visions of human life itself. The evidence presented by the hu-
man body to verify individual identity is evidence of a unit within a human 
population that is pockmarked by unknown spaces and forever ringed by an 
outside. Again, we must attend to discontinuous histories in order to under-
stand the ways in which error- prone technoscience imagines and targets hu-
man life, which is itself, “never completely in the right place, that is destined 
to ‘err’ and be ‘wrong’ ” (Foucault 1994, 15).
Of course, the point here is not that the human body cannot be read or 
that all technical and scientific efforts are doomed to failure; rather, we have 
attended to particular contemporary ways of reading the human body and 
looked to the contemporary drive to do so in an expanding number of do-
mains. The new bodies of evidence create new power- knowledge regimes and 
with them novel ethical dilemmas. They result from the confrontation of 
power with the fleshy condition of human existence. Insecurity is written 
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into the body. For example, the deployment of biometric registration reveals 
the intimate link between moral order and body inspection. The technologi-
cal upgrading of the multilayered international borders causes innumerable 
physical and mental injuries and even death. The use of forensic evidence for 
recovering the stories of victims of specific political orderings, such as illegal 
border crosses or victims of mass killings, individualizes and sentimentalizes 
the memory of suffering. It offers avenues for families to mourn and cope with 
untimely death at the cost of sidelining broader political debates about ethical 
failure and unjust orders. Counterinsurgency tactics and the use of drones are 
defended by a discourse that celebrates death as achievement of intelligence. 
The rhetoric of the War on Terror justifies killing suspected bodies before 
they can articulate an alternative truth. The effort to fix and settle opens the 
search for security and play of evidence to its Other. Thus, questions of dif-
ference come into sharp focus in contemporary policing and counterterror-
ism. When one reads Gregory Feldman on how an undercover police team 
translates intelligence into “evidence,” one is left wondering about the status 
of both. Do police, those charged with the provision of security, recognize 
shifts in security discourses and practices; do they see contemporary bod-
ies of evidence as pockmarked by unknown spaces and forever ringed by a 
troublesome outside?
It seems that anthropology needs to be better engaged with “evidence- 
based” institutions and assemblages where security is produced, and thus 
better able to offer insights and critique. To date, many of the efforts to study 
evidence in the discipline of anthropology have been methodological, react-
ing to a sense that anthropology will lose its relevance among evidence- based 
fields if it does not agree to become more transparent about its own data- 
gathering techniques. Thus far, these efforts have not gained traction, and the 
discipline has not engaged with evidence as a problem of the contemporary. 
Bodies as Evidence is an effort to highlight the problem of evidence today, 
rather than an effort to fold anthropology and ethnographic approaches into 
contemporary power- knowledge. Herein, we do not valorize anthropology or 
the ethnographic; rather, we are unified by a concern with evidence in secu-
rity contexts: if we can grapple with and pin down the problem of evidence 
in contexts where security is produced then engagement, reflexive analysis, 
and even critique are possible. If not, the truth will be produced by others, 
elsewhere, uncritically.
DISCONTINUITIES AND DIVERSITY 235
References
Cheney, Dick. 2001. “Vice President Cheney on NBC’s ‘Meet the Press’ with Tim Rus-
sert.” Washington Post. September 16. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- srv 
/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/cheney091601.html.
Chua, Liana, Casey High, and Timm Lau. 2009. How do We Know? Evidence, Ethnog-
raphy, and the Making of Anthropological Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge 
Scholars Press.
Comaroff, Jean. 2013. “The Truth about Crime.” “Bodies of Evidence” workshop, De-
cember 10, Maynooth University, Ireland.
Comaroff, Jean, and John L. Comaroff. 2006. An Excursion into the Criminal Anthro-
pology of the Brave Neo South Africa. Berlin: lit Verlag.
Csordas, Thomas. 2004. “Evidence of and for What?” Anthropological Theory 4(4): 
73 – 80.
Cull, Richard. 1854. “Remarks on the Nature, Objects, and Evidences of Ethnological 
Science.” Journal of the Ethnological Society of London 3(1): 103 – 11.
Dewey, John. 1930. The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and 
Action. London: George Allen and Unwin.
Douglas, Mary. 1972. “Self- Evidence.” The Henry Myers Lecture. Proceedings of the 
Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, 27 – 43.
Engelke, Matthew, ed. 2009. The Objects of Evidence. London: Wiley- Blackwell and 
the Royal Anthropological Institute.
Foucault, Michel. 1983. “On the Genealogy of Ethics.” In Michel Foucault: Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics, edited by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, 
229 – 53. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Foucault, Michel. 1994. “Life: Experience and Science.” In The Essential Foucault: Se-
lections from Essential Works of Foucault, 1954 – 1984, edited by Paul Rabinow and 
Nikolas Rose, 6 – 18. New York: New Press.
Foucault, Michel. 1995. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: 
Vintage Books.
Hastrup, Kirsten. 2004. “Knowledge and Evidence in Anthropology.” Anthropological 
Theory 4(4): 455 – 72.
Lambert, Helen. 2009. “Evidentiary Truths? The Evidence of Anthropology through 
the Anthropology of Medical Evidence.” Anthropology Today 25(1): 16 – 20.
Maguire, Mark, and Pete Fussey. 2016. “Sensing Evil: Counterterrorism, Techno- 
science, and the Cultural Reproduction of Security.” Focaal 75(3): 31 – 45.
Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat. 1914. The Spirit of Laws. London: G. Bell and Son.
Rabinow, Paul. 1996. Essays on the Anthropology of Reason. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.
Rose, Nikolas. 1996. “Governing ‘Advanced’ Liberal Democracies.” In Foucault and 
236 MAGUIRE AND RAO 
Political Reason, edited by Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose, 
37 – 64. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Tambiah, Stanley J. 1990. Magic, Science, Religion, and the Scope of Rationality. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Taussig, Michael. 1993. Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses. New 
York: Routledge.
CONTRIBUTORS
CAROLINA ALONSO- BEJARANO teaches in the Latino and Caribbean Studies 
Department at Rutgers University. Her research interests lie in the intersec-
tion of decolonial feminism and migration studies, particularly as it relates to 
interethnic immigrants’ rights activism in the United States. She absolutely 
loves teaching and believes it is an important form of activism, and in her 
spare time she works as a dj in New York City.
GREGORY FELDMAN teaches in the Department of Sociology, Anthropology, 
and Criminology at the University of Windsor. His previous books include 
The Migration Apparatus: Security, Labor, and Policymaking in the European 
Union (2011) and We Are All Migrants: Political Action and the Ubiquitous 
Condition of Migrant- hood (2015).
FRANCISCO J. FERRÁNDIZ is a tenured researcher at the Spanish National Re-
search Council (csic). He received a PhD in social and cultural anthropology 
from the University of California, Berkeley. He is the author of El pasado bajo 
tierra: Exhumaciones contemporáneas de la Guerra Civil (2014), and has co-
edited (with Antonius Robben) Necropolitics: Mass Graves and Exhumations 
in the Age of Human Rights (2015).
DANIEL M. GOLDSTEIN is Professor in the Department of Anthropology at Rut-
gers University. He is the author of three monographs: The Spectacular City: 
Violence and Performance in Urban Bolivia (2004); Outlawed: Between Secu-
rity and Rights in a Bolivian City (2012); and Owners of the Sidewalk: Security 
and Survival in the Informal City (2016).
238 CONTRIBUTORS
ELIDA K. U. JACOBSEN is Senior Researcher at the Peace Research Institute 
Oslo (prio). She is also academic coordinator of the semester course in Peace 
and Conflict Studies by Oslo and Akershus University College, which takes 
place in Pondicherry, India. Her research concentrates on governance and 
local practices in India and Europe.
IEVA JUSIONYTE is Assistant Professor of Anthropology and Social Studies at 
Harvard University. Her research on statecraft, borders, crime, and security 
lies at the intersection of legal and political anthropology, and multidisci-
plinary approaches to space and terrain. She is the author of Savage Fron-
tier: Making News and Security on the Argentine Border (2015) and Threshold: 
Emergency and Rescue on the U.S.- Mexico Border (forthcoming in 2018).
MARK MAGUIRE is Dean of Maynooth University Faculty of Social Sciences. 
His research explores counterterrorism training and operations in several 
European jurisdictions. He is coeditor of The Anthropology of Security (2014) 
and of Spaces of Security (2018).
JOSEPH P. MASCO is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Chi-
cago. He is the author of The Nuclear Borderlands: The Manhattan Project in 
Post – Cold War New Mexico (2006) and The Theater of Operations: National 
Security Affect from the Cold War to the War on Terror (2014).
AMADE M’CHAREK is Professor of Anthropology of Science in the Department 
of Anthropology, University of Amsterdam. Her laboratory ethnography of 
human genetic diversity has been published with Cambridge University Press 
(2005). She is the principal investigator of the erc- consolidator RaceFaceid 
project, on face- making and race- making in forensic identification.
URSULA RAO is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Leipzig in Ger-
many. Her current research focuses on e- governance and the social conse-
quences of biometric technology in India. She has also written on Hindi and 
English journalism, urban space, and ritual theory. She is the author of News 
as Cultures: Journalistic Practices and the Remaking of Indian Leadership Tra-
ditions (2010).
ANTONIUS C. G. M. ROBBEN is Professor of Anthropology at Utrecht University. 
His books include Political Violence and Trauma in Argentina (2005) and 
Argentina Betrayed: Memory, Mourning, and Accountability (2018). His most 
recent edited volumes are Necropolitics: Mass Graves and Exhumations in 
the Age of Human Rights (2015; coedited with Francisco Ferrándiz), Death, 
CONTRIBUTORS 239
Mourning, and Burial: A Cross- Cultural Reader (2017), and A Companion to 
the Anthropology of Death (2018).
JOSEBA ZULAIKA is Professor and researcher at the Center for Basque Studies, 
University of Nevada, Reno. His books on political violence and terrorism 
include Basque Violence: Metaphor and Sacrament (1988); Terror and Taboo: 
The Follies, Fables, and Faces of Terrorism (1996; coauthored with William 
Douglass); Terrorism: The Self- Fulfilling Prophecy (2009); and That Old Bilbao 
Moon (2014).
NILS ZURAWSKI is a senior researcher and visiting professor at the Institute 
for Criminological Research at the University of Hamburg. He has published 
widely on surveillance, security, and control. He is coeditor of The Anthropol-
ogy of Security (2014) and author of the monograph Space- Control- Worldview 
(2014; published in German).
This page intentionally left blank
INDEX
affect, 17, 31, 55, 81, 118, 125, 173, 176 – 77, 
180, 183, 190 – 91, 229 – 30
Agamben, Giorgio, 1, 11, 162
algorithms, 16 – 17, 38, 144, 147
Andersson, Ruben, 96, 105
Apartheid, 7; funerary apartheid, 
124 – 25
apparatus, 4, 17, 58 – 59, 72, 132, 139, 142, 
143, 161, 176, 188, 230
Arab Spring, 89 – 91
Arizona, 12 – 13, 43 – 47, 49 – 52, 55 – 56, 
58 – 60, 61n1, 73 – 74, 76, 80
atherosclerosis, 10 – 11
Bateson, Gregory, 137, 154 – 55
biometric security, 2, 4, 9 – 14, 92 – 93, 
107n5, 163, 166, 233 – 34; in India, 
24 – 42; iris recognition, 25 – 32; and 
surveillance, 67 – 88; 91
Blake, Robert, 2
Blake, William, 210
border security, 2, 7, 9, 11 – 15, 32, 43 – 60, 
61n2, 61n3, 61n4, 61n5, 61n6, 67 – 69, 
71 – 72, 75, 82 – 83, 90 – 101, 105 – 6, 
107n1, 107n4, 163 – 64, 166, 173n1, 234; 
eurosur, 92; E-Verify, 13 – 14, 67 – 84; 
frontex, 91 – 94; Joint Operation 
Hermes, 91; Schengen, 91, 93, 163; 
Schengen Information Service (sis), 
91, 93, 163; Secure Border Initiative, 
46, 55
Bourdieu, Pierre, 58
Brown, Michael, 16, 137 – 38, 153, 154n2
Bush, George W., 181, 192, 195, 196n2, 
196n3, 196n10, 202, 211, 214, 217
Campesi, Giuseppe, 91
Canguilhem, Georges, 20n6, 34
Capa, Robert, 110 – 12
Capehart, Jonathan, 138
Cattaneo, Christina, 100 – 1, 103 – 4, 
107n10, 107n11
Cheney, Dick, 192, 196n10, 211, 220, 230
classification, 11, 26, 31, 33, 35, 37, 113, 
177, 181 – 82, 184, 186 – 89, 196n2, 196n7
Clifford, James, 5
Cold War, 7, 17, 175, 177 – 80, 184, 186, 
191, 195, 219, 221, 223
Comaroff, Jean and John, 7 – 8, 20n4, 
232; Jean, 232 – 33; John, 104
crime, 4, 7 – 8, 20n4, 79, 92, 100, 147, 
151 – 52, 171, 206, 213, 215, 217; 
242 INDEX
crime (continued) 
crime-scene analysis, 138; future, 
16, 149 – 50; data on, 20n4, 142 – 43, 
145 – 47, 149; against humanity, 15, 
113 – 15, 120 – 26, 129, 131 – 33, 219; map-
ping of, 139, 143, 148, 150, 155n3, 156n8; 
organized, 153, 164
Csordas, Thomas, 5 – 6, 229
databases, 11, 20n4, 25, 38, 72 – 73, 79, 93, 
97, 103, 163; data double, 29. See also 
statistical data
De Genova, Nicholas, 55, 67 – 68
De León, Jason, 47, 50, 69, 96
dental evidence, 15, 99 – 100; forensic 
dentistry (odontology), 100
Descartes, René, 230
dna, 10, 15, 99 – 101, 103, 107n8, 115, 
126 – 27, 130 – 31, 133, 138
Douglas, Mary, 11, 229
drones, 14, 46, 90, 92, 106, 184, 186, 194, 
202, 218 – 22
Egypt, 89
emergency responders, 13, 43 – 60, 61n1, 
61n5; firefighters, 44 – 45, 49, 51 – 52, 
54 – 57, 60, 61n3, 61n4
Engelke, Matthew, 5, 229
errors, 3, 11 – 12, 24, 28 – 29, 31, 34 – 39, 
233; failure, 3, 12, 34, 37, 59, 94, 126, 
190, 211, 220, 233 – 34; failure to enroll, 
12, 26
ethnographic methodology, 4 – 5, 7, 9, 
12 – 14, 16, 19, 45, 47, 58, 61n1, 75 – 76, 
139 – 40, 142, 145, 152, 155n2, 173n1, 
228 – 29, 234
European Commission, 92 – 93
Evans-Pritchard, E. E., 6
evil, 203, 218
families, 22; relatives, 103 – 4, 127, 
130 – 31, 188 – 89, 234; undocumented, 
74, 77, 81, 83
Fassin, Didier, 57 – 58, 147, 153
Feldman, Gregory, 4, 17, 57, 141, 162, 
173n2, 234
Ferguson, Missouri, 137 – 39, 142, 146, 
154
fingerprints, 15, 25 – 29, 36, 100, 122, 163, 
233
forensic science, 2, 9, 11, 14 – 16, 90 – 91, 
95 – 96, 99 – 106, 107n8, 110 – 15, 119 – 22, 
124, 126, 129 – 33, 231 – 34; csi effect, 
14, 16, 126, 133; exhumations, 112 – 13, 
115, 122 – 23, 125, 130
Fortes, Maximilian, 3
Foucault, Michel, 3, 10, 20n6, 34, 
139 – 43, 151, 153, 155n4, 172, 190, 
230 – 31, 233
Franco, General Francisco, 113, 124 – 25, 
128 – 29; Francoism, 126 – 27, 128 – 31
fraud, 2, 8, 11 – 12, 24 – 28, 35, 38, 189, 232; 
identity theft, 75
Frazer, James, 5, 18
Geographical Information Systems 
(gis), 16, 148, 150
Goffman, Alice, 153
Goldstein, Daniel M., 4, 20n5, 76, 140; 
Carolina Alonso-Bejarano and, 
13 – 14, 33, 231
governance, 12, 19, 27, 32, 34 – 38, 147, 
154, 155n3, 155n4, 180, 195, 231; smart 
cards, 25
Graeber, David, 170
gray zone, 162, 165, 169 – 70, 173, 161 – 62





Homeland Security, 13, 45 – 46, 57, 59, 67, 
72, 75, 181, 196n5
hospitals, 10 – 11, 31, 44 – 45, 49 – 52, 
56 – 57, 59, 61n6, 101 – 2
INDEX 243
human rights, 104, 115, 120 – 22, 126, 
128 – 29, 131 – 33, 215
Hussein, Saddam, 192, 194 – 95, 201, 
202 – 3, 220, 222
India, 11 – 14, 24 – 25, 27, 29, 33, 36, 38, 99, 
228, 233
inequality, 20n4, 48, 140
intelligence, 16 – 18, 116, 138, 141, 146 – 47, 
151, 161 – 62, 169 – 71, 173, 176, 184 – 85, 
190, 192, 195, 196n10, 201, 203, 220, 
224n4, 230, 234
Ingold, Tim, 10
infrastructure, 11, 14 – 15, 45 – 46, 57, 
59 – 60, 69, 90, 99 – 106, 175 – 76, 181, 
183, 190, 192
Islamic State, 1, 214; Islamic terrorism, 
216
Jusionyte, Ieva, 4, 12 – 13, 55 – 56, 58, 90, 231
kidnapping, 8, 47, 122
laboratories, 12, 99, 104 – 5, 122, 141 – 42, 
193 – 94
Lambert, Helen, 228 – 29
Latour, Bruno, 10
Libya, 89 – 90, 95, 97, 104 – 5, 107n1
lies, 16, 79, 102
Los Angeles, 138, 145 – 46
magic, 5, 8, 203, 232
Magnet, Shoshana, 32 – 33
Maguire, Mark, 4, 9 – 10, 16 – 17, 33 – 35, 
68, 232
Malinowski, Bronislaw, 5
Marcus, George E., 5 – 7, 9
Masco, Joseph P., 4, 17 – 18, 57, 176 – 78, 
180, 196n1, 202 – 3, 219, 223
medical evidence, 1, 11, 34, 44 – 45, 
48 – 50, 52, 54 – 56, 59, 60, 61n6, 112, 114
Mediterranean, 13 – 14, 90 – 92, 97 – 103
Merkel, Angela, 214
Mexico-U.S. border, 12, 43 – 46, 49 – 50, 
54 – 55, 57 – 60, 61n6, 67 – 69, 71, 82
military, 8, 12, 43, 47, 57, 104, 113, 116, 
119 – 20, 122, 124 – 25, 131, 139, 176 – 80, 
182, 184, 186, 191, 194 – 95, 219 – 22, 
230 – 31; counterinsurgency, 139, 




Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, 230
Nash, June, 6
Nazi Germany, 112
negative space archive, 12, 35
neoliberalism, 26, 58, 83, 133, 141, 173
New Jersey, 67 – 84
Obama, Barack, 72, 180 – 81, 186, 196n4, 
197n12, 214, 218, 222
paramedics, 43 – 60
passports, 12, 25, 31 – 33, 49, 93, 166
photographic evidence, 25, 83n2, 101, 
110 – 12, 130
policing, 2, 4, 7 – 8, 10, 16 – 17, 32, 120 – 22, 
137 – 38, 140 – 43, 156n7, 160 – 62, 164, 
167 – 69, 215, 223, 231, 233 – 34; anthro-
pology of, 140; border, 14, 17, 46 – 47, 
55, 58, 60, 68 – 69, 71 – 72, 74, 77 – 78, 
82, 84n6, 91, 100, 103; Border Patrol, 
13, 44 – 60, 61n2, 61n3, 61n4, 68, 71; 
community, 147, 151, 153; Europol, 
91; predictive, 16 – 17, 138 – 39, 143 – 47, 
153 – 54, 155n3
policy, 1, 4, 12, 67, 141, 161, 169 – 71; im-
migration policy, 70 – 72, 74, 82, 84n6, 
90, 91, 94, 97, 102, 105; public policy, 
4, 219; security policy, 67 – 68, 125, 177, 
182 – 83, 190, 195, 196n2, 205, 218
post-truth, 1, 2




prison, 34, 58, 154, 190, 217; Guantá-
namo Bay, 204 – 7, 210; prisoners, 11, 
17, 116, 119 – 21, 182, 190, 207, 210 – 12, 
214, 217, 231
profiling, 16, 52, 93, 99 – 100, 139, 156n8, 
211
Rabinow, Paul, 6, 19n1, 24, 34, 231
Rao, Ursula, 4, 11, 26, 32, 36 – 37, 99,  
106; Elida K. U. Jacobsen and, 12 – 13, 
25
Red Cross (International), 103, 130;  
Red Cross (Mexico), 44
refugees, 68, 89 – 92, 94, 96, 98, 100, 106, 
106n1, 113; refugee camps, 96, 106n1; 
refugee crisis, 105
Robben, Antonius C. G. M., 4, 15 – 16, 
100, 115, 118
Rose, Nikolas, 156n9, 231
Rove, Karl, 2
Rumsfeld, Donald, 211
science fiction, 147, 222
secrecy, 17 – 18, 175 – 96, 202, 219
securitization, 13, 44, 47 – 50, 68, 83;  
(in)securitization, 19, 231 – 32
Solzhenit syn, Aleksandr, 6
South Africa, 2, 7 – 8
Soviet Union, 6, 112, 177 – 80, 186, 190, 
218
Spanish Civil War, 110, 124
statistical data, 16, 37, 46, 73, 97, 126, 139, 
142 – 43, 149, 163, 190; Big Data, 147, 
155n3. See also databases
Stocking, George W., 5
Strathern, Marilyn, 5
surveillance, 14, 26 – 27, 32 – 33, 38, 
45 – 46, 55, 68, 70 – 71, 90 – 94,  
107n5, 140, 151, 154, 156n7, 159,  
163 – 72, 182, 189 – 90; surveillance 
studies, 26
Syria, 92, 97, 105
taboo, 11, 207, 218, 221 – 22
Taussig, Michael, 15, 124, 233
technoscience, 11 – 12, 14, 16, 232, 233
terrorism, 45, 201, 203 – 4, 214 – 19, 
223 – 34; counterterrorism, 2, 4, 10, 
182 – 83, 196n2; 211 – 12, 219, 232, 234
Thucydides, 2
torture, 11, 16 – 18, 114, 118 – 19, 132, 214, 
231
totalitarianism, 7, 14 – 15; dictatorships, 
113 – 14, 124 – 26, 128
Trump, Donald, 3
truth telling, 11, 34
Tunisia, 90, 95, 97 – 98, 101, 107n9
Turkey, 94 – 95, 140, 212
uncertainty, 1, 7, 10, 19n1, 81, 83, 114,  
167
undocumented migrants, 13, 26, 27, 45, 
47, 51 – 53, 60, 61n5, 61n6, 61n8, 67 – 83, 
83n1, 84n7, 84n8; deportation, 44, 
52, 69 – 72, 75, 78 – 79, 81 – 83, 84n6, 97; 
illegal immigrants, 11 – 13, 26, 31, 33, 
43 – 44, 52 – 53, 55 – 56, 60, 68, 71, 77, 91, 
96, 102, 160 – 61, 165, 171, 231, 234
Unique Identity (uid), 11, 24 – 25, 29
United Kingdom, 3, 32, 107n8, 114, 
139 – 40, 147 – 51, 156n7, 178, 195, 228
Vietnam, 20n2; Vietnam War 2, 43, 
112, 187
violence, 2, 8, 13, 45, 47 – 48, 55, 55 – 59, 
90, 124, 132, 138, 140, 146, 151, 153, 186, 
216, 221, 224; structural violence, 31, 
153
visual security, 10 – 12, 27, 39, 139,  
142 – 43
Wacquant, Loïc, 58
war on drugs, 45, 55; drug trafficking, 
13, 17, 46 – 48, 53, 59, 96, 167, 172,  
173n1
war on terror, 11, 17 – 18, 57, 68, 180, 182, 
INDEX 245
186, 195, 201, 203, 215, 217 – 18, 223,  
234
weapons of mass destruction (wmd), 
180, 184, 191 – 92, 201 – 2, 220 – 21
welfare, 11, 25 – 26, 33, 36, 38, 58; welfare 
state, 26, 226, 231
witchcraft, 203, 205
witnessing, 6 – 7, 44, 51, 54, 94, 107n3, 
112, 117, 119 – 20, 122, 138, 169, 172, 184, 
228
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 18
White House, 2, 3, 191
workplaces, 13 – 14, 69 – 72, 79, 82
Žižek, Slavoj, 206, 208, 221, 224
Zulaika, Joseba, 4, 17 – 18, 186, 216
This page intentionally left blank
This page intentionally left blank
This page intentionally left blank
This page intentionally left blank
This page intentionally left blank
